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Abstract
Forests in developing countries have the potential to contribute to global efforts to
mitigate climate change, promote biodiversity and support the livelihoods of rural, local
people. Approximately one-fourth of such forests are under the control of local
communities, which primarily manage forests for subsistence and to meet their livelihood
needs. The trend of bottom-up community control is increasing through the adoption of
decentralization reforms over the last 40 years. In contrast, the United Nations has
introduced the top-down program, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD+) for the conservation and enhancement of forest carbon and the
sustainable management of forest in developing countries. REDD+ incentivizes forestmanaging communities to sequester carbon and reduce emissions. REDD+ has created
hope for managing forests to mitigate climate change and has created fear that the new
initiative may not be effective and may not ensure continuing forest-managing
community benefits. However, little research has been conducted to answer these
concerns. By taking nationally representative data from Nepalese community-managed
forests (“forest commons"), I bring insights into whether and how these forests can
contribute to REDD+ initiatives, particularly as they relate to carbon sequestration,
biodiversity, equity in benefit sharing and collective action.
My results indicated the highly variable carbon and biodiversity in the forest plots across
the country, depicting the availability of space for additional growth in carbon storage
and biodiversity conservation. My results also reflect the complex and varied
relationships of carbon with different indices of biodiversity at the national level, across
i

geographic and topographic regions, and in forests with varying canopy covers. Weak
positive relationships between carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation
indicate the possibility of synergies between carbon-forestry and biodiversity
conservation. I also found that the formal community forestry program (CFP) has clearly
positive impacts on biodiversity conservation and household-level equity in benefit
sharing and a negative impact on carbon sequestration at the national level. However,
disaggregated results of impacts of CFP on biodiversity, carbon and equity across
geography, topography, forest quality and social groups display mixed results i.e., either
positive or negative or neutral. I also identified that different drivers of collective action
have different (i.e., positive, neutral, and negative) associations with carbon
sequestration, which either supports or challenges established knowledge. In aggregate,
my research indicates the potential of contribution by forest commons, and specially the
CFP, to global environmental initiatives such as REDD+. It suggests that targeted,
dedicated policies and programs to increase carbon sequestration, biodiversity
conservation and foster equity and collective actions are critical. In addition, my results
also contribute to the growing literature on socio-ecological implications of forest
commons that demonstrated the need of interdisciplinary research to understand humannature relationships in the changing context.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background
1.1 Introduction to the research
Climate change is one of the contemporary, pressing and serious threats to socio-cultural
and economic wellbeing of people and environmental security of the earth. This
is interlinked with another global challenge: biodiversity loss (Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment, 2005). To address such environmental challenges and part of socioeconomic issues, the global community has put in place agreements such as the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD). These initiatives clearly recognize the importance of tropical
forests, a major terrestrial carbon sink and biodiversity hotspot, to sequester and store
carbon and conserve biodiversity (Clark et al., 2001; Mittermeier et al., 2004; Pan et
al. 2011; Parmentier et al. 2007; Philips et al. 1998).
Over a billion local forest users (those living within or in close proximity to forests)
control approximately 15.5% of global forests, and the trend of community control is
increasing as a result of decentralization reforms, particularly in tropical, developing
countries (Charnley & Poe, 2007; Larson & Soto, 2008; Rights and Resource Initiative,
2014; Sunderlin et al., 2008). Both the UNFCCC and the CBD recognize the communitycontrolled forest (“forest commons”) as a vehicle for effective forest management. In
forest commons, equity in benefit sharing constitutes an important part of motivation for
forest-managing communities, so as to manage forest commons in such a way that lead to
reduced social conflict and environmental degradation (e.g., Andersson & Agrawal,
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2011; Boyce, 1994) and increased economic and ecological outcomes (McDermott,
2009). Equity becomes more important when the international forestry programs
incentivize local forest-managing communities. For instance, equity is critical in
the United Nations Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation, conservation and enhancement of forest carbon and sustainable
management of forest in developing countries (REDD+), as it is implemented at the
community level. REDD+ values “forest” as an economic commodity i.e., carbon (Arsel
& Buscher, 2012; Mcafee, 2012). It affects historical and contemporary forms of forest
resource distribution and appropriation (e.g. Fairhead et al., 2012). Researchers and
policy makers have identified poor forest policies and communities’ institutional
practices as the most pressing cause of deforestation and forest degradation (D&D) in
tropical, developing countries (Corbera et al., 2010; Woodwell & Ullsten, 2001; World
Bank, 2004;). Beyene et al. (2013) reported that the institutional practices of forestmanaging communities are one of the most important determinants of carbon
sequestration.
Scientists, policy makers and practitioners have identified forest-based mitigation as one
of the effective options to limit climate change. However, there is an acute shortage of
empirical, evidence-based knowledge that informs practical policies, management plans
and incentive mechanisms at national and local scales. For instance, inadequate empirical
knowledge of the relationship between carbon sequestration and biodiversity
conservation in tropical forests (Midgley et al., 2010; Szwagrzyk & Gazda, 2007; Talbot,
2010; Thompson et al., 2011) raises questions about the potential contribution of
2

biodiversity conservation to carbon sequestration and vice versa, particularly in the
REDD+ agreement processes (Miles & Dickson, 2010; Secretariat of the Convention on
Biological Diversity [SCBD], 2011). Accurate and precise knowledge of the relationship
between carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation improves understanding of
the effects of forest management activities on carbon storage and ecosystem functioning
(Woodall et al., 2011) and promotes biodiversity conservation and carbon storage
simultaneously (Gardner et al., 2012; Midgley et al., 2010; Miles & Dickson, 2010;
Sharma et al., 2010; Strassburg et al., 2010).
Chhatre and Agrawal (2009) suggested that the mere implementation of forest commons
does not guarantee both carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation; rather there
could be either synergy and/or tradeoffs in achieving these two outcomes. Gautam et al.
(2002), Pandey (2015) and Thapa-Magar & Shrestha (2015) have reported the
possibilities of carbon sequestration in Nepalese community forestry, a form of formal
and popular forest commons. Acharya (2004) demonstrated the loss of biodiversity and
Shrestha et al. (2010) reported the possibilities of biodiversity gain or loss in in Nepalese
community forestry. Such inconclusive knowledge prevents forestry actors from knowing
the effectiveness of the forest commons in storing carbon and conserving biodiversity and
thereby limiting the possibility of innovative, productive management of forests.
Scientists, policy makers and practitioners are not able to resolve the issue of equity in
the forest decentralization and REDD+ development process, primarily due to inadequate
knowledge (e.g., Adhikari, 2005; Agarwal, 2001; Iversen et al., 2006; Lamichhane &
Parajuli, 2014; Mahanthy et al., 2009; Thoms, 2008). Different factors affect equity such
3

as wider societal processes (Hobley, 2007), economic and cultural power relations (Bist,
1991), power of decision-making and resource access (Persha & Anderson, 2014), and
economic growth and commercialization processes (Beck & Nesmith, 2001). However,
empirical knowledge about the implications of such factors in equity is highly contextual
and not sufficient.
Studies have identified inconclusive and conflicting results about the implications of
decentralization policies and institutions on local socio-ecological systems, including
collective actions and carbon sequestration. One challenge is due to different disciplinary
understandings1 of institutional practices (e.g., Durkheim, 1995; Mauss, 1969; Pareto,
1935; Trent et al., 2003) that implant confusion and contradiction among scientists,
hindering their ability to make adequate theoretical and empirical advances. The debates
regarding the potential contribution of decentralized forestry in REDD+ indicates the
need for interdisciplinary research. Empirical studies with better and smarter socioecological data combined with robust analytical techniques are needed to conclusively
evaluate linkages of policies and institutions of forest commons with biodiversity
conservation and carbon sequestration (e.g. Beyene et al., 2013). For instance, panel
socio-ecological data and the analysis that controls the effects of confounding variables
or endogeneity would be helpful in this regard.

1

Different academic disciplines interpret institutional analysis differently such as (i) economists refer to it

as ways of thinking that have a direct impact on behaviors (Pareto, 1935); (ii) sociologists refer to it as the
laws or the family evolve over time (Durkheim, 1995); (iii) anthropologists refer to it as the identification
of hidden forms of power that institute behaviors and organizational procedures (Mauss, 1969); and (iv)
public governance experts refer to it as implementing policies (Trent et al., 2003).
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My research adds critical knowledge on how forest commons function to yield ecological
and socio-economic outcomes and contribute to climate change mitigation. I assessed the
ecological, socio-economic and institutional dynamics of Nepalese forest commons that
are critical to make REDD+ effective. I used survey and perceptions data of nationally
representative random samples of 130 forest commons (both forest and communities) and
1300 households (10 in each community) in Nepal. Nepalese forest commons offer a
unique learning ground to bring wide ranges of socio-economic and ecological issues into
the analysis, as Nepal hosts a wide range of geographic locations, climatic patterns, forest
types, socio-cultural practices, economic statuses, and policy and institutional provisions.
Also, Nepal provides a long history of forest commons including approximately 40 years
of formal decentralization efforts, where > 42% of the country’s population is directly
engaged in the management of forest commons (Department of Forest [DoF], 2015).
I assessed the relationship between carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation in
forest commons. Identifying this relationship helps increase understanding of the
potential synergy and/or tradeoff between REDD+ and CDB initiatives, and therefore
provides guidance to policy makers and forest commons managers. I also examined the
effectiveness of formal community forestry on carbon sequestration and biodiversity
conservation by using a robust analytical method - a quasi-experimental, matching
method. I specifically answered the following questions: Does community forestry
increase plant species diversity and carbon storage in the community forests, and if so, to
what extent? I identified the answers for such questions for the national level and across
geographic regions and forest qualities.
5

I also examined the impact of formal community forestry on equity in benefit sharing at
the household level using a robust matching method. I identified such impacts for the
overall national level and across social groups and geographic regions. In addition, I
examined the relationships between collective action drivers and carbon sequestration.
By using a multivariate regression analysis, I identified the key collective action drivers
and examined their potential associations with carbon sequestration. Finally, I discussed
the results in view of scientific understanding of ecological and socio-economic aspects
of forest commons and their potential implications for policies and programs, and in
particular, the REDD+ initiative.
The dissertation is organized in 6 Chapters as follows: Chapter One provides a broader
context for the research, particularly in relation to climate change negotiation, role of
forests in climate change mitigation, REDD+ initiatives, forest commons, Nepal as
research site, and the research objectives. Chapter Two investigates the relationship
between carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation (paper 1). Chapter Three
examines the effectiveness of formal community forestry programs on carbon
sequestration and biodiversity conservation (paper 2). Chapter Four examines the
effectiveness of formal community forestry programs on household level equity in
benefit sharing (paper 3). Chapter Five explores and examines the collective action
drivers in relation to their association with carbon sequestration (paper 4). Finally,
Chapter Six outlines the overall synthesis of the research.
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1.2 Climate change negotiation and issues
Climate change has been one of the most complex, uncertain, pressing and serious
contemporary threats to the socio-cultural and economic wellbeing of people and
environmental security of the earth. A rapid and dramatic change in the world’s climatic
parameters, temperature and precipitation, has occurred since the industrial revolution.
Recent decades have been the hottest throughout history, and precipitation has become
more unpredictable. A range of human activities such as the use of fossil fuels, change in
land use, increase in industrialization, and modernization in agriculture and livestock
farming that emit greenhouse gases (GHGs) have caused increased global warming,
resulting into unprecedented climate change (UNFCCC, 2007a).
The global community has promoted climate change negotiation as the top, mainstream
political agenda at the international level, particularly through the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. The UNFCCC has
recently agreed to the stabilization of the global atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) level
at 450 parts per million and limiting temperature increases, relative to the pre-industrial
period, to below 20C as guiding targets to reduce climate change risks, impacts and
damages (Mein-shausen et al., 2009; Pachauri, 2007; UNFCCC, 2015). It has agreed on a
range of major strategic and cross-national collaborative actions on mitigation,
adaptation, financing, technology development and capacity building to combat climate
change.
Reducing climate change risks through cross-national collaborations demands
consideration of crucial social processes, in which different actors with often diverse and
7

conflicting interests interact and coordinate at different levels (UNFCCC, 2007a). Actors’
interests diverge and conflict partly due to the inequalities in carbon footprints and longterm differential impacts of climate change across countries. Divergent and conflicting
interests result in challenges to framing climate change and to devising ways to address
it. The debates about causes, consequences, timing, trajectory and remedies of climate
change continue at different levels (Cammack, 2007). There are inadequate effective
public discussions about climate change remedies (Giddens, 2008) and the outcomes of
negotiations have rather slowly been trickling down to national and local levels. As yet
there are no adequate substantive policy and action frameworks to offer a coherent and
consistent path to cope with the long-term challenges of climate change. Climate change
remains one of the most difficult issues to manage (Dessler & Parson, 2006), despite
[isolated] efforts of different actors (Cammack, 2007).
One of the major challenges in finding appropriate solutions to climate change is
knowledge gaps in understanding the dynamic relationships among science, economy,
society, culture and practices at global, national and local scales. To fill such knowledge
gaps, actors such as scholars, policy makers, planners, technologists, financial experts,
and development specialists have chosen science to be the important agenda setter for
climate change negotiations. Consequently, climate sciences and global discourses have
become key in rendering climate governable (Tanner & Allouche, 2011; Webb, 2011)
i.e., recognizing climate as a domain of problem and turning it into a coherent, technical
and manageable object of governance that is amenable for regulation and interventions
through technical expertise and management (Lovbrand & Stripple, 2011).
8

The roles of scientific expertise in climate change negotiations are being contested
(Lovbrand, 2014). A distinct and independent international body, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) emerged to contribute to climate negotiations through
the UNFCCC processes. The IPCC consists of internationally accepted principles, norms
and decision-making procedures and engages a large network of scientists, experts and
governments for assessing, producing, synthesizing, evaluating and legitimizing expert
knowledge on climate change (Biermann, 2002). However, some actors have raised
concerns of legitimacy and credibility of the IPCC, particularly relating to developing
countries’ distrust in the cognitive and normative homogeneity of dominant epistemic
communities,2 (Lahsen, 2004) and have raised questions about whether the processes it
follows are fair, inclusive and unpartisan (Mitchell et al., 2006). Considering the welldocumented disparity in the production of science among developed countries (Karlsson
et al., 2007), IPCC has been criticized for feeding northern research agendas and norms
into global decision-making while neglecting the environmental concerns of the
developing countries (Jasanoff & Martello, 2004). The preference of, and reliance on,
scientific knowledge limits the role of indigenous knowledge (Hiraldo & Tanner, 2011)
within developing countries in the climate negotiation process. The experts’ ability to
deliver available information in a useful format has also been debated as the facts,
theories, models and causal beliefs they share are questioned. The concerns related to
legitimacy and credibility of the IPCC may create gaps leading to impractical policies

2

Epistemic community is a network of knowledge-based experts with recognized expertise and

competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that
domain or issue-area.
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such as resource and technology transfer to developing countries without proper
understanding of their resource base, governance, and socio-cultural values and practices.
The dominant voices in the international climate negotiations and debates are coming
from the industrialized countries, particularly those of scientists, international policymakers, intellectual elites and influential international [environmental] organizations.
This is particularly true as international and domestic playing fields and players are not
even (Kakonen et al., 2014). The lack of economic power and international political
influence of developing countries significantly constrains their opportunities and
capacities to contribute to shaping global climate governance (Dryzek & Stevenson,
2011). Developing countries are not able to bring innovations to international
deliberations due to their limited capacity and differences in socio-cultural values in
relation to the more formal institutional culture of international negotiation processes.
Rather, developing countries adopt donor-driven climate change policy narratives, draw
on science-dominated expert knowledge to which they have limited access, and interpret
climate change as an easily governable issue (Kakonen et al., 2014).
International environmental negotiations continue to be riddled with controversies
regarding the fair distribution of costs, resources and responsibilities (Prost & Camprubi,
2012). The efforts to address climate change could be a threat multiplier if less attention
is given to the issue of discriminatory and exploitative power relations and social
inequalities that exist at international, national and local scales. This is particularly true in
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the context of elite capture3 of resources, resource constraints, conflicts and poor
governance that exacerbate existing inequalities and drive those with poor adaptive
capacity into deeper conditions of vulnerability to shocks and stresses (Polack, 2008).
1.3 Climate change mitigation strategy and forest management
Climate change mitigation primarily identifies and adopts sustainable paths of emissions,
which can be achieved through switching to low-carbon energy sources (e.g., renewable
and nuclear energy) and expanding carbon sinks (e.g., forests and others) (UNFCCC,
2007b). A wide range of actions that reduce or prevent GHG emissions have been
identified such as using new technologies and renewable energies, making older
equipment more energy efficient, changing management practices or consumer behavior,
conserving and managing forests, reducing waste and inefficiency, and adopting laborintensive activities (UNFCCC, 2007a). Some of these mitigation actions, including
forest-based actions, possess the “public good”4 nature and demand collective actions for
proper management (UNFCCC, 2007b). Reforms in regulatory, economic, and
technological aspects and capacity building can facilitate collective action. Regulatory
reform includes formation and enforcement of policies and institutions. Economic
measures create incentives, and technological innovations offer more efficient and

3

Elite capture is a situation when resources (e.g., economic, political, educational) transferred for the

benefit of the larger population are usurped by a few individuals of superior status.
4

A public good is non-excludable and non-rivalrous. They are subject to excessive use resulting in negative

externalities. Such externalities are often closely related to the "free-rider" problem. Therefore, such goods
may be under-produced, overused or degraded. However, they can be better managed by converting them
into other types of goods such as club good, private good and/or common good by introducing proper
policy, institution and/or incentive.
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effective means of production. Capacity building offers knowledge and skill in adopting
climate-friendly actions.
Forests can be both carbon sinks and sources (Dixon et al., 1994) and therefore have
implications for climate change mitigation. They reduce ambient CO2 levels by
sequestering atmospheric carbon into biomass through photosynthesis. Forest
management measures may sequester atmospheric carbon and improve forest ecosystem
productivity. Forests also sequester soil organic carbon (Brown & Pearce, 1994) through
the process of biomass decomposition and therefore reduce emissions. An estimated total
of 638 Gigaton of carbon is stored in global forests in 2005 (UNFCCC, 2011). About
80% of carbon is stored above ground (Kirschbaum, 1996; Saatchi et al., 2011), despite
the effects of fragmentation, deforestation and forest degradation (D&D) (Scheller &
Mladenoff, 2008). Old growth forests can continue to be a net sink of carbon (Luyssaert
et al., 2008). Most forests have the potential to become old growth and store carbon
(Harmon, 2001). Due to active management and recovery from past disturbances,
temperate and boreal forests are net sinks of carbon (Dixon et al., 1994a).
Land-use change contributes 17.4% of global anthropogenic emissions, particularly CO2
– the most abundant GHG (IPCC, 2007). The emissions from land use change continue to
escalate and its global dynamics and regulations are inadequately understood (Houghton
et al., 1992). The dynamics of terrestrial carbon flux is influenced by several factors such
as vegetation succession (Harmon, 2001), photosynthesis (Collatz et al., 1991),
ecosystem respiration (Parton et al., 1993; Ryan, 1991), disturbances (Crutzen &
Andreae, 1990), erosion (Stallard, 1998), herbivory (McNaughton et al., 1989) and
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biomass removal (Houngton & Hackler, 2000). Land use change usually results from a
combination of proximate factors, underlying causes and other factors involving
individuals, community groups, corporations, government agencies and development
projects (Geist & Lambin, 2002). Proximate causes include land-use change for
agriculture, logging and infrastructure development that directly remove forest cover.
Underlying causes include economic, policy, institutional, technological, cultural and
demographic factors that influence land-use decisions (Trexler & Haugen, 1995) but are
beyond the control of deforestation agents. Other factors include environmental factors,
biophysical drivers and social trigger events.
Almost all forest-based emissions are reported either from burning or from
decomposition of above-ground biomass in tropical countries where D&D is prevalent.
Much of the deforested area is converted into low carbon intensive new agriculture or
pasture lands, which often replace degraded agricultural lands that may or may not be
capable of supporting tree cover for carbon sequestration (Brown, 1993; Dale et al.,
1993). Forest degradation that occurs through damage to residual trees and soil from poor
logging practices, log poaching, fuelwood collection, overgrazing, and anthropogenic fire
also results in a significant loss of biomass carbon (Brown et al., 1991; Food and
Agriculture Organization [FAO], 1993; Flint & Richards, 1994; Goldammer, 1990).
Scientists and environmental organizations have put forward several arguments with
empirical and/or logical supports either to include or to exclude forest in the climate
change mitigation program. Including forest in a mitigation program can be advantageous
from both environmental and socio-economic perspectives. Forests can significantly
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reduce emissions, remove CO2 from the atmosphere, improve soil quality and increase
biodiversity (Batjes & Sombroek, 1997). Several studies have indicated that D&D is
marginally profitable, therefore the forest-based mitigation program could be one of the
cheapest options in climate policy (Kindermann et al., 2008; McKinsey & Company,
2009; Stern, 2006). Forest management has the potential to reduce emissions quickly
with policy and institutional reform as shown in the case of forest decentralization, and it
may not require expensive and time-taking technological innovations (Angelsen &
Atmadja, 2008). Forests are equally important to achieve socio-economic co-benefits
(e.g., McDowell, 2002; Sombroek et al., 1993), including conservation of ecosystem
services and biodiversity, and reduction of poverty.
Future forest carbon cycling trends could be attributable to uncertain losses and regrowth
associated with global climate and land-use change. Management of forests merits
consideration in climate change mitigation strategies. If managed properly, forests have
the potential to: (i) lessen carbon emissions by protecting and conserving the carbon
pools in existing forests; (ii) create carbon sinks by expanding carbon storage capacities,
increasing the area and/or carbon density of native forests, plantations and agroforests,
and by increasing the total pool of wood products; and (iii) substitute fossil fuels with
fuelwood from sustainably managed forests, short-lived wood products with long-lived
wood products, and energy-expensive materials with wood (Dixon et al., 1991; Grainger,
1988; IPCC, 1992; Nilsson & Schopfhauser, 1995; Trexler & Haugen 1995; Winjum et
al., 1992a, 1992b).
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Global efforts to stabilize the concentration of GHGs <450 ppm in the atmosphere could
practically be impossible without including forests in mitigation strategies. Therefore,
after long deliberations on potential pros and cons, the UNFCCC decided to include
forest management in its climate change mitigation program. Consequently, the
UNFCCC developed the REDD+ program. REDD+ placed forests squarely within
climate change mitigation options and made forests governable in a new way by framing
them as crucial carbon stocks. An increasing number of tropical countries now perceive
REDD+ as a potential solution and source of funding to fight against the persistent
problems of D&D, biodiversity loss and poverty, and they are therefore engaged in
REDD+.
1.4 REDD+ features, opportunities and issues
The UNFCCC developed the REDD+ program to incentivize the contributions of
tropical, developing countries to reducing emissions from D&D and conservation and
enhancement of carbon through sustainable management of forests. The idea behind
REDD+ is to encourage forest management by financing forestry activities to maintain
existing, and/or generate additional, carbon stocks (Kanowski et al., 2011). It would
involve billions of dollars, perhaps significantly greater than that currently available for
biodiversity conservation, to improve forest management (Eliasch, 2008). Such finances
are available to carry out different activities that reduce D&D, conserve and enhance
forest carbon, and manage forests sustainably.
Several globally-developed, sophisticated and science-based requirements and standards
such as ensuring additionality, controlling leakages, maintaining permanence, and
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ensuring social and environmental safeguards are introduced to make REDD+ a
successful program at national and local levels. The concept of additionality emphasizes
crediting only real emission reductions caused due to the REDD+ program. Controlling
leakage means trees saved within the REDD+ project area or country do not lead to more
trees being harvested elsewhere. The idea of permanence demonstrates that any tree
saved now and credited for carbon sequestration will not be felled for a specified number
of years. Social safeguards are primarily introduced to respect national sovereignty of
participating countries in governing and managing forest resources and to ensure the
forest rights of, and distribute the payments equitably to, forest dependent poor,
vulnerable, marginalized, and/or indigenous peoples. Environmental safeguards demand
maintaining ecological integrity and conserving forest biodiversity in line with the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and other national policies. Several
transparent, scientific and reliable monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems
are visualized to help monitor the extent and level of REDD+ achievements by estimating
accurate forest carbon stocks (Maniatis et al., 2011; Miles & Dickson, 2010) and
assessing the status of safeguards.
REDD+ is accepted as a cheaper, quicker, significant and win-win strategy to halt landuse changes, reduce D&D and increase carbon sequestration (Angelsen & Atmadja 2008;
Toni 2011). It would include significantly larger forest area than the area currently
receiving conservation efforts (Harvey et al., 2010). It has potential to deliver enormous
benefits for carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation through the protection of
species-diverse forests (Gardner et al., 2012; Harvey et al., 2010).
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REDD+ is seen as a unique opportunity to foster collaboration between developed and
developing countries to address global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity
loss and poverty, simultaneously. It allows developed countries opportunity and
flexibility to adopt emission offset options. It increases unconventional forestry
investment in developing countries (Eliasch, 2008). Such investments may bring myriad
opportunities to improve forest governance and bolster global conservation efforts
(Wollenberg & Springate-Baginski, 2010), promote low carbon paths to development,
generate livelihoods, and fight against persistent problems of poverty. REDD+ may
provide an opportunity for local communities to revisit existing policies, institutions and
practices of forest commons, so as to make them more effective, efficient and equitable.
It also provides developing countries an opportunity to contribute to climate change
mitigation, which otherwise, particularly in the Kyoto protocol, was not visualized.
Social and environmental safeguards of REDD+ have generated considerable hope in the
UNFCCC and CBD processes (CBD, 2011), and among conservation science
communities (e.g. Busch et al., 2011; Harvey et al., 2010; Stickler et al., 2009; Strassburg
et al., 2009). The UNFCCC considered three principles, including “do no harm” to
natural forests, maintain long-term ecological integrity of forests, and secure net-positive
impacts for biodiversity, in the environmental safeguards development process (CBD,
2010). “Do no harm” intends to reduce the risk of conversion of natural forests and the
displacement (leakage) of D&D to areas of lower carbon but high biodiversity value.
Ecological integrity, by taking lessons from landscape ecology and the ecosystem
approach (Gardner et al., 2009), aim to ensure the permanence of forest carbon stocks
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and functional significance of biodiversity (Diaz et al., 2009; Thompson et al., 2009).
Positive biodiversity aims for achieving economies of scale and delivering additional
benefits for biodiversity (Miles & Kapos, 2008).
REDD+ may add to the tensions related to the climate finance (e.g. Gupta, 2009;
Stadelmann et al., 2010). Several design-related issues such as fitting REDD+ within the
overall UNFCCC processes, developing financing approaches (e.g., voluntary market,
compliance market or fund-based) and choosing crediting baselines for financing (e.g.,
input-based approach or performance-based approach) are still unresolved. Concerns may
be raised that if forest-based offset becomes cheaper and fungible with clean technology,
carbon markets may be distorted negatively affecting the development of clean
technology. For example, Bosetti et al., (2011) showed that REDD+ may reduce
investments in cleaner energy technologies over the next four decades by a maximum of
10%.
Scholars have pointed out that REDD+ may undermine the overall value of the forest.
For instance, REDD+ tends to overemphasize forests as “carbon sinks,” and that can lead
to adverse effects to existing multi-purpose forest management practices of communities
(Caplow et al., 2011). It may overlook livelihood-related outcomes for local communities
(Campbell 2009; Coomes et al., 2008; Putz & Redford, 2009) and gradually alienate local
people from resource access in the future (Phelps et al., 2010b). However, Karsenty &
Ongolo (2012) argued that concern about the marginalization of forest communities
appears to be unjustified in many countries where the capacity of the state is limited by
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various crisis-linked situations (e.g., post-conflict, institutional instability and ethnic
tensions).
Different scholars have explicitly indicated that REDD+ may not be beneficial or rather
may be harmful in certain ways. The trade-offs between local livelihoods, biodiversity
conservation and carbon sequestration caused by REDD+ are highly uncertain (Corbera
& Brown, 2010; Hiraldo & Tanner, 2011). REDD+ is not going to necessarily help local
community-managed forests (Ostrom, 2010). For instance, REDD+ has now created the
notion of “global forests,” moving local forests away from their local physical and
cultural contexts and integrating them with global carbon markets and strong governance
(Eliasch, 2008).
On the basis of knowledge drawn from historical forest management practices,
particularly the creation of protected areas that alienate local people from resources
(Cernea & Schmidt-Soltau, 2006), different challenges and issues are brought into
attention while developing the REDD+ program. Some of these issues are related to (i)
defining and meeting requirements and standards of REDD+ at the local level; (ii)
defining and ensuring ownership and tenure security of forestland, forest resources and
carbon; (iii) enhancing capacity of the forestry actors; (iv) transforming and balancing de
jure and de facto power relations of actors; (v) maximizing carbon sequestration while
meeting immediate forest product needs; and (vi) maintaining equity and justice in
benefit sharing. Reflecting from different REDD+ pilot projects, scholars have indicated
issues related to the governance of forests. For instance, Peskett et al. (2011) and
Thompson et al. (2011) indicated that REDD+ does not fully acknowledge the links
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among political, economic, technical, ecological, and social issues in governing tropical
forests. Rather, it would destabilize forest governance (Bluffstone et al., 2013) and
exacerbate the persistent efforts of governments and corporations to exert increasing
control over forests, leading to reverses in recent trends of forest devolution, thereby
reducing community autonomy and wellbeing (Lovera, 2009; Phelps et al., 2010b).
Khatri (2012) and Ratsimbazafy et al. (2011) indicated the possibility of subtle
recentralization of forest governance power by the state forest authority and negative
implication for forest-dependent poor from REDD+.
Taking the case of a REDD+ pilot project in Nepal, Paudel et al. (2011) and Upreti et al.
(2011) showed that REDD+ may either reinforce existing conflicts or induce new ones in
the management of forest commons. They also reported concerns related to implementing
REDD+ standards and monitoring carbon sequestration and emissions from the forest
commons. Particularly, the emergence of new functions and agencies in carbon
monitoring may affect motivation, commitment, action and power dynamics of
communities in forest management. Compounding these issues with the social
heterogeneity and discriminatory power relations among community members may result
in inequity in benefit sharing. These dynamics affect the overall processes and outcomes
on forest commons and REDD+ in the long run.
REDD+ involves contextualization, complexity and uncertainty that may lead to both
tradeoffs and synergies in the outcomes. Major parts of complexities and uncertainty are
contingent on several factors, including viewing the forest as different resources (e.g.,
carbon reservoir, natural resource and home for different species and/or people),
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designing REDD+ features, and formulating policies and institutions at local, national
and international levels. Scholars have further identified a range of factors to make
REDD+ a successful program. For instance, Luintel et al. (2013) identified that
availability of capable human resources at national and grassroots levels is crucial; Cotula
and Mayers (2009) highlighted that effective governance, clear property rights and secure
tenure of forests are pre-requisites; and Agrawal et al. (2011) recommended the
collaborative efforts and use of lessons from past forestry, agriculture, biodiversity and
development policies. In addition, robust forest and emission databases, proper policy
framework and institutional set up, and co-benefits are crucial factors for the success of
REDD+. Allowing flexibility in designing REDD+ projects at different levels (e.g.,
national, project and nested levels) is crucial for effective, efficient and equitable
outcomes. Effectiveness demonstrates the level of emissions reductions against the plan.
Efficiency shows the cost of emission reductions. Equity highlights whether benefits and
costs are distributed fairly among forest managing communities.
1.5 Forest commons features, outcomes and issues
Ostrom (1990) reviewed age-old customary practices and local institutions, and
theoretically and empirically demonstrated the great potential of local communities to
manage forest commons sustainably. Over a billion people are using approximately 18%
of forests globally (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009; Dietz & Henry, 2008; White & Martin
2002), among which approximately 15.5% are under the control of communities (Rights
and Resources Initiatives [RRI], 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2008). Community-controlled
forests (“forest commons”) have a wide range of crucial features that make them unique
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and successful in achieving developmental goals, at least at the local level. They
represent forests that are held in common and owned collectively or by the state or a legal
entity but not privately. They are physically accessible to all members of a community
and therefore likely to be under the most pressure from land use change. Ranges of legal
and customary forest commons with locally acceptable access, use and management
practices are present worldwide. Such forest commons are variously named community
forestry, collaborative forest management, joint forest management, leasehold forestry,
participatory forestry, buffer zone forestry, social forestry, and village forestry. Despite
the difference in name, they primarily embrace the basic idea of engaging local
communities in the management of forest resources, albeit different forms and degrees.
These models of forest commons translate into the practice based on either legal or
customary rules.
Forest commons primarily builds on traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) and bottomup planning approach. As TEK is derived from socially different groups of people based
on age, sex, caste, ethnicity, education, regions of settlement and occupation (Spoon,
2011), forest commons may benefit from wide range of knowledge held in common.
Environmental problems, such as tragedy of commons, may not be avoided through
conventional approaches such as by state/external control or by market but could be
addressed by developing local common property institutions in certain conditions
(Ostrom, 1990), indicating the importance of TEK in conservation. Even simple TEK
about plant and animal include knowledge about their habitats and therefore provide clue
to understand overall ecosystem and to address complex conservation problems (Lee,
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1993). TEK is helpful to increase the diversity of ecological and cultural capitals upon
which local people can draw environmental resources for their livelihoods even in the
time of unanticipated change (Berkes & Folke 1994; Turner et al., 2003). It is extremely
important in managing ecological systems while improving productivity through semidomestication, domestication, cultivation, controlled firing, mulch preparation and
reforestation (Posey, 2008 [1985]). It has also been important for understanding
ecological hazards, reducing disaster risk, mitigating vulnerability (Lauer, 2012).
The objective of forest commons management is to supply tangible products and
functional services needed for consumptive and non-consumptive uses at the local scale.
The local communities are the primary stakeholders for the management and use of forest
commons. They are better suited to, and therefore do, develop the forest management
plan and locally-suitable criteria, indicators and standards for assessing ecological and
socio-economic impacts of forest management. They use national forest management and
biodiversity conservation frameworks as references to design and execute forest
management plans and monitor activities at the local scale. They possess rights to govern,
manage and use forest resources and to access management services as and when needed.
The role of government forestry institutions is primarily confined to policy formulation,
technical support, capacity building, and monitoring. The communities enjoy all or part
of benefits derived from forests on the basis of legal and/or customary arrangements.
Resource and cost sharing mechanisms and processes are normally prepared considering
several factors such as legal provisions, community needs, resource condition and
availability, and historical practices.
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The formal decentralization of forest commons is becoming a more popular, dominant
strategy for conservation of biodiversity, reduction of D&D, enhancement of local
livelihoods and democratization of the forestry sector in developing countries (Brown et
al., 2002; Johannes, 2002; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Nurse & Malla, 2006). The trend of
forest decentralization is increasing (RRI, 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2008). Governments
transfer forest rights to forest-managing communities through decentralization policy
reforms in tropical, developing countries (Charnley & Poe, 2007; Larson & Soto, 2008;
Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). Forest rights can be differentiated into access, withdrawal,
management, exclusion and alienation rights (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). Often these
rights are defined nationally and locally considering the forest conditions, national forest
management priorities and community needs. The formal forest commons are associated
with democratization of resource access, poverty alleviation, and forest resource
sustainability (Pulhin, 2000). They also attract funding support from international nongovernmental organizations (FAO, 1993; Sharma & Rowe, 1992).
Forest commons have been instrumental to gaining multiple outcomes from forests
(Chazdon, 2008; Nepstad et al., 2006; Ranganathan et al., 2008). They provide key forest
products to well over a billion people (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009; Dietz & Henry, 2008)
and livelihood benefits to more than half a billion poor people in the world (Eliasch,
2008; World Bank, 2004). They offer the best prospect for environmental sustainability,
particularly through revitalization of degraded forest ecosystems, sustainable
management of forest resources, poverty reduction, inclusion of poor and marginalized
people, promotion of community development and institutional strengthening in rural
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areas (Chapagain & Banjade, 2009; Gautam et al., 2002; Kanel, 2004; Luintel et al.,
2009; Luintel, 2006; Mahat, 2009; Pokharel et al., 2007; Yadav et al., 2003). They spread
over large areas and offer opportunities to support carbon sequestration and biodiversity
conservation beyond the remotely located conventional conservation areas. They provide
space to improve the relationships between different groups of people in the community.
For instance, local communities organized in community forestry in Nepal have been
able to transform the hegemonic, discriminatory and unjust forest-based social relations
to some extent (Luintel et al., 2009; Pokharel et al., 2007). Such communities have been
largely practicing good forest governance (Pokharel et al., 2007).
Forest commons conserve, manage and sequester carbon by slowing D&D, increasing
forest area and/or carbon density, promoting plantations and agroforestry, and increasing
the transfer of biomass carbon into products (e.g., long-lived wood products and biofuels
that can be used instead of fossil-fuel). Their governance frameworks, time-tested
institutional practices, and abilities of forest management could be effective institutional
vehicles for REDD+ implementation that sequesters carbon and achieves co-benefits at
the local level. Through the management of forest commons, local communities could be
mobilized effectively in creating awareness in adopting energy efficient technology and
expanding tree-plantations in agricultural land so as to reduce emissions and sequester
carbon. Such communities could devise locally suitable, practical methods to support
forest-dependent poor with required resources (e.g., Pokharel et al., 2006).
Different issues exist in the management of forest commons. For instance, Nepalese
community forests are managed passively (Yadav et al., 2003). Inequity, gender
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discrimination and elite capture of resources and decision-making processes are prevalent
in forest-managing communities (Agarwal, 2001; Banjade et al., 2004; Luintel & Timsina
2007; Luintel 2006; Malla et al., 2003; Persha & Anderson, 2014). Conflicts between
different actors are increased due to ambiguity in forest property rights. The forest
property rights in Nepal are shaped by discriminatory, exploitative and unjust historical
social relations of power (Luintel & Chhetri, 2008). Bribery has been a driving factor for
forest product trade (Paudel et al., 2006). The weak enterprising capacity of forestmanaging communities compounded with inadequate policy, financial and technical
supports limits better utilization of economic opportunities derived from forest commons
(Kunwar et al., 2009). Forest-managing communities may reduce biological diversity by
favoring and/or clearing particular species (Huettner, 2012). These issues may hinder the
environmental sustainability and social harmony in the long run.
Primary objectives of forest commons and REDD+ may not be matched perfectly. They
may either conflict and/or complement each other. Therefore, the REDD+ outcomes in
forest commons may imply trade-offs and/or synergies depending on the resource, policy
and institutional contexts (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009). There are not adequate studies to
understand such potential synergy and tradeoff between both initiatives.
1.6 Forest commons and REDD+ in Nepal
Nepal covers a total of 147,148 square kilometers and is broadly divided into three
geographic regions: the high Himalaya (16%) to the north, the middle hills (68%) and the
plain land, Terai, (17%) to the south. The altitudinal range varies from 73 - 4848m from
the mean sea level, providing an opportunity for diverse geo-climatic zones from tropical
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to alpine regions. Legally, 40.36% (5.96 million hectares) of land is categorized as forest
in Nepal (Department of Forest Research and Survey [DFRS], 2015). While Nepal
occupies 0.1% of the Earth’s land, it harbors >3% and >1% of the world’s known flora
and fauna, respectively (Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation [MoFSC], 2014). It
hosts about 118 ecosystems and 35 forest types (Stainton, 1972). More than two-thirds of
the population live in the rural areas and have subsistence agricultural economies where
forest constitutes an integral part of their livelihoods. Approximately 77% of energy in
the country is supplied as fuelwood majority of which come from the forest and
contribute to one of the major sources of emissions in Nepal (Water and Energy
Commission Secretariat, 2010).
Nepal has a long history of customary and formal forest commons management. It was an
early leader in initiating formal community forestry, an innovative program involving
local communities in forest management (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001). The Nepalese
government started experimenting with community forestry from the mid-1970s and fully
developed and implemented a concrete program in the early 1990s. The Nepalese
government and international environmental organizations started providing support to
local communities for the protection and management of forests. Now, community
forestry has been one of the most prioritized, popular and extensive forestry programs to
revitalize the degraded forests in the hills and fulfill the demand of subsistence forest
products in the rural areas. The hill region of the country was prioritized for community
forestry due to communities’ dependence on, and willingness to protect, forests;
existence of traditional management practices; inability of government forestry staff to
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protect and manage forests; deteriorating forest conditions; little value for commercial
use and public revenues; and financial and technical support of international development
communities (Gilmour & Fisher, 1991; World Bank, 2001). Nepalese community
forestry have been contributing to the environmental sustainability, particularly through
revitalization of degraded forest ecosystems, sustainable management of forest resources,
poverty reduction, inclusion of poor and marginalized people, promotion of community
development and institutional strengthening in rural areas (e.g., Chapagain & Banjade,
2009; Gautam et al., 2002; Kanel, 2004; Luintel et al., 2009; Luintel, 2006; Mahat, 2009;
Pokharel et al., 2007; Yadav et al., 2003).
Community forestry directly engages ~12 million people (~42% of the population) in the
management and consumptive uses of >1.8 million hectares (~1/3) of forest (Department
of Forest [DoF], 2015). In addition, many communities are traditionally, informally
engaged in the management of forests. The community forestry policy legally recognized
local forest-managing communities by forming and registering the community forest user
groups (CFUG). The CFUG is an autonomous and self-organizing public body having
perpetual succession for forest management that can acquire, possess, transfer or manage
property (Ministry of Law and Justice [MoLJ] 1995, 1993). The communities managing
forests are formally or legally entitled to own, access, manage, use and sell (including
setting pricing) all the resources of community forests (except wildlife and minerals) as
per the self-prepared and DFO-approved forest management plan. Such legal,
institutional arrangements made community forestry an indispensable strategy for any
international environmental initiatives managing local forests such as REDD+. The
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diversities in terms of characteristics of forests and communities have created
opportunities to carry out varieties of research related to environmental and socioeconomic outcomes of forest commons management.
The Nepalese government is a party to the UNFCCC and has been officially taking part
in REDD+ readiness activities to capacitate itself to implement forest carbon projects. It
prepared a Readiness Preparation Proposal (RPP), a roadmap for developing and
implementing regulatory and programmatic strategies for REDD+ in a participatory way
involving governmental and non-governmental organizations, civil society, communities
and donors (MoFSC, 2010b). The Nepalese government has now been developing
REDD+-sensitive forest policies, programs, institutions, databases, and capacity. The
new forest sector strategy 2015 has made provisions for payment of ecosystem services
and paved the way for REDD+ projects. The Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation
(MoFSC) has created a “REDD Implementation Centre (REDD-IC)” to organize REDD+
initiatives in the country. The REDD IC is taking the lead in formulating REDD+
strategy including clarifying carbon ownership, strengthening institutional mechanisms,
creating mechanisms for efficient MRV of carbon sequestration and safeguard systems,
equitable benefit sharing and practical safeguards. Recently, the MoFSC decided to carry
out a REDD+ pilot project in the western and central Terai of the country.
Different organizations such as civil societies, national and international nongovernmental organizations, donors and development partners have been supporting the
REDD+ initiative in Nepal. For instance, the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership
Facility (FCPF) is supporting the country's overall REDD+ readiness. The United
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Nations-REDD (UN-REDD) is providing capacity-building support in policy
development. The government of Finland has been assisting in the Forest Resource
Assessment. The governments of Finland, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States of America have been assisting in a range of forestry development
projects and REDD+ initiatives. Local development partners and national civil societies
are closely working with international environmental organizations to create awareness
and build capacity of forest-managing communities. Luintel et al. (2013) demonstrated
the need and possibility of partnership and collaboration between actors to build capacity
for REDD+ at the local level so that the forest-managing communities are able to manage
the forest to increase carbon storage and co-benefits.
A range of challenges have appeared to meeting REDD+ standards in Nepal. Such
challenges include the lack of adequate and dedicated policy framework, limited
competency of stakeholders, inadequate attention to the local ecological conditions and
communities’ socio-economic requirements in the planning process, and lack of
provision for local people’s free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). Also, national
forestry professionals voice the concern that REDD+ incentives may perhaps be too weak
to address the drivers of D&D. The drivers of D&D in Nepal, particularly in the plainland
Terai region, are historical, cultural and socio-political in nature and therefore complex to
address (Paudel et al., 2014).
1.7 Research approach and objectives
I took an interdisciplinary and cross-scale approach to accomplish my research. This
interdisciplinary approach helps better elucidate the linkages between local ecological
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and socio-economic systems (Berkes & Folke, 1998). Understanding socio-ecological
linkages are crucial to help manage forest resources, particularly in the context of a
changing climate. I used contemporary, cross-scale information and their linkages to
accomplish this research. Specifically, I took data from the forest commons, forestmanaging communities and households, and discussed the findings in relation to national
policies and programs that are often guided by international environmental initiatives.
Such an approach helps bring local perspectives into national and global climate change
policy initiatives and vice versa.
My research is located on the fundamental premise of human-forest interactions in the
context of emerging global environmental challenges. The central focus of my research is
to examine the conditions of forest commons and communities’ practices, so as to
develop a better understanding of how they are likely to respond to REDD+ in Nepal. My
aim is to examine how local ecological conditions and communities’ institutional
practices affect outcomes of forest commons management in view of REDD+. More
specifically, I addressed the following four objectives.
Objective # 1: Examine the relationship between carbon sequestration and biodiversity
conservation in forest commons
To achieve objective # 1, I assessed forest carbon stocks, biodiversity and their
relationships. Such assessments are important to understand the current forest
conditions and the possible future-forest scenario in relation to carbon and
biodiversity. I used standard allometric equations to estimate carbon and biodiversity.
I applied statistical tools, correlations and regressions, to estimate the strength and
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direction of relationships and the unbiased coefficients, respectively. I carried out
such assessments at the national level and across management regimes, geographic
regions, topographic regions and forest qualities, so as to gain disaggregated and
comparative pictures. I critically discussed the empirical results in relation to
theoretical expectations, other studies, and potential implications in policy and
management in view of REDD+.
Objective # 2: Examine the effectiveness of formal community forestry on carbon
sequestration and biodiversity conservation
To achieve objective # 2, I examined the effects of formal community forestry on
carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation. I used a robust analytical quasiexperimental method i.e., the matching method to estimate the effect of community
forestry against non-community forestry. I carried out analyses at the national level
and across geographic regions, topographic regions and forest qualities. I critically
discussed the empirical results in relation to theoretical expectations, other studies,
and potential implications in policy and management in view of REDD+.
Objective # 3: Examine the effectiveness of formal community forestry on equity in
benefit sharing at the household level.
To achieve objective # 3, I used a robust matching method to estimate the effect of
community forestry on equity against that of non-community forestry. I carried out
analyses at the national level and across geographic regions and social groups. I
critically discussed the empirical results in relation to theoretical expectations, other
studies, and potential implications for policy and management in view of REDD+.
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Objective # 4: Examine the relationships between collective action drivers and carbon
sequestration.
To achieve objective #4, I examined relationships between collective action drivers
and carbon sequestration. I examined such relationships by identifying key collective
actions drivers and using a multivariate regression analysis to estimate their
contribution to carbon sequestration. Finally, I discuss the results of the study in the
context of scientific contributions and implications for the REDD+ initiative.
Achieving these objectives helps understand critical dimensions of linkage between forest
commons and REDD+. While carbon constitutes the core interest of REDD+ program,
biodiversity is the major, unavoidable co-benefit. Similarly, equity constitutes one of the
critical components of incentive structure, which is the key of REDD+ mechanism. The
impacts of formal community forestry program on biodiversity, carbon and equity
provide crucial knowledge on what modality of forest commons are effective and
therefore should be promoted. The understanding of collective action drivers in relation
to carbon storage would signal the areas for specific attention in view of REDD+ in view
of REDD+.
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Chapter 2: Biodiversity and Carbon in the Nepalese Forest Commons: Implications
for Global Environmental Initiatives
2.1 Introduction
Climate change and biodiversity loss are two interlinked, contemporary environmental
crises of global magnitude, each posing serious risks to human wellbeing and ecosystem
function (Metz et al., 2007; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). To address
climate change and biodiversity loss, the global community has put in place agreements
such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). These initiatives recognize the
importance of forests, particularly as they contribute to carbon storage and biodiversity
conservation, as ecosystem services. They highlight the importance of forest
management and forest health monitoring at the national scale. They also prioritize the
management of tropical forests, which are both major terrestrial carbon sinks and
biodiversity hotspots (Clark et al., 2001; Mittermeier et al., 2004; Pan et al., 2011;
Parmentier et al., 2007; Philips et al., 1998).
Balvanera et al. (2006), Hooper et al. (2005) and Tilman (2001) reported the positive
correlation between biodiversity and ecosystem performance, including carbon
sequestration. Greater biodiversity provides more functional variations of biotic
communities, buffers against environmental fluctuations, and fosters the stabilization of
ecosystem processes (Schlapfer et al., 1999; Schwartz et al., 2000). Biodiversity also
provides insurance against the loss or poor performance of some species (Folke et al.,
1996). Biodiversity generally includes species with higher growth rates and adaptive
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capacity to withstand diverse environmental conditions (Fridley, 2001) and accumulates
higher carbon (Caspersen & Pacala, 2001). The relationships between biodiversity and
carbon depend on the nature of ecological processes in the particular ecosystem. For
instance, complementarity in utilizing different resources such as through niche
partitioning and facilitation may allow different species to increase overall productivity in
less stressful habitats, while dominant species may competitively exclude other species in
more productive habitats (Loreau & Hector, 2001; Paquette & Messier, 2011; Warren et
al., 2009). Such relationships vary across time and space due to spatial heterogeneity and
disturbance regimes (Cardinale et al., 2000).
There is inadequate empirical knowledge regarding the relationships between
biodiversity and carbon, particularly in tropical forests (Midgley et al., 2010; Szwagrzyk
& Gazda, 2007; Talbot, 2010; Thompson et al., 2011). Such gap of empirical knowledge
hinders environmental scientists’ ability to inform policy makers regarding the potential
contributions of biodiversity conservation to carbon sequestration and vice versa. Such
hindrance has appeared in the international environmental agreement processes such as
the United Nations program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation, conservation and enhancement of forest carbon and sustainable
management of forests in developing countries (REDD+). For example, the Secretariat of
the Convention on Biological Diversity [SCBD] (2011) and Miles and Dickson (2010)
raised concerns that REDD+ would displace deforestation of diverse forests and convert
natural forests into less diverse plantations, respectively.
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Assessment of the relationships between biodiversity and carbon supports efforts to better
understand the effects of various forest management activities on carbon storage and
ecosystem functioning (Woodall et al., 2011). Accurate and precise knowledge of the
relationships between biodiversity and carbon in different forest types at national and
regional scales is a prerequisite to promoting biodiversity conservation and carbon
storage simultaneously (Gardner et al., 2012; Midgley et al., 2010; Miles & Dickson,
2010; Sharma et al., 2010; Strassburg et al., 2010).
I assessed biodiversity and carbon relationships using data from 620 nationally
representative random sample plots in Nepalese forest commons (e.g., both formally
decentralized community forest (CF) and open access forests protected by the
government but used by the local communities (NCF)). Nepal harbors over three percent
and one percent of the world’s known flora and fauna, respectively, despite a 0.1% share
of the Earth’s land (Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation [MoFSC], 2014). High
biodiversity is attributed to its location at the crossroads of the Indo-Malayan and
Palearctic biogeographic regions and the wide range of geographic and climatic
diversities (Stainton, 1972). It is topographically divided into three regions: the high
altitude Himalaya (16%), the middle hills (68%) and the lowland plains referred to as
Terai (17%). Approximately 23 million people depend on 5.8 million ha of forest for
ecosystem services such as forest products and watershed services. More than 12 million
people are directly engaged in the management and consumptive uses of forests, which
poses challenges and creates opportunities for biodiversity conservation and carbon
storage.
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I estimated the tree and shrub biodiversity (hereafter called biodiversity) and Above
Ground Tree and Sapling Carbon (AGTSC) for forests overall and across altitudes, slopes
and canopy covers. I also identified species in which most of the AGTSC are
concentrated. Further, I clarified how and under what circumstances biodiversity can
serve as a useful indicator for AGTSC. I tested three hypotheses: (i) Plot-level
biodiversity and AGTSC were strongly, positively correlated at national scales and across
altitudes, slopes and canopy covers; (ii) Plot-level biodiversity and AGTSC were more
strongly correlated in highly productive forests (i.e., lower altitudes, lower slopes and
closed canopies) than less productive forests (i.e., higher altitudes, higher slopes and open
canopies). Finally, I discussed the study results in relation to emerging global
environmental policy, particularly carbon forestry (i.e., REDD+.)
2.2 Research site, design and analytical model
The data presented are part of an ongoing multi-disciplinary research project funded by
the World Bank and jointly implemented by Portland State University and ForestAction
Nepal (Bluffstone et al., 2015). The primary aim of the project was to assess the potential
synergies and/or tradeoffs between Nepalese forest commons and REDD+.
2.2.1 Data sources and sampling methods
ForestAction researchers and I jointly conducted a pilot survey in 2012 to estimate the
required number of sample plots. We selected 45 sample plots from nine community
forests (CFs) across physiographic regions to capture the most heterogeneity possible in
plot basal area, a proxy of forest biomass. We deployed a field team to measure the
diameter at breast height (DBH) of trees and saplings and estimated the basal area for
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each plot. Considering variance of basal area, we calculated the number of required
sample plots for 10% error and 95% confidence level using the standard formula (2.1)
(Saxena & Singh, 1987).
N = Cv2t2/E2…………………………….(2.1)
Where N = Required number of sample plots;
Cv = Coefficient of variation, s/µ (s= standard deviation and µ= sample mean);
E = Standard error, s/√n (n= sample number);
t = Value of student-t distribution for (n-1) degrees of freedom and 95%
confidence level
We estimated that a total of 325 plots were required for sampling in the CF. Sample plots
were distributed in 65 CFs, which were selected from the random samples chosen for a
national CF impact study conducted by the Nepalese government during 2010-2012.
ForestAction recruited a team of 25 Nepalese field researchers with whom I closely
worked to collect the data. Each of the field researchers had undergraduate degrees in
forestry (12) and graduate degrees in social science (13), and ForestAction trained them
to conduct forest surveys, forest inventories and household surveys.
As the size of CF varies, we allocated between 3-7 sample plots in each forest based on
the quintile distribution of forest size. As forest size in the hills and Terai markedly
differ, we considered different quintile ranges for the hills and Terai (Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1 Distribution of sample plots in community forests.
Quintile
distribution
st

1 quintile

Forest size (ha)
Hill

Terai

Sample
plots/forests

No. of
forests

No. of
plots

< 18

< 113

3

13

39

nd

18 - 64

113 - 154

4

13

52

rd

64 - 91

154 - 335

5

13

65

th

4 quintile

91 - 183

335 - 526

6

13

78

5th quintile

≥ 183

≥ 526

7

13

91

2 quintile
3 quintile

The field team selected 65 non-CFs in such a way that they were as similar as the CFs in
a variety of characteristics. Such plots were close but not next to CFs to avoid being used
simultaneously by the same people. The field team carried out forest boundary surveys
using Geographic Positioning System (GPS), prepared forest maps on graph paper and
estimated forest area. The maps of CF that were in the forest operational plan were also
copied on the graph paper so as to divide areas into smaller grid cells. To identify the
sample plot, the cells were selected randomly, and X and Y coordinates of the center of
selected cells were identified. The coordinates were then fed into a GPS unit to locate the
plots in the forests. Due to differences in non-CF size, it was possible to allocate 295
plots following forest size criteria and standards given in Table 2.1. The distribution of
sample plots is given in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 Distribution of sample plots
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A circular plot with a radius of 8.92m was selected for collecting environmental data and
measuring trees (>5cm diameter at breast height [DBH]), which is suitable for moderate
to dense vegetation and is widely used (MacDicken, 1997). Using the same center,
second and third plots with radiuses of 5.64m and 1m were established to measure
saplings (1-5cm DBH) and count seedlings (Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2 Size and shape of sample plot

The team measured height and circumference of each tree and sapling using a clinometer
and linear tape, respectively. Vernacular names of species were recorded and the data on
canopy, slope, altitude, aspect, soil color, soil depth, fire occurrence, forest
encroachment, forest product collection, soil erosion and grazing were also collected. In
addition, forest area and management regime, households using the forest, and distance
of forest from the road and district headquarters were collected. All the information was
collected from February to May 2013. Some data such as households in the CF user
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group was used from the CF impact study conducted by the Nepalese government in
2010, for which I trained field enumerators and conducted preliminary data analysis.
2.2.2 Description and preparation of data variables
I focus on AGTSC, because it provides information about the location of carbon sources
and sinks and allows partial estimation of carbon storage and emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation (Houghton, 2005; Ketterings et al., 2001). Recent
studies using estimates of AGTSC have indicated a growing potential for tropical forests
to serve as carbon sinks (Baker et al., 2004; Lewis et al., 2009; Pan et al., 2011; Philips et
al., 1998).
I used equations (2.2) and (2.3) proposed by Chave et al. (2005) to estimate Above
Ground Biomass (AGB), which is prepared using a large global dataset of trees across
different climatic conditions. Equations (2.2) and (2.3) are used to estimate AGB in dry
(<1500mm average annual rainfall) and moist forests (1500-4000mm average annual
rainfall), respectively. These equations are used by several researchers and are
recommended by the Nepalese government (MoFSC, 2010a). Approximately 5% of my
sample plots were in dry forests.
AGB (kg) = 0.112*(

D2H)0.916 …………………………... (2.2)

AGB (kg) = 0.0509*

D2H ………………………………..(2.3)

where,
= Specific gravity of wood (g cm-3);
D = DBH;
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H = Tree height
I used species-based wood specific gravity recommended by Jackson (1994) to calculate
biomass. Where such information was unavailable, I used general values derived from
average specific gravity of associated species (same genus and family) within a forest
type (Baker et al., 2004; MoFSC, 1988; Ngugi et al., 2011).
I used Nepal-specific biomass equations developed by Tamrakar (2000) to estimate the
green biomass of individual saplings. I converted the green biomass into dry biomass
multiplying by species-wise fractions or the average of associated species identified in
the literature. I used the fractions 0.627, 0.613, 0.58, 0.57, 0.545, 0.517, 0.5 and 0.45 for
Quercus species, Lyonia ovalifolia, Pinus roxburghii, Alnus nepalensis, Schima wallichii,
Shorea robusta, Terminalia tomentosa and Pinus wallichiana, respectively (Bhatt &
Tomar, 2002; Jain & Singh, 1999; Kataki & Konwer, 2002; Shrestha et al., 2006;
Wihersaari, 2005). For unidentified species, or where wood density information was not
available for the species, genus or family, I used the overall mean wood density obtained
from the database of species compiled for this study (Baker et al., 2004). Finally, I
converted AGB into carbon stock multiplying by 0.50 (International Panel on Climate
Change [IPCC], 2007).
I checked the names of all tree and shrub species for orthography and synonymy. I
calculated plot-wise biodiversity indices to reflect different salient features: species
richness (S) to account for the number of species present, Shannon Wiener index (H’) to
account for S and abundance of species, effective number of species (eH’) to account for S
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and H’ in an unbiased and easily interpretable form, and Shannon equitability index
(ESW) to account for the evenness of species.
I calculated S by simply counting the number of species present in a plot. Using equation
(2.4), I calculated H’, which positively correlates with the number and evenness of
species and takes a value of zero when there is only one species and a maximum value
when all species are present in equal abundance (Mohan et al., 2007).
H’= − ΣSi=1 pi ln pi …………………………………………….. (2.44)
where, S = Species richness;
i = Individual species;
pi = Individuals of one species (n) divided by the total number of individuals of
all species in the plot (N);
Σ = Sum of the calculations
By using equation (2.5), I transformed H’ to eH’, which is the number of species present if
all species were equal in abundance. This transformation is an unbiased estimate of
diversity (Beck & Schwanghart, 2010) that reduces inaccuracies when comparing
diversity among plots (Jost, 2006). It measures the diversity in units of number of species
making it relatively easy to interpret.
eH’= eH’ …………………………. (2.5)
where, e = natural log
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I calculated the ESW, which normalizes H’ to a value between 0 and 1 (1= evenness) for
each plot by using equation (2.6):
ESW = eH’/lnS ………………………………………….. (2.6)
where,

ln = Natural log

2.2.3 Specification of analytical models
2.2.3.1 Assessment of forest carbon and biodiversity
I assessed the current forest and tree characteristics, including AGTSC and biodiversity,
using descriptive statistics. I disaggregated biodiversity and AGTSC on the basis of
altitude, slope and canopy, as they are important aspects to account for forest health and
management decisions (Table 2.2). Looking at the overall altitudinal distribution of
sample-plots i.e., from 75m to 2775m from mean sea level and the general change in
vegetation with altitude, I disaggregated altitudes into 6 categories by 500m class.
Similarly, as the sample plots fall from 0 - 600 slopes, which has implications for forest
type, structure and composition, I categorized forests into 5 groups of 100 classes. As
there were few plots > 400, these very steeply-sloped plots are all in one class. For
canopy, I followed the general practice of using 4 categories.
Table 2.2 Altitude, slope and canopy cover classes
Class

Altitude (m)

Slope (degree)

Canopy (%)

1

< 500

< 10

0 - < 25%

2

500 - < 1000

10 - 20

25 - < 50%

3

1000 - < 1500

20 - 30

50 - < 75%

4

1500 - < 2000

30 - 40

75 - 100%

5

2000 - < 2500

> 40

6

2500 - < 3000
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I also identified the high AGTSC contributing species and analyzed their share.
2.2.3.2 Relationships between carbon and species diversity
I estimated the Pearson correlation between different biodiversity indices (i.e., S, H’, eH’
and Esw) to assess the strength of their relationships. I also estimated the Pearson
correlation between biodiversity indices and AGTSC to assess the direction and strength
of their relationships. These relationships were analyzed for overall forests and forests
across altitudes, slopes and canopies. I divided forests into lower (< 1000m) and higher
(≥ 1000m) altitudes, lower (< 150) and higher (≥ 150) slopes, and open (< 50%) and
closed (≥ 50%) canopies. I also developed regression models using AGTSC as the
dependent variable and different biodiversity indices as independent variables controlling
average tree DBH, average tree height, tree density, forest area, altitude, slope and
canopy to assess the significance of biodiversity indices (i.e., to estimate the unbiased
coefficient.) The models were selected on the basis of Akaike’s Information Criterion
(AIC). Finally, I checked diagnostics for each model by looking at residual plots and
confirmed that the assumptions of the model were not violated. A relatively flat line of
residual versus fitted values indicated the linearity of residuals. Most of the residuals look
normal except at the upper end. I calculated Cook’s Distance, which confirmed that no
observations showed a strong influence in the model and no outliers were detected. A
relatively flat line of standardized residuals versus fitted values showed a constant
variance, indicating homoscedasticity (i.e., the variance of residuals does not change as a
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function of X.) Finally, the values of Variance Inflation Factors for each variable were
between1.05 – 4.23, indicating a lack of multicollinearity.
2.3. Results and analyses
2.3.1 Current status of carbon and biodiversity
The current status of different forest attributes related to forest location, management,
disturbances and trees are presented (Table 2.3). A total of 264 (57.4%) plots were in the
Terai region. The mean time required for two-way travel from the forest to the nearest
roadhead was shorter than to the district headquarters, indicating easier access to
transportation than to the management support from district forest offices (DFOs) that are
usually located at the district headquarters.
Altogether, 324 species were recorded. The mean plot S, H’, eH’, Esw- were 4.54 ± 0.11,
3.67 ± 0.09, 0.99 ± 0.02, and 0.32 ± 0.01, respectively. Given the small plot size, S, H’
and eH’ seemed to be moderately diverse while Esw was relatively low. The 155 plots
within the upper quartile of eH’ estimates had five times higher mean eH’ (6.89 ± 0.30 Mg
ha-1) compared to the 155 plots within lower quartile of eH’ estimates (1.21 ± 0.08 Mg ha1

), indicating a high degree of variation in biodiversity among plots.

A total of 98.34 ± 4.19 Mg ha-1 AGTSC was recorded. The 155 plots within the upper
quartile of AGTSC estimates had 18 times higher mean carbon (244.19 ± 16.45 Mg ha-1)
compared to the 155 plots in the lower quartile of the AGTSC estimates (11.09 ± 1.25
Mg ha-1), indicating high AGTSC variation across plots. Those plots had a higher mean
eH’ (4.15 ± 0.37) compared to the plots in the lower quartile of the AGTSC estimates
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(2.81 ± 0.33), indicating a difference of eH’ between plots with higher and lower AGTSC.
Only 45 plots in the upper quartile of eH’ fell in the upper quartile of AGTSC estimates,
indicating not all biodiverse forests have higher levels of AGTSC.
Table 2.3. The status of forest, tree, disturbance, management, AGTSC and species diversity.
Continuous and ordinal variables are presented as means ± standard errors (95% confidence interval) of the
mean; dichotomous variables are presented as percentages.
Variables (units)
Forests exist in the hill (yes/no)
Forests exist in Terai (yes/no)
Altitude (m)
Slope (degree)
Forest area (ha)
Moisture gradient (1-5= lowhigh)
Forest fire (yes/no)

Overall forest
(N=620)
264 (42.5%)

Variables (units)

Overall forest
(N=620)

Tree density (no. ha-1)

570.11 ± 18.14
-1

356 (57.5%)

Sapling density (no. ha )

491.73 ± 22.04

748.20 ± 25.20

Regeneration density (no.
ha-1)

323164 ± 13692

15.40 ± 0.53
127.70 ± 27.92
3.38 ± 0.05
179 (28.9%)

Total biomass (Mg ha-1)
-1

AGTSC (Mg ha )
S
H’
H’

Average tree height (m)

11.60 ± 0.22

e

Average tree DBH (cm)

21.11 ± 0.47

Esw

Canopy cover (%)

49.70 ± 0.93

196.67 ± 8.37
98.34 ± 4.19
4.54 ± 0.11
0.99 ± 0.02
3.67 ± 0.09
0.32 ± 0.01

A disaggregated eH’ and AGTSC across altitudes, slopes and canopies is given in Figure
2.2 (a-i). A decreasing trend in mean AGTSC was observed with increasing altitude or
slope and with a decline in canopy. Standard errors (SE) and percent SE of mean AGTSC
also increased as the altitude or slope increased albeit in different rates.
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b. Plant diversity by altitude
Effective no of species

Carbon (Mg ha-1)

a. Carbon by altitude
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
-20

250

750

1250

1750

2250

6
5
4
3
2
1
0

2750

250

Mid_altitude (m)

35

45

Carbon (Mg ha-1)

Effective no. of species

25

3
2
1
0
25

35

45

h. Plant diversity by canopy cover

87.5

Effective no. of species

62.5

15

Average slope (degree)

g. Carbon by canopy cover

Carbon (Mg ha-1)

2750

4

5

140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
37.5

2250

5

Average slope (degree)

12.5

1750

e. Plant diversity by slope

140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
15

1250

Mid- altitude (m)

d. Carbon by slope

5

750

Average canopy cover (%)

5
4
3
2
1
0
12.5

37.5

62.5

87.5

Average canopy cover (%)

Figure 2.3 Average eH’ and AGTSC with standard error bars.
Standard bars represent uncertainties at 95% confidence interval for each altitude, slope and canopy classes
as shown in the x-axes by their corresponding mid-points.

The 95% confidence intervals of the mean eH’ across altitudes and slopes overlap,
indicating statistical plausibility of having the same mean values of eH’. Sizes of SE
increase with altitudes or slopes, except in the1500-2000m altitude class and in the 20300 slope class, indicating increased uncertainty in higher altitudes and slopes. The 95%
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confidence intervals of eH’ overlap in 25 - < 50%, 50 - < 75% and 75 - 100% canopy
classes (except 0 - < 25% canopy class), indicating the statistical plausibility of having
same mean eH’.
I found that 84% of AGTSC is available in 10 (3%) dominant species, indicating a highly
skewed AGTSC distribution across species (Table 2.4). Each species in Table 2.4
contributed > 1% of total AGTSC. Shorea robusta, Terminalia tomentosa and Pinus
roxburghii jointly contributed the most: > 74%, > 80% and > 51% in overall and lower
and higher altitudes respectively. While Shorea robusta and Terminalia tomentosa are
major contributors to AGTSC in lower altitudes, Pinus roxburghii, Shorea robusta and
Schima wallichii contributed the most in higher altitudes.
Table 2.4 Contribution of AGTSC in different forests by species.
All the values are given in the percentage.
National

< 1000m
altitude

≥ 1000m
altitude

57.01

69.25

16.48

Saj (Terminalia tomentosa)

9.12

11.08

2.65

3

Jamun (Syzigium cumini)

1.10

1.36

0.24

4

Sissoo (Dalbergia sissoo)

0.88

1.09

0.19

5

Bot dhangero (Lagestroemia parviflora)

1.36

1.50

0.90

6

Pinus roxburghii

8.39

1.19

32.21

7

Chilaune (Schima wallichii)

3.66

1.55

10.67

8

Katus (Castanopsis indica)

0.89

0.19

3.22

9

Gurans (Rhododendrom arboretum)

0.50

0.00

2.14

10

Utis (Alnus nepalensis)

0.99

0.01

4.22

SN

Species

1

Sal (Shorea robusta)

2

2.3.2 Relationships between biodiversity and carbon
The relationships between S, H’, eH’ and Esw were examined by analyzing the Spearman
correlation coefficients (Table 2.5). Most of these biodiversity indices are strongly,
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positively correlated with each other. However, the strength of correlation varies. A
general trend was observed that the Esw is moderately correlated with S and eH’.
Table 2.5 Correlations among different biodiversity indices.
All correlation coefficients have p-values < 0.001.
Biodiversity indices
S
H’

eH’

S

1

H’

0.83

1

eH’

0.96

0.78

1

Esw

0.60

0.87

0.63

Esw

1

Spearman correlations between biodiversity and AGTSC were complex and variable. The
correlations of S, H’ and eH’ with AGTSC were weakly positive or insignificant (Table
2.6) and the correlations varied in strength across altitudes, slopes, canopies and
biodiversity indices. For instance, the correlations between AGTSC and S or eH’ are
significant at all categories of forests. Such correlations at open canopy forests are
relatively higher followed by lower altitude, higher slope, overall forest, lower slope,
higher altitude and closed canopy. correlations are insignificant at higher altitudes. The
correlations between AGTSC and H’ are relatively lower than the correlations between
AGTSC and S or eH’, being insignificant in case of higher altitude and open and closed
canopies. Similarly, AGTSC is insignificantly correlated with Esw.
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Table 2.6 Correlations of AGTSC with different biodiversity indices.
P-values of coefficients are given in the parentheses. Bolded correlation coefficients are significant at a
0.05 level of significance. The sign “-” denotes an inverse relationship.
Forest type

S

H’

eH’

Esw

Overall forest

0.22 (0.000)

0.10 (0.009)

0.26 (0.000)

- 0.03 (0.447)

Lower altitude (<1000m)

0.26 (0.000)

0.11 (0.028)

0.29 (0.000)

- 0.03 (0.598)

Higher altitude (≥1000m)

0.18 (0.011)

0.13 (0.057)

0.20 (0.005)

- 0.01 (0.884)

Lower slope (<15 degree)

0.21 (0.000)

0.10 (0.089)

0.26 (0.000)

- 0.01 (0.852)

Higher slope (≥15 degree)

0.26 (0.000)

0.15 (0.006)

0.28 (0.000)

- 0.02 (0.659)

Closed canopy (≥50%)

0.13 (0.018)

0.03 (0.584)

0.18 (0.001)

- 0.06 (0.289)

Open canopy (<50%)

0.30 (0.000)

0.15 (0.013)

0.33 (0.000)

0.02 (0.777)

The regression models using AGTSC as a dependent variable and S, H’, eH’ and Esw as
independent variables controlling average tree DBH, average tree height, tree density,
forest area, altitude, slope and canopy depicted the significance of such indices. S has
positive, unbiased, significant coefficients in the overall forest (6.76) and eH’ has positive,
unbiased, significant coefficients in lower altitudes (9.49), lower slopes (9.55) and closed
canopies (9.50) (Table 2.7). Esw has negative, unbiased, significant coefficients in overall
forest (-58.30) and forests in lower altitudes (-49.81), lower slopes (-54.48) and higher
slopes (-264.64). No biodiversity indices were significant in explaining AGTSC in high
altitudes and open canopies, indicating no relationship existed. The H’, slope and canopy
cover were not significant in explaining variations in AGTSC in overall forest and forests
across altitudes, slopes and canopies.
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Table 2.7 Regression models.
I used the AGTSC as dependent variable. I presented standard errors in the parentheses along with coefficients. Only significant coefficients are reported.
All models have p-value < 0.001.
Model
Overall forest
Lower altitude
Higher altitude
Lower slope
Higher slope (
Closed canopy Open canopy
attributes
( < 1000 m)
( > 1000 m)
( < 15 degree)
≥ 15 degree)
( ≥ 50%)
( < 50%)
Intercept
-79.03***
-93.45***
-92.19***
-86.55***
-49.94*** (12.74) -191.6***
-43.80***
(11.38)
(14.31)
(13.75)
(17.39)
(17.94)
(12.80)
S

6.76*** (1.59)

….

….

….

….

….

….

H’

….

….

….

….

….

….

….

eH’

….

9.49*** (2.41)

….

9.55** (3.01)

….

9.50*** (1.87)

….

Esw

-58.30**(21.52)

-49.81. (25.69)

….

-54.48 . (29.91)

….

….

Average DBH

3.15*** (0.43)

2.52*** (0.58)

4.57*** (0.68)

2.24** (0.68)

4.48*** (0.65)

5.00*** (0.56)

1.56* (0.61)

Average height

4.93*** (0.91)

6.43*** (1.30)

2.96** (1.13)

6.12*** (1.53)

4.48*** (1.21)

7.81*** (1.21)

4.66**(1.30)

Tree density

0.06*** (0.01)

0.06*** (0.01)

0.07*** (0.01)

0.06*** (0.02)

….

0.09*** (0.01)

0.08*** (0.01)

Forest area

0.11*** (0.02)

0.11*** (0.02)

….

0.12*** (0.02)

….

0.07*** (0.02)

0.14*** (0.03)

Altitude

-0.01* (0.005)

….

….

….

….

-0.02** (0.01)

-0.01. (0.008)

Slope

….

….

….

….

….

….

….

Canopy cover

….

….

….

….

….

….

….

Degree of
freedom

612

406

203

270

338

337

270

Adjusted R2

0.4780

0.4784

0.4223

0.4682

0.3722

0.5772

0.4381

p value

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

.

Note: “***”= 0.001; “**”= 0.01, “*”= 0.05 and “ ”= 0.1 level of significance.

-264.64***(45.14)
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2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 Assessment of carbon and biodiversity
The AGTSC estimate is comparable with Nepal’s recent field-based regional studies
(e.g., Baral et al., 2009; Gurung et al., 2015; Pandey et al., 2014) and a secondary databased national study (Oli & Shrestha, 2009). As expected, the AGTSC is higher than the
IPCC default value of biome average (90 Mg ha-1) and some studies of similar Indian
forests (e.g., Chaturvedi et al., 2011; Haripriya, 2000). On the contrary, the AGTSC is
markedly less than the secondary data-based estimates of Asian moist forests (e.g., 264
Mg ha-1) (Houghton, 2005).
Differential AGTSC estimates across altitudes, slopes and canopy covers reflect the
variation in site quality, climatic factors, topographic conditions, and past disturbances.
As altitude and slope increases, soil erosion increases, retarding tree growth rate; average
temperature drops for longer periods resulting in a shorter growing season; and incidence
of past disturbances such as forest fire and loss of forest cover (Eckholm, 1975) lowered
the base AGTSC. The increased AGTSC as the canopy cover increases is a reflection of
forest productivity where both vertical and horizontal spaces of forest are better utilized.
The variations in the plot level AGTSC indicate the potential to increase carbon storage
in Nepal’s forest through appropriate management interventions. This indication is
supported also by Thapa-Magar and Shrestha (2015), who demonstrated that the forest
carbon stock in mid-hill Shorea robusta forest proportionally increased with management
duration at the rate of 2.6 Mg ha-1yr-1 and by Pandey et al. (2014), who report that forest
carbon stock positively changed by 25% from 2010 to 2012 in 104 CF. Well-managed
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forests provide better site, space and nutrients for remaining trees and saplings for their
enhanced growth that compensates for the removed biomass (Lung & Espira, 2015;
Taylor et al., 2008).
Plot level variations of biodiversity estimates across altitude, slope and canopy cover
indicate the existence of a wide range of variables simultaneously affecting the
distribution of biodiversity. Higher variances on eH’ in higher altitudes and higher slopes
may be due to greater uncertainties and more variation in local factors (e.g., microclimate
or diverse edaphic conditions.) The lower level of variation across altitudes does not
follow an earlier study that indicated species diversity in natural growth varied with
altitude, with higher diversity in lower altitudes compared to higher altitude forests
(Swamy et al., 2000). Increased mean eH’ with increases in canopy cover reflects the
existence of multi-layer canopies and better utilization of vertical and horizontal spaces in
the forest. The higher percentage of variance in eH’ in the open canopy is due to the
higher level of anthropogenic disturbances and the availability of gaps in the forest floor,
which provide space for more species to regenerate (Sapkota et al., 2009).
A highly skewed AGTSC, with most carbon in a few species, lowered the influence of
biodiversity on AGTSC. In the case of carbon forestry, forest management could apply
silvicultural activities in such a way that keep only high carbon-yielding species, putting
other ecologically important species at risk. Such a forest management approach may
result in a less resilient ecosystem and reduce livelihood and economic opportunities for
forest-managing communities. Forest-managing communities prefer economically viable
species at the expense of other species (e.g., Acharya, 2004; Harrison & Paoli, 2012;
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Venter et al., 2009) that provide a conducive environment by facilitating nutrient cycling
and conserving moisture for economically viable or high carbon sequestrating species.
Eventually, many species could be disturbed through either ecological processes or
management interventions, and the forest or particular species could be threatened.
2.4.2 Relationships between carbon and biodiversity
The biodiversity indices have shown varied relationships with AGTSC. For instance, the
S and eH’ showed a clear positive but weak relationship with AGTSC in overall forest and
forests in lower altitudes, lower and higher slopes, and closed and open canopies based
on correlation and/or regression coefficients. This finding resembles earlier studies
showing weak positive correlations between biodiversity and carbon (e.g., Nadrowski et
al., 2010; Potvin et al., 2011; Thompson et al., 2009). This finding also indicates the
possibility of dominant interspecific complementarity rather than interspecific
competitive exclusions in such forests. A clear positive relationship of S and eH’ with
AGTSC indicates the possibility of increasing the carbon stock by maintaining or
increasing the number and abundance of species.
Esw showed an insignificant correlation with all categories of forests. However, clear
significant negative regression coefficients of Esw with AGTSC in overall forest and
forests in lower altitudes and lower and higher slopes indicate the increased evenness of
species could imply decrease in the carbon in these forests. However, no relationship
between Esw and AGTSC in higher altitudes and closed and open canopy forests indicate
the possibility of no impact of evenness of species on carbon forestry.
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These variations in the relationships between different indices of biodiversity and carbon
in forests across altitudes, slopes and canopies reflect the existence of a complex network
of interactions between wide ranges of co-varying abiotic and biotic environmental
factors. Such factors affect different dimensions of biodiversity and AGTSC. For
instance, soil quality, drainage and topography strongly influence the relationships
between biodiversity and carbon (Healy et al., 2008).
2.4.3 Relevance of findings in global environmental initiatives and future research
The possibility to increase carbon storage reveals a forest’s potential to contribute to
emerging global environmental initiatives that aim to mitigate climate change such as
REDD+. This potential can best be harnessed using field-based methods of carbon
measurement, which may estimate higher carbon than the IPCC default value and thereby
better incentivize communities that engage in forest management.
The skewness of carbon towards a few species indicates a critical need for an effective
biodiversity safeguard approach in carbon forestry. The positive relationships between
AGTSC and biodiversity, particularly S and eH’ in overall forest and forests in lower
altitudes, lower slopes and closed canopies, indicate the possibility of synergy between
biodiversity conservation and carbon forestry. These indicate the relevance of number
and abundance of species to climate change policies. In light of the studies by Gibson et
al. (2011) and SCBD (2009) that show that the conservation of primary and mature
forests maintains higher levels of AGTSC and biodiversity simultaneously, my findings
indicate that bringing more natural and mature forests under a REDD+ regime may
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contribute to both biodiversity conservation and carbon storage in overall forest and
forests in lower altitudes, lower slopes and closed canopies.
Insignificant correlations of S and eH’ with AGTSC in higher altitude forests indicate the
lack of synergy between biodiversity conservation and carbon forestry. This finding
warrants that carbon forestry neglecting biodiversity conservation may lead to neither
tradeoff nor synergy with the number and abundance of species. The negative and/or
neutral associations of Esw with AGTSC clearly indicate the need to target both
biodiversity and carbon in forest management for their conservation and storage,
respectively.
These findings clearly indicate that policy makers, planners and managers may need to
clarify which of their interests in biodiversity (i.e., components of biodiversity such as
species richness, abundance or evenness) are of prime importance. If the interest is
species richness and abundance, carbon forestry may not be a challenge but of minimal
support. However, if species evenness is also a target of biodiversity conservation, then
carbon forestry may need to accommodate the interest of biodiversity evenness
exclusively. In such a case, efficient tradeoffs between biodiversity conservation and
carbon sequestration could be the better target for future forest management, which can
partly be achieved by incorporating both carbon and biodiversity in a spatial planning
process (Thomas et al., 2013). Strassburg et al. (2009) also indicate that additional gains
in biodiversity conservation are possible, without compromising the effectiveness of
carbon sequestration, if carbon forestry takes biodiversity distribution into account.
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The high variabilities of biodiversity, AGTSC and their relationships warrant further indepth studies to understand their dynamics (e.g., Day et al., 2013; Thompson et al.,
2012). There is a need to analyze the changes in biodiversity and carbon over time at
different scales and management regimes to gain better knowledge about biodiversity and
carbon dynamics. Novel biodiversity indices such as functional and evolutionary
diversities may help refine understanding of relationships between biodiversity and
AGTSC. Studies on adaptive capacity of forest and impacts of management modalities on
species composition, forest structure and growth are also crucial in enhancing
understanding of biodiversity and carbon relationships.
The AGTSC and biodiversity estimates are conservative as I used only the trees and
saplings that were ≥ 5cm DBH for AGTSC and only tree and shrub species for
biodiversity. These estimates of carbon may need to be revised for the purpose of
incentivizing forest-managing communities under REDD+. However, because these
underestimations are expected to impact all plots in equal proportion, the analysis of the
relationship between AGTSC and biodiversity is consistently affected. Estimates of both
biodiversity indices and AGTSC captured the uncertainties derived from plot variation.
Within-plot variation, errors associated with the allometric equations, and uncertainties
arising from sampling design and inferences to large landscapes might have influenced
estimates.
2.5 Conclusion
In the context of mounting concerns about sustainable environmental health, my
assessments of forest biodiversity, carbon and their relationships bring critical insights for
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researchers, policy makers and practitioners at global, national and local levels. Nepal’s
forests have potential for carbon storage and biodiversity conservation, and REDD+ is
critical for fighting climate change and promoting biodiversity as envisioned by the
UNFCCC and CBD, respectively. As carbon and biodiversity fluctuate across altitude,
slope and canopy cover, they are critical factors for planning and implementing forestry
projects. The comparable carbon with other local and regional field studies and the higher
carbon than the IPCC biome average demonstrate possibilities of greater incentives for
forest-managing communities through carbon forestry if field-based methods are used for
carbon measurement.
As the dynamics of biodiversity, carbon and their relationships are complex, calculating
accurate and fully reliable estimates are challenging when using one-time cross-sectional
data. However, my study indicates the possibility of weak synergies between carbonforestry and biodiversity conservation in Nepal’s forests, although there could be neutral
relations and/or tradeoffs in some cases. These possibilities indicate that policy makers
and forest managers need to adapt their forest management decisions in light of local
environmental factors to make the REDD+ and CBD effective. Particularly, planning and
implementation of REDD+ need especial attention in the provisioning and
implementation of effective biodiversity safeguards. Dedicated policy and institutional
arrangements, careful and site-specific planning of silvicultural activities, and proper
implementation and periodic monitoring of forestry projects are required to ensure
synergy between carbon and biodiversity outcomes and thereby promote climate
mitigation, biodiversity conservation and other ecosystem services in the long run. A
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national forest inventory system may need to be established to periodically collect
required information that helps promote future studies and planning.
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Chapter 3: An Assessment of Causal Effects of Nepal’s Community Forestry
Program on Biodiversity Conservation and Carbon Storage
3.1 Introduction
Over a billion local people control ~15.5% of global forests and the trend of community
control is increasing (Rights and Resource Initiative [RRI], 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2008).
Most of such local control of forests is in tropical, developing countries. Tropical forests
host 34 global biodiversity hot spots, constitute 40% of terrestrial biomass carbon and
emit 17% of global anthropogenic emissions (Mittermeier et al., 2004; Pan et al., 2011),
and therefore the role of local communities in proper management of tropical forests for
biodiversity conservation and carbon storage is imperative. By recognizing the role of
local communities, governments in most tropical countries have been transferring various
forest rights (e.g., access, use, management, alienation, governance, and due process and
compensation) to the local communities through decentralization policy reforms over the
last 40 years (Charnley & Poe, 2007; Larson & Soto, 2008). These governments and
other forestry actors expect that this decentralized forestry has a positive impact on forest
health and communities’ livelihood.
Considering these facts, global environmental initiatives of biodiversity conservation and
carbon storage such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, Conservation and enhancement of
forest carbon and sustainable management of forest in developing countries (REDD+)
recognized the community-controlled forest as a vehicle for effective forest management.
The National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans, which the Parties need to prepare
to fulfill the commitment of CBD, recognize the inevitable role of local communities in
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conservation. For instance, Nepalese biodiversity strategies recognize the need for full
and effective participation, knowledge and innovations, and cooperation and
collaboration of indigenous and local communities in the management of biodiversity
(Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation [MoFSC], 2014). REDD+ initiatives also
prioritize the need for indigenous and local communities’ full and effective participation
in managing local forests through the provisioning of safeguards. Free, prior and
informed consent of local communities are imperative for the effective implementation of
REDD+.
One popular form of decentralized community-controlled forest management, the
community forestry program (CFP), legally provides opportunities to local communities
for the management and use of forest resources to support local livelihood, environment
and economy (Brown et al., 2002; Nurse & Malla, 2006). It is recognized as a major
accomplishment in natural resource management and credited with successfully curbing
deforestation and protecting forests while supporting local livelihoods (Agrawal &
Ostrom, 2008; Gautam et al., 2002; Pokharel et al., 2007). However, naive
implementation of CFP does not guarantee biodiversity conservation and carbon
sequestration, as past studies show potential for both synergy and tradeoffs in achieving
these two outcomes depending on contexts and management interventions. For instance,
Nepal’s CFP revitalized the degraded forests in the hills (Chapagain & Banjade, 2009;
Gautam et al., 2002), which might have led to increased biodiversity conservation and
carbon sequestration, However, communities’ use of biomass might have decreased
biodiversity and carbon (Shrestha et al., 2010). By taking the case of two community
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forests in Nepal, Acharya (2004) found that communities often carry out speciespreferred silvicultural practices leading to reduction in plant species diversity. By
conducting a study of 11 community forest user groups for three years, Yadav et al.
(2003) argued that communities manage the forest “passively” i.e., prioritizing
conservation rather than carrying out appropriate silvicultural practices to increase the
productivity of forests. Bhattarai (2006) indicated that Nepal’s Forest Policy 2000
discriminated in the implementation of CFP between the hill and plain-land, (i.e., Terai),
discouraging Terai communities in managing forests sustainably. In contrast to these
studies, by taking cases of landscape-level community forests, Pandey (2015) and ThapaMagar and Shrestha (2015) recently collected the carbon data and demonstrated the
evidence that Nepal’s CFP has potential to increase carbon sequestration over time.
Increasing and/or maintaining credibility, legitimacy and acceptability of CFP
necessitates rigorous empirical evaluations of its impacts. Evaluations of CFP in
biodiversity conservation and carbon storage are now particularly important to
empirically examine the contribution of the CFP in the CBD and REDD+. So far, despite
small-scale, localized studies showing positive impacts of CFP on communities’
livelihoods and revitalization of degraded forests (e.g., Luintel et al., 2009; Pokharel et
al., 2007), there are not adequate empirical studies at larger scales evaluating its
environmental impacts, particularly on biodiversity conservation and carbon
sequestration (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009). This knowledge gap prevents stakeholders
from predicting the effectiveness of the program and therefore limits the possibility of
innovative, productive management of forests that help address the new, global
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environmental concerns of biodiversity loss and carbon emissions. Beyene et al. (2013)
indicated the need for empirical studies with better and smarter data (e.g., more variables
and observations at multiple points of time) combined with robust analytical techniques
to conclusively evaluate linkages of CFP with biodiversity conservation and carbon
sequestration. It is critical to analyze empirical evidence of CFP effects in biodiversity
conservation and carbon sequestration in order to inform future research, policies and
management.
Nepal has a long history of CFP that offers a unique, suitable ground to carry out research
about the effects of CFP in biodiversity conservation and carbon storage (Agrawal &
Ostrom, 2008; Pokharel et al., 2007). Specifically, I addressed the following research
questions: 1. Did the CFP increase plant species diversity? and 2. Did the CFP enhance
carbon storage in community forests? To answer these questions, I used cross-sectional
data collected in the year 2013 from nationally representative random samples of
community forest (CF) and corresponding non-CF (NCF) and followed rigorous
analytical processes. One challenge in evaluating CFP was to derive an appropriate
counterfactual condition such as: What would have happened in the absence of the
program? As the CFP areas were seldom distributed randomly across the country,
overcoming potential selection bias was critical. I addressed this problem by use of a
quasi-experimental, matching method. I identified confounding variables (“confounders”)
affecting the assignment of forest into the CFP and controlled those confounders through
a matching process, which is a trusted and satisfactory technique that helps mimic
randomized experiments (Hansen, 2004). The matching method helped develop a
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counterfactual control group allowing me to use existing data from NCF and providing
information on what would have happened to biodiversity conservation and carbon
storage in the absence of CFP (Pattanayak, 2009).
By using only matched samples, I estimated the average treatment effect on treated
(ATT) i.e., the average effect of CFP on biodiversity (ATTb) and average effect of CFP
on carbon (ATTc). As national-level estimates may mask a great deal of variation in the
effectiveness of CFP across the country, I estimated ATTb and ATTc across geographic,
topographic and geo-political regions and forest qualities. The identification of CFP
effects across regions and forest qualities provides critical and specific information to
policy makers, planners, managers and researchers to design their future courses of action
so as to balance the local cost of CFP with local and global benefits. I also explored
whether, where, and to what extent the ATTb and ATTc persist by testing their sensitivity
to bias as driven by unobserved covariates.
This research makes several contributions in the context of the acute shortage of
empirical knowledge regarding the effects of CFP on biodiversity conservation and
carbon sequestration. By providing the first rigorous evidence, it adds to the scarce
literature to broaden and deepen scientific understanding of the effects of CFP (e.g.,
Bluffstone et al., 2015; Chapagain & Banjade, 2009; Gautam et al., 2002). It may inform
researchers, policy makers and practitioners for future research design, policy
formulation and action-plan preparation in Nepal and beyond, which are particularly
important as many tropical countries have already decided, and are now preparing, to
adopt carbon-focused forestry (e.g., REDD+). In such forestry practices, biodiversity
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conservation has also been one of the critical objectives, as depicted in the safeguard
provisions, which is in line with the provisions made in the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD). My research found heterogeneous effects of CFP across regions and
forest qualities in carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation. These results
provide critical information to governments to design targeted, appropriate plans across
regions and forest qualities and improve CFP outcomes.
3.2 Context of the community forestry program in Nepal
Nepal covers a total of 147,148 square kilometers and is broadly divided into three
geographic regions: the high Himalaya (16%) to the north, the middle hills (68%), and
the Terai (plain lands; 17%) to the south. The altitudinal range varies from 73-4,848m
from the mean sea level, providing an opportunity for diverse geo-climatic zones from
tropical to alpine regions. Legally, 39.6% (5.8 million ha) of land in Nepal is forested
(Department of Forest Research and Survey [DFRS], 1999). While Nepal occupies 0.1%
of the Earth’s land, it harbors >3% and >1% of the world’s known flora and fauna,
respectively (MoFSC, 2014). It hosts about 118 ecosystems and 35 forest types (Stainton,
1972). More than two-thirds of the population live in rural areas and have subsistence
agricultural economies where forest constitutes an integral part of their livelihoods. More
than three-fourths of energy in the country is supplied from the forest, which contributes
to one of the major sources of emissions in Nepal.
The Nepalese government nationalized all the Nepalese forests, particularly those
distributed to elites by earlier governments, through the enactment of the Private Forest
Nationalization Act 1957, to control environmental degradation and increase national
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revenue. The state’s monopoly on national forests was further reinforced by necessary
legal and institutional arrangements. However, the government was not able to slow
deforestation and forest degradation, and most of the forest remained as open access
commons where a phenomenon known as the ‘tragedy of the commons’5 (Hardin, 1968)
appeared. Consequently, conservationists, scientists, and administrators expressed
growing alarm about the rapid deterioration of the Himalayan environment in the late
1960s and 70s (e.g., Eckhholm, 1975). Gradually, local communities became interested
in the protection and management of local forests so as to sustain their subsistence forest
product needs (Gilmour & Fisher, 1991), and the Nepalese government and international
environmental organizations, where possible, started providing support to local
communities for the protection and management of forests.
Nepal was an early leader in initiating CFP as an innovative program involving local
communities in forest management (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001). Building on local
communities’ traditional practices of forest management, the Nepalese government
started experimenting with CFP in the mid-1970s and fully developed and implemented a
concrete program in the early 1990s. The formal CFP has been one of the most
prioritized, popular and extensive forestry programs in Nepal to revitalize the degraded
forests in the hills and fulfill the demand of subsistence forest products in the rural areas.
Thus far, local communities have been managing forests for timber, fuelwood, nontimber forest products, medicine and soil conservation. Yadav et al. (2003) reported that
5

Tragedy of the commons represent a deteriorating situation of a shared-resource system, where individual

users act independently and rationally to maximize their own benefits without considering the sustainability
of the resource.
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the CF in Nepal are primarily managed “passively” i.e., focusing on the protection and
conservation of forests and restricting the harvest of forest products. Bhattarai (2001)
reported the existence of different innovative practices of forest protection at the
community level (e.g., fencing, fines, rotational patrolling, and cash and/or in-kind
contributions), which are intended primarily to strengthen collective action and reduce
deviant behavior of members.
Nepal’s CFP provides unique, complex and dynamic environments that both create
opportunities and pose challenges for biodiversity conservation and carbon storage by
directly engaging ~12 million (~40%) of the population in the management and
consumptive uses of ~1.8 million ha (~one-third) of forests (Department of Forest [DoF],
2015). The CFP legally recognized local forest-managing communities, community
forest user groups (CFUG), as an autonomous public body having perpetual succession
for forest management that can acquire, possess, transfer or manage property (Ministry of
Law and Justice [MoLJ], 1993). The CFUG is entitled to own, access, manage, use and
sell (including setting pricing) all the resources of CF (except wildlife and minerals) as
per the self-prepared and DFO-approved forest management plan. Such legal institutional
arrangements made CFP an indispensable strategy for any international environmental
initiatives that need local forest management such as CBD and REDD+.
The Nepalese government prioritized the hill region of the country for the CFP due to
communities’ dependence on and willingness to protect forests; existence of traditional
management practices; inability of government forestry staff to protect and manage
forests; deteriorating forest conditions; little value for commercial use and public
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revenues; and financial and technical support of international development communities
(Gilmour & Fisher, 1991; World Bank, 2001). The government has maintained its control
and has been reluctant to hand over forests to communities in the Terai due to high
commercial value and revenue potential of forests in the region (Bhattarai, 2006; Gilmour
& Fisher, 1991). Rather, the government delineated, gazetted and managed the large
contiguous forests in the Terai as national forests (MoFSC, 2000). The focus of the
government in Terai forest management was on timber production from the often
dominant natural Shorea robusta forest (Banjade et al., 2011). The illegal logging and
cross-border smuggling of Shorea robusta timber has long been an informal source of
income for forest bureaucracy (Paudel et al., 2006). Only small to medium sized, barren
forests in the vicinity of the settlement were handed over to communities in the Terai.
3.3 Research site, design and analytical model
The data presented are part of an on-going multi-disciplinary research project funded by
the World Bank and jointly implemented by Portland State University and ForestAction
Nepal (Bluffstone et al., 2015). The primary aim of the project is to assess potential
synergies and/or tradeoffs between Nepalese forest commons and REDD+.
3.3.1 Sampling methods and research sites
A pilot survey was conducted in 2012 to estimate the required number of sample plots. I
selected 45 sample plots from nine community forests (CFs) across physiographic
regions to capture the greatest possible heterogeneity in plot basal area, a proxy of forest
biomass. I deployed a field team to measure the diameter at breast height (DBH) of trees
and saplings and estimated the basal area for each plot. Considering variance of basal
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area, I calculated the number of required sample plots for 10% error and 95% confidence
level using the standard formula (3.1) (Saxena & Singh, 1987).
N = Cv2t2/E2…………………………….(3.1)
Where,
N = Required number of sample plots;
Cv = Coefficient of variation, s/µ (s = standard deviation and µ= sample mean);
E = Standard error, s/√n (n = sample number);
t = Value of student-t distribution for (n-1) degree of freedom and 95%
confidence level.
A total of 325 plots were estimated to be required for sampling in the CFs. Sample plots
were distributed among the 65 CFs, which were selected from the random samples
chosen for a national CF impact study conducted by the Nepalese government during
2010 - 2012. ForestAction Nepal recruited a team of 25 Nepalese field researchers with
whom I closely worked to collect the data. Each of the field researchers had
undergraduate degrees in forestry (12) and graduate degrees in social science (13), and
ForestAction Nepal trained them to conduct forest surveys, forest inventories and
household surveys
As the size of CF varies, we allocated between 3-7 sample plots in each forest based on
the quintile distribution of forest size. As the forest size in the hill and Terai markedly
differ, we considered different quintile ranges for hill and Terai (Table 3.1).
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Table 3.1 Distribution of sample plots in community forests.
Quintile
Forest size (ha)
Sample
Number
distribution
Hill
Terai plots/forest of forests
1st quintile
<18
<113
3
13
2nd quintile
18-64
113-154
4
13
rd
3 quintile
64-91
154-335
5
13
4th quintile
91-183
335-526
6
13
5th quintile
≥183
≥526
7
13

No. of
plots
39
52
65
78
91

The field team selected 65 non-CFs in such a way that they were similar to the CFs in a
variety of characteristics. Such plots were close but not next to CFs to avoid being used
simultaneously by the same people. The field team carried out forest boundary surveys
using Geographic Positioning System (GPS), prepared forest maps on graph paper and
estimated forest area. The maps of CF that were in the forest operational plan were also
copied on the graph paper so as to divide areas into smaller grid cells. To identify the
sample plot, the cells were selected randomly, and X and Y coordinates of the center of
selected cells were identified. The coordinates were then fed into a GPS unit to locate the
plots in the forests. Due to differences in non-CF size, it was possible to allocate 295
plots following forest size criteria and standards given in Table 3.1. The distribution of
sample plots is given in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1 Distribution of sample plots
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A circular plot with a radius of 8.92m was selected for collecting environmental data and
measuring trees (> 5cm diameter at breast height [DBH]), which is suitable for moderate
to dense vegetation and used widely (MacDicken, 1997). Using same center, second and
third plots with radiuses of 5.64m and 1m were established to measure saplings (1-5cm
DBH) and count seedlings, respectively (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2 Size and shape of sample plot

The team measured height and circumference of each tree and sapling by using
clinometer and linear tape, respectively. Vernacular name of each species were recorded
and the data on canopy, slope, altitude, aspect, soil color, soil depth, fire occurrence,
forest encroachment, forest product collection, soil erosion and grazing were collected for
each plot. Data on forest area and management regime, number of households using the
forest and distances of forest from the nearest roads and district headquarters were also
collected. Data was collected from February to May 2013. Some data such as households
in the CF user group was used from the CF impact study conducted by the Nepalese
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government in 2010 for which I trained field enumerators and conducted preliminary data
analysis.
Sample plots were distributed in the tropical, sub-tropical and temperate climatic zones of
42 (out of 75) districts across the country. The majority of studied CFs (63%) are in the
hills. This reflects the higher number and area of CFs in the hills i.e., ~ 87% CFs
covering ~ 80% CF area are in the hills (DoF, 2015). A range of different types of natural
as well as plantation forests, ranging from approximately 80m to 2800m altitude (average
748.20 ± 25.20m) from the mean sea level and 0 - 60 degree slope (average 15.40 ± 0.53
degree) were sampled. The mean time required traveling to and from the forest to the
nearest road-head (i.e., less than half day) is shorter than traveling to the districtheadquarters (i.e., more than half-day), indicating easier access to transportation than to
the management support from district forest offices (DFOs) that are usually located at the
district head-quarters.
The average moisture gradient, reflected primarily by aspect, is modest. While the
average size of overall forest is 127.70 ± 27.92 ha, average size of forest per household is
0.82±0.30 ha. More detailed statistics are given in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 The status of forest, tree, disturbance and management of sampled forests.
Continuous and ordinal variables are presented as means ± standard errors of the mean; dichotomous
variables are presented as N (%). Mann-Whitney test for continuous variables and proportion test for
dichotomous variables were carried out to test the difference between CF and NCF. Bolded p-values
(p<0.05) indicate significant differences between CF and NCF.
Variables and their measurement units Overall forest
CF
NCF
P(N=620)
(N=325)
(n=295)
values
Forest location and area
Forests exist in the hills (yes/no)
264 (42.5%)
205 (33.1%)
59 (9.6%) <0.001
Forests exist in Terai (yes/no)
356 (57.5%)
120 (19.4%)
236 (38.1%)
0.004
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Variables and their measurement units
Time required for 2-way travel to and
from road (1-3 = <2 hours to a day)
Time required for 2-way travel to and
from district headquarters (1-3 = <2 hours
to full day)
Altitude (m)
Slope (degree)
Forest area (ha)
Per household forest area (ha)
Moisture gradient (1-5 = low-high based
on aspect)
Forest disturbances
Presence of forest fire (yes/no)
Presence of fodder collection (yes/no)
Presence of grazing (yes/no)
Presence of fuelwood harvesting (yes/no)
Presence of timber harvesting (yes/no)
Presence of encroachment (yes/no)
Presence of soil erosion (yes/no)
Presence of wildlife herbivory (yes/no)
Forest management
Years of forest user group formation (no.)
Households of forest users (no.)
Existence of forest operational plan
(yes/no)
Existence of forest management rules
(yes/no)
Existence of community protection of
forest (yes/no)
Existence of provisions of penalties for
culprits (yes/no)
Tree attributes
Average tree height (m)
Average tree DBH (cm)
Forest attributes
Canopy cover (%)
Tree density (no. ha-1)
Sapling density (no. ha-1)
Regeneration density (no. ha-1)
Presence of Shorea robusta (yes/no)
Broadleaved-conifer forest gradient
(1= broadleaved, 2= mixed, 3= conifer)

Overall forest
(N=620)

CF
(N=325)

NCF
(n=295)
1.33±0.04

Pvalues

1.41±0.03

1.48±0.05

0.058

2.45±0.05

2.59±0.07

748.20±25.20
15.40±0.53
127.70±27.92
0.82±0.30

981.67±33.77
20.37±0.68
148.96±44.17
0.90±0.27

3.38±0.05

3.14±0.07

179 (28.9%)
379 (61.1%)
309 (49.8%)
430 (69.4%)
266 (42.9%)
40 (6.5%)
158 (25.5%)
408 (65.8%)

75 (23.1%)
165 (50.8%)
126 (38.8%)
208 (64.0%)
135 (41.5%)
19 (5.8%)
78 (24.0%)
210 (64.6%)

104 (35.3%)
214 (72.5%)
183 (62.0%)
222 (75.3%)
131 (44.4%)
21 (7.1%)
80 (27.1%)
198 (67.1%)

0.058
0.002
0.001
0.082
0.679
0.708
0.615
0.709

11.2±0.20
295.82±101.09
388 (62.6%)

10.10±0.26
295.80±182.70
325 (100.0%)

12.43±0.28
295.85±88.44

<0.001
0.496
<0.001

516 (83.2%)

325 (100.0%)

0.002
2.28±0.06
485.13±31.69
9.87±0.71
106.44±33.71
0. 47±0.32

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

3.65±0.07

63 (21.4%)
<0.001
192 (65.1%)
549 (88.5%)

325 (100.0%)

224 (75.9%)

<0.001

542 (87.4%)

325 (100.0%)

217 (73.6%)

<0.001

11.60±0.22
21.11±0.47

11.17±0.29
19.62±0.57

12.13±0.34
22.84±0.77

0.047
0.009

49.70±0.93
570.11±18.14
491.73±22.04
32316.84±
1369.32
350 (56.5%)

48.66±1.21
629.17±27.75
512.92±35.67
29661.93±
1965.02
145 (44.6%)

51.09±1.43
503.46±22.40
471.19±25.07
35420.49±
1896.97
205 (69.5%)

0.105
0.002
0.640
<0.001
<0.001

1.39±0.02

1.53±0.03

1.22±0.03

<0.001
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Variables and their measurement units
Normalized Difference Vegetation IndexNDVI1, 1989 (0=bare, 1=green)
Proportion of households living in the
village for at least 2 generations
Proportion of ethnic population
Proportion of poor population
1

Overall forest
(N=620)

CF
(N=325)

0.2942±0.0022

0.2945±0.0030

0.748±0.011
0.416±0.012
0.376±0.009

0.821±0.014
0.437±0.019
0.372±0.012

NCF
(n=295)
0.2938±
0.0032

Pvalues
0.388

0.668±0.017
0.394±0.015
0.382±0.014

<0.001
0.107
0.600

NDVI is a widely used and important tool that measures "greenness" of vegetative cover based on

remotely sensed data. It is directly related to energy (visible light in the red band) absorption by plant
canopies (chlorophyll) for use in photosynthesis, which correlates to denser vegetation (Myneni et al.,
1995; Sellers, 1985). A cloud free Landsat 5 image of November 1989 was used to calculate NDVI, as it
gives information about the quality of forests just before the CFP was begun, crucial information to
estimate the unbiased effect of CFP on carbon and biodiversity. The equation: NDVI = (NIR - Red)/(NIR +
Red) was used to calculate the NDVI, where NIR= near-infrared (band 4) and Red= visible red light (band
3). (Charles Maxwell, PhD student at The School of the Environment, PSU calculated NDVI).

3.3.2 Variable selection and measurement
3.3.2.1 Treatment and control variables
The implementation of a formal CFP is the treatment variable. Local communities and/or
government opt into CF status, and therefore the data are observational and non-random.
On the other hand, the non-implementation of CFP, specifically the NCFs, are the control
variable. The resources of the NCFs are formally owned by, and management
responsibilities are vested on, the government. However, they remain open access, and
local communities may protect and use forest resources, particularly non-timber forest
products, for fulfilling subsistence needs.
3.3.2.2 Outcome variables
The effective number of species (eH’) and the Above-Ground Tree and Sapling Carbon
(AGTSC) are two outcome variables. I used the eH’ (i.e., the numbers of species present if
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all species were equal in abundance) to assess biodiversity, as it is an unbiased estimate
of diversity that reduces inaccuracies when comparing diversity among plots (Jost, 2006).
It measures biodiversity, considering both species richness (S) and abundance, in units of
the number of species making it relatively easy to interpret.
I checked names of all tree and shrub species for orthography and synonymy. I calculated
S by simply counting the number of species present in a plot. To estimate eH’, I calculated
the Shannon-Weiner Index (H’) using equation (3.2) and transformed it using equation
(3.3). H’ is positively correlated with the number and evenness of species and takes a
value of zero when there is only one species and a maximum value when all species are
present in equal abundance (Mohan et al., 2007).
H’ = − ΣSi=1 pi ln pi …………………………………………….. (3.2)
Where, S = Species richness;
i =Iindividual species;
pi = Individuals of one species (n) divided by the total number of
individuals of all species in the plot (N);
Σ = Sum of the calculations.
eH’= eH’ ……………………………………………...…………. (3.3)
Where, e = Natural log
The AGTSC provides information about the location of carbon sources and sinks,
particularly providing an estimation of major carbon storage in forests and potential
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emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (Houghton, 2005; Ketterings et al.,
2001). Recent studies, using estimates of AGTSC, have indicated the growing potentials
of tropical forests to serve as a carbon sink (Lewis et al., 2009; Pan et al., 2011).
I used equations (3.2) and (3.3) proposed by Chave et al. (2005) to estimate AboveGround Biomass (AGB), which is prepared by using a large dataset of trees across
different climatic conditions of global sites. Equations (3.2) and (3.3) are used to estimate
AGB in dry (< 1500mm average annual rainfall) and moist forests (1500 - 4000mm
average annual rainfall), respectively. These equations are used by several researchers
and recommended by the Nepalese government (MoFSC, 2010a). Approximately 95%
and 5% sample plots in my study were classified as moist and dry forests, respectively.
AGB (kg) = 0.112 * (D2H)0.916 ………………….………. (3.2)
AGB (kg) = 0.0509 * D2H ………………………………..(3.3)
Where,
= Specific gravity of wood (g cm-3);
D = DBH;
H = Tree height.
I used species-based wood specific gravity recommended by Jackson (1994) to calculate
biomass. Where such information is unavailable, I used a general value derived from
average specific gravity of associated species (same genus and family) within a forest
type (Baker et al., 2004; Ngugi et al., 2011). I used Nepal-specific biomass equations
developed by Tamrakar (2000) to estimate the green biomass of individual saplings,
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which is converted into dry biomass by multiplying by species-wise fractions or
calculating an average of the associated species identified in the literatures. I used the
fractions 0.627, 0.613, 0.58, 0.57, 0.545, 0.517, 0.5 and 0.45 for Quercus species, Lyonia
ovalifolia, Pinus roxburghii, Alnus nepalensis, Schima wallichii, Shorea robusta,
Terminalia tomentosa and Pinus wallichiana, respectively (Bhatt & Tomar, 2002; Jain &
Singh, 1999; Kataki & Konwer, 2002; Shrestha et al., 2006; Wihersaari, 2005). For
unidentified species, or where wood density information was not available for the
species, genus or family, I used the overall mean wood density obtained from the
database of species compiled for this study (Baker et al., 2004). I converted AGB into
carbon stock by multiplying by 0.50 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
[IPCC], 2006).
3.3.2.3 Confounding variables
Because communities opted into CFP, or the government persuaded communities to
participate, there are a number of confounding variables, or confounders, that affected
treatment status and/or outcomes. Confounders may inflate errors in ATTb or ATTc
estimates (Heinrich et al., 2010). I controlled the confounders in the matching process
that helps identify the best matches between CF and NCF plots so as to minimize error.
Matching helped me develop a counterfactual control group, which allowed me to use
select existing data from NCF plots and provided information on what would have
happened to biodiversity conservation and carbon storage in the absence of CFP
(Pattanayak, 2009).
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On the basis of the literature (see Section 3.2) and consultation with experts and
community members, I identified 16 observable confounders determined by nature and
communities. On the basis of my data, the identified confounders and their relationships
with the CFP assignment is analyzed for overall forest and forests across altitudes, slopes,
geo-political regions (i.e., hill and Terai) and canopies (Table 3.3) and briefly discussed
below. If the treatments were randomly assigned, the coefficients should be statistically
insignificant.
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Table 3.3 Observed confounders and their relationships with CFP assignment.
The model of relationship is generated using the probit model considering probability of forest selected under CFP as the dependent variable and
confounders as independent variables. The coefficients and the p-values in parentheses are reported. A blank space indicates that the concerned
confounder is not used in the model to achieve matching in the particular forest category.
Confounders

Overall
forest

Lower
altitude
(<1000m)

Higher
altitude
(≥ 1000m)

Lower
slope
(< 150)

Higher
slope
(≥ 150)

Terai

Hill

Open
canopy
(< 50%)

Closed
canopy
(≥ 50%)

Intercept

-0.1051
(0.127)

-0.3224
(0.000)

-0.2165
(0.536)

-0.3526
(0.013)

0.218
(0.009)

-0.3522
(0.001)

0.9589
(0.000)

-0.2128
(0.086)

-0.0704
(0.520)

Forest area

0.0000
(0.951)

0.0000
(0.946)

….

0.0005
(0.005)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(0.948)

….

….

0.0008
(0.000)

Forest size per household

….

….

-0.0228
(0.630)

….

….

….

0.0333
(0.223)

0.0559
(0.010)

….

Travel time to nearest road

0.0036
(0.889)

….

-0.0156
(0.653)

0.1442
(0.015)

-0.0683
(0.069)

0.1295
(0.005)

….

0.0074
(0.835)

0.0155
(0.653)

Travel time to district
headquarters

….

0.0725
(0.001)

….

….

….

….

-0.0130
(0.602)

….

….

Slope

-0.0000
(0.999)

- 0.0000
(0.989)

-0.000
(1.000)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(1.000)

-0.0000
(0.989)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(1.000)

Altitude

0.0000
(0.997)

0.0000
(0.996)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(0.998)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(0.997)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(1.000)

Moisture gradient

0.0000
(0.992)

0.0000
(0.982)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(0.984)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(1.000)

-0.0000
(1.000)

Broadleaved-conifer gradient

0.1515
(0.000)

….

-0.0949
(0.074)

….

0.0910
(0.066)

….

-0.0742
(0.106)

0.1848
(0.000)

0.2209
(0.000)

Presence of Shorea robusta

0.0000
(0.985)

0.0000
(0.979)

….

0.0000
(1.000)

-0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(0.978)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(1.000)

-0.0000
(1.000)
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Confounders

Overall
forest

Lower
altitude
(<1000m)

Higher
altitude
(≥ 1000m)

Lower
slope
(< 150)

Higher
slope
(≥ 150)

Terai

Hill

Open
canopy
(< 50%)

Closed
canopy
(≥ 50%)

Presence of soil erosion

0.0000
(0.918)

0.0000
(0.883)

….

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(0.869)

-0.0000
(1.000)

- 0.0000
(1.000)

-0.0000
(1.000)

NDVI 1989

-0.0127
(0.270)

-0.0148
(0.214)

0.3724
(0.375)

-0.1936
(0.001)

-0.2388
(0.012)

-0.0065
(0.312)

-0.4148
(0.221)

0.2112
(0.010)

-0.3927
(0.020)

Years of communities
conserving forest

0.0000
(0.985)

0.0165
(0.000)

….

0.0210
(0.000)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0192
(0.000)

….

….

….

Number of forest user
households

0.0000
(0.270)

0.0000
(0.214)

….

0.0001
(0.145)

0.0004
(0.012)

0.0000
(0.312)

….

….

0.0000
(0.510)

Proportion of households living
in the village for at least 2
generations

0.5127
(0.000)

0.3224
(0.000)

1.1900
(0.000)

0.4654
(0.000)

0.4785
(0.000)

0.2126
(0.014)

….

0.5333
(0.000)

0.3881
(0.000)

Proportion of ethnic population

0.0000
(0.999)

0.3002
(0.000)

0.0000
(1.000)

-0.0257
(0. 128)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.2804
(0.005)

0.0000
(1.000)

0.1064
(0.241)

-0.0000
(1.000)

Proportion of poor population

0.0000
(0.996)

0.0000
(0.993)

-0.2708
(0.066)

….

0.0000
(1.000)

0.0000
(0.993)

0.1870
(0.150)

-0.3284
(0.009)

-0.0000
(1.000)
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Forest area: Forest area had significant positive effect on the expected log odd of a forest
to be selected under CFP; each additional hectare of forest adds to expected log odds of
0.0005 in lower slopes and 0.0008 in closed canopies. Similarly, the expected log odd of
a forest being selected under CFP is increased by 0.0559 in open canopies if the size of
forest per household is increased by one hectare. This is reasonable as the local
communities prefer larger-sized (and larger per household) forest for provision of more
resources, and also the government has a policy of designating forests according to the
communities’ willingness and capacity to manage (MoLJ, 1995).
Distance from road and district headquarters: As two-way travel time from forest to
nearest road increases by 2-2.5 hours, the expected log odds of a forest to be selected
under CFP increases by 0.1442 in lower slopes and 0.1295 in Terai. Similarly, a 2-2.5
hours increase for two-way travel from forests to district head-quarters increases the
expected log odds of a forest to be selected under CFP in lower altitudes by 0.0725.
These results indicate that the government prioritized inaccessible forests for CFP as they
were less connected with markets and had less revenue potential (Gilmour & Fisher,
1991).
Forest composition and quality: As forest composition shifts from broadleaved to mixed
or mixed to conifer-dominated, the expected log odd of forest to be selected under CFP
increases by 0.1515 in overall, and by 0.1848 and 0.2209 in open and closed canopies,
respectively. These data reflects that most of the plantations that were handed over to
communities were dominated by Pinus roxburghii (Campbell & Bhattarai, 1983; Gilmour
et al., 1990; MoFSC, 1988). The greenness of the forest as measured by NDVI 1989 has a
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significantly negative effect on the expected log odd of forest being selected under CFP.
Each additional unit of index reduces the expected log odd of forest to be selected under
CFP by 0.1936, 0.2367 and 0.3947 in lower slopes, higher slopes and closed canopies,
respectively. This reflects the preference of the government to hand over degraded forests
to communities (Kanel & Shrestha, 2001). However, the result of 0.2112 positive
expected log odd in open canopies may be due to the handover of relatively good quality
forests that perhaps became degraded. Some good quality forests were handed over to the
communities due to communities’ willingness and ability to manage as well as political
pressure and willingness of DFO. Initially, DFOs were interested in gaining trust from
local communities by demonstrating that they were willing to hand over good quality
forests.
Management history: Each additional year that communities managed/protected a forest
before the commencement of CFP raises the expected log odds of participating in the
CFP in lower altitudes, lower slopes and Terai by 0.0165, 0.0210 and 0.0192,
respectively. The government prioritized traditionally managed forests for CFP, as they
increase the probability of the success of the program. Forest-dependent communities in
the vicinity of forests that were cohesive in nature were prioritized for CFP (Gilmour &
Fisher, 1991).
Community attributes: Each proportion of household living for ≥2 generations in a
community has 0.2126 to1.19 positive effects on the expected log odds of participation in
the CFP in all categories of forest except hill. Non-migrated communities likely follow
traditional subsistence livelihood strategies based on agriculture and forest resources and
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therefore are interested in CFP participation. In lower altitudes, each additional
proportion of ethnic household in a community has a 0.3002 positive effect on the
expected log odd of participation in the CFP. Ethnic homogeneity increases the
cohesiveness of communities and therefore is positively associated with better collective
actions in managing forests (Tachibana et al., 2001). Nepalese ethnic communities have
their own, locally suitable forest governance and management (e.g., protection,
harvesting and use) practices that have been proven effective. Each additional proportion
of poor households in a community has a 0.1708 and 0.3284 negative effect on the
expected log odds of participation in the CFP in higher altitudes and open canopies,
respectively. This could be due to the communities’ limited awareness and capacity to
bear organizing and management costs.
According to my data, some of the confounders such as altitude, slope, moisture, soil
erosion, presence of Shorea robusta and number of forest users’ households are
insignificantly related to the assignment into the CFP. However, these confounders are
important criteria for decision making during the initial years of CFP, and therefore I kept
them in the analytical models.
3.3.3 Specification of analytical models
3.3.3.1 Addressing confounding through matching
Because my study is observational, the principal problems in the estimation of ATTb and
ATTc are identifying counterfactual conditionals and dealing with confounding,
particularly due to selection bias. Selection bias arises when the location of CFP is not
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randomly selected, and CF plots differ from NCF plots for reasons other than their status
as CF or NCF per se. Differences of CF and NCF confounders depict their effects on eH’
and AGTSC even if the CFP had no effect. Therefore, confounders need to be controlled
to identify counterfactuals so as to make matched plots as good as random or statistically
equivalent. Matched CF and NCF plots allow comparing to achieve unbiased measures of
ATTb and ATTc.
I used a two-step method, nonparametric matching and analysis, for identification of
counterfactuals and estimation of the ATTb and ATTc. Matching, an ex post identification
technique, reduces selection bias and generates a comparable set of NCF observations by
controlling observed confounders (Ho et al., 2007; Imben, 2004; Rosenbaum & Rubin,
1983; Sekhon, 2011). Appropriate matching asymptotically balances observed
confounders by removing bias (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). However, there is no
consensus on exactly how matching ought to be done, how to measure the success of the
matching procedure, and whether matching estimators are sufficiently robust to
misspecification (Heckman et al., 1998).
Matching reduces selection bias only if assumptions of ‘conditional independence or
unconfoundedness’ and ‘common support’ are met (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).
Conditional independence means that CFP status is independent of the confounders.
Matching techniques control the selection bias fully if all confounders determining CFP
assignment are used, which is rare in practice as there are likely to be unobservable
confounders. This is a strong assumption as it makes CF and NCF plots comparable and
has to be justified by the data at hand. The “common support condition” refers to two
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important conditions: positive probability (i.e., existence of positive probability of being
both CF and NCF for each value of covariate) and overlap condition (i.e., finding
adequate comparable matches that help reduce model dependence).
I developed matching and propensity score models by including 10 to 14 observed
confounders that affect the assignment into CFP, eH’ and AGTSC (Table 3.3). As the
confounders were measured at both plot and forest levels, I applied a mixed-effect probit
model to estimate propensity scores and fed these into the matching model. I found
almost all variances (>99%) of random effects were attributed to forest level effects. The
fixed effects of confounders are discussed in section 3.3.2.3.
I used ≤ 0.25 standardized mean difference (SMD) as a cut-off point, a common
numerical balance diagnostic criterion to check whether the matching is satisfactory and
acceptable, for matching adjustment (Rubin, 2001). The SMD expresses the standardized
bias and is similar to an effect size relative to the variability observed and estimated by
dividing difference in mean outcomes between CF and NCF plots by standard deviation
of outcome among CF plots. Reducing SMD minimizes overt bias due to measured
covariates in the ATTb and ATTc estimates (Imai et al., 2008; Rubin & Thomas, 1996).
I matched CF and NCF plots based on observed confounders by using the MatchIt
package of R 3.2.2 (Ho et al., 2007). I used the matching with replacement approach,
allowing each selected NCF plot to be matched to ≥ 1 CF plots, as it is a good option for
the highest degree of balance and the lowest conditional bias (Abadie & Imbens, 2006;
Dehejia & Wahba, 1999). I used genetic matching, a multivariate matching that optimizes
the confounding balance between CF and NCF plots by automating the process of finding
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good matches using an evolutionary search algorithm (Diamond & Sekhon, 2013). This is
a generalization of propensity score and Mahalanobis distance matching (Rosenbaum &
Rubin, 1985), which minimizes balance measures by using p-values. The Mahalanobis
metric is considered a useful tool for determining similarities between CF and NCF plots
even when there are several, correlated confounders (Mahalanobis, 1936; Rubin, 1980).
In my dataset, I found that genetic matching was the best-suited algorithm to balance the
maximum number of confounders bringing the SMD below the acceptable limit
(Appendix A). As the post-matching SMD for confounders is less than 0.25 standard
deviations and the average SMD across all covariates range from 0.08 – 0.17. I was able
to find a sufficient number of NCF plots that are similar to CF plots based on the
covariates included in the matching process. In some cases, it was not possible to bring
SMD down to ≤ 0.25 for some confounders while keeping as many covariates as
possible. However, I included some of those confounders in the matching models, as they
contributed positively in achieving overall balance. A total of 18 - 52% of NCF plots are
matched with CF plots in overall forest and across altitudes, slopes, geo-political regions
and forest canopies. The average ratios of matched NCF to CF plots ranges from 1:2.8 to
1:4.6 across forest categories.
3.3.3.2 Comparing biodiversity and carbon
The ATTb and ATTc are estimated based on the average difference of eH’ and AGTSC
between matched CF and NCF plots. As tests of average difference rely on the
distributions of such differences, I checked whether the distributions are normal by using
graphical plots (e.g., histogram and qq plot) and the Shapiro-Wilk test. I found that
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differences were not normally distributed and therefore a t-test was not possible.
However, because data were independently collected and randomized through the
matching process, I used a pairwise Wilcoxon signed rank sum test to identify the
[median] ATTb and ATTc by deducting NCF values from CF values.
3.3.3.3 Sensitivity analysis
Matching methods are not robust against “hidden bias” arising from the existence of
unobserved confounders that simultaneously affect assignment to CFP and outcomes.
The legitimacy of matching is based on the assumption that the assignment to CFP is
ignorable only when all the confounding covariates are employed in the analysis
(Thoemmes & Kim, 2011). Testing this assumption is empirically impossible as
measuring all confounders is practically not possible. Therefore, sensitivity analysis is
essential to help understand the robustness of research findings to potential hidden bias.
Following the model of sensitivity analysis approach proposed by Rosenbaum (2002, ch.
4) and using the sensitivitymv package in R 1.3, I explored how sustainable my ATTb
and ATTc estimates are in view of potential effects of unobserved confounders. I
quantified the degree to which a key model assumption, that CFP assignment is
effectively random conditional on the matches, must be violated in order for my results to
be reversed. I estimated how strong the effects of unobserved confounders on the CFP
would have to be to change the probability of assignment to CFP that significantly
change my ATTb and ATTc estimates. I used a sensitivity parameter, gamma (Γ), that
shows critical levels of hidden bias as a quantity of difference in the odds of CFP
assignment for two individuals with the same observed confounders but that diverge on
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unobserved confounders. A higher Γ implies that the estimated ATTb and ATTc results
are robust against a greater potential selection bias, while a low Γ implies that even a
mild selection bias could make the estimate insignificant (where Γ= 1 indicates that no
hidden bias exists). I determined the smallest value of Γ that will change the p-value of
the “true” ATTb or ATTc to a non-significant level (>0.05). When the p-value exceeds
0.05, the Γ value indicates the CF to NCF odds ratio at which ATTb or ATTc estimates
are sensitive to hidden bias. Since the sensitivity analysis for insignificant ATTb and
ATTc is not meaningful, I computed critical level of hidden bias only for the significant
CFP effects (Hujer et al., 2004).
3.4 Effect of Community Forestry Program
3.4.1 Effect of community forestry program in biodiversity conservation
The ATTb depicted the varied estimates and levels of sensitivity of the effect of the CFP
on eH’ across forest categories (Table 3.4). CF and NCF plots in the overall forest, lower
and higher slopes, open canopies and Terai are significantly non-identical (p<0.05). The
positive differences in the ATTb in those forests indicate significant positive effects of the
CFP on eH’. The estimated ATTb in the overall forest, lower slopes, higher slopes, open
canopies and Terai are 0.65, 0.60, 0.67, 0.88 and 0.73, respectively. The sensitivity
analyses showed that these results can be nullified by the influence of unobserved
confounders if the odds ratios of CF to NCF are changed by 1.24, 1.18, 1.36, 1.45 and
1.26 in overall forest, lower slopes, higher slopes, open canopies and Terai, respectively.
In lower altitudes, the result showed that CF and NCF plots are identical and therefore the
ATTb is insignificant (p>0.05).
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Results showed CF and NCF plots in higher slopes are non-identical (p<0.05). The
negative ATTb in those forests indicate a significant negative effect of the CFP on eH’.
The estimated ATTb in higher slopes is -0.51. Sensitivity analysis showed that results can
be nullified by the influence of unobserved confounders even if forest plots are fully
randomized. Results in lower altitudes, closed canopies and hills showed that CF and
NCF plots are identical and therefore ATTb is insignificant (p>0.05).
Table 3.4 Average effect of CFP on eH’ and sensitivity analysis by forest category.
Columns 2 and 3 depict the number of CF/NCF plots and average SMD of confounders before and after
match across forest categories. Columns 4, 5-6 and 7 depict the ATTb, lower and upper confidence levels
of ATTb and p-values, respectively. The last 2 columns provide information about the sensitivities of
estimated results to the unobserved confounders. For sensitivity estimation, trimming was carried out at 2.5
times the median of the absolute matched difference, which is analogous to a trimmed mean that trims 5%
of outliers from each tail. As there is no need, I did not calculate the hidden bias for insignificant CFP
effects.
Forest
No. of Average
ATTb
Hidden bias
category
CF/
SMD of
Point
Lower Upper pCritical
PNCF
observed
estimate
confid confid value
level of
value
confounders
ence
ence
bias (Γ)
(before/afte
limitlimitr match)
95%
95%
Overall forest

325/70

0.40/0.11

0.65

0.31

1.00

0.000

1.24

0.052

Lower
altitude

170/60

0.37/0.21

0.38

-0. 14

0.90

0.151

Higher
altitude

155/28

0.24/0.08

-0.51

-0.98

-0.04

0.031

1

0.998

Lower slope

89/28

0.39/0.11

0.60

0.08

1.14

0.024

1.18

0.052

Higher slope

236/56

0.26/0.17

0.67

0.27

1.07

0.001

1.36

0.052

Terai

120/43

0.36/0.13

0.73

0.20

1.22

0.008

1.26

0.052

Hill

205/41

0.16/0.10

-0.29

-0.71

0.17

0.201

Open canopy

149/41

0.42/0.09

0.88

0.39

1.36

0.001

1.45

0.053

Closed
canopy

176/53

0.39/0.13

0.33

-0.04

0.07

0.072
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These ATTb estimates mask variations in the effectiveness of effects of CFP on eH’ across
forest categories. The 95% confidence interval (CI) across forest categories indicates that
there is no difference in the ATTb in overall forest, lower slopes, higher slopes, open
canopies and Terai. Open canopies have higher CF to NCF odds ratios, narrower CI and
lowest SMD (average = 0.09, range = 0.02-0.24), indicating ATTb that is less sensitive to
hidden bias, with the more precise ATTb estimate and the better match between CF and
NCF plots reflecting a more robust ATTb estimate.
3.4.2 Effect of community forestry policy intervention in carbon
The ATTc depicted varied estimates and levels of sensitivity of the effect of CFP on
AGTSC across forest categories (Table 3.5). CF and NCF populations in lower slopes
and open canopies are non-identical (p<0.05). The positive ATTc in those forests indicate
significant positive effects of CFP on AGTSC. The estimated ATTc is 25.51 t ha-1 in
lower slopes and 25.84 t ha-1 in open canopies. The sensitivity analysis showed that these
results can be nullified by the influence of unobserved confounders if odds ratios of CF to
NCF are changed by 1.10 and 1.66 in lower slopes and open canopies, respectively.
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Table 3.5 Average effect of CFP on AGTSC and sensitivity analysis by forest category.
Columns 2 and 3 depict the number of CF/NCF plots and average SMD of confounders before and after
match across forest categories. Columns 4, 5-6 and 7 depict the ATTc, lower and upper CI of ATTc and pvalues, respectively. The last 2 columns provide information about the sensitivities of estimated results to
the unobserved confounders. For sensitivity estimation, trimming was carried out at 2.5 times the median of
the absolute matched difference, which is analogous to a trimmed mean that trims 5% of outliers from each
tails. As there is no need, I did not calculate the hidden bias for insignificant CFP effects.
Forest
No. of
Average
ATTc
Hidden bias
category
CF/
SMD of
Point
Lower Upper pCritical P
NCF
observed
estimate confid confid value
level of value
confounders
ence
ence
bias (Γ)
(before/after
limitlimitmatch)
95%
95%
Overall forest

325/70

0.40/0.11

-15.11

-26.35

-3.49

0.012

1

0.982

Lower altitude

170/60

0.37/0.21

11.21

-7.42

31.02

0.243

Higher altitude

155/28

0.24/0.08

-22.81

-37.41

-9.39

0.001

1

0.999

Lower slope

89/28

0.39/0.11

25.51

0.98

55.14

0.041

1.10

0.053

Higher slope

236/56

0.26/0.17

-17.72

-30.93

-4.22

0.010

1

0.989

Terai

120/43

0.36/0.13

5.87

-15.88

32.80

0.585

Hill

205/41

0.16/0.10

9.76

-1.48

22.04

0.089

Open canopy

149/41

0.42/0.09

25.84

12.22

41.36

0.000

1.66

0.051

Closed canopy

176/53

0.39/0.13

-2.93

-18.06

12.11

0.694

Results showed CF and NCF plots in the overall forest and higher slopes are nonidentical (p<0.05). The negative ATTc in those forests indicate a significant negative
effect of the CFP on AGTSC. The estimated ATTc in overall forest is -15.11 t ha-1 and in
higher slopes is -17.72 t ha-1. Sensitivity analysis showed that results can be nullified by
the influence of unobserved covariates even if forest plots are fully randomized. In lower
altitudes and Terai, results showed that CF and NCF plots are identical and therefore
ATTc are insignificant (p>0.05).
These ATTc estimates mask variations in the effectiveness of effects of CFP on AGTSC
across forest categories. The 95% CI across forest categories indicates that the ATTc in
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the overall forest is lower than in lower slopes, open canopies and Terai. Also, the ATTc
in the overall forest is not different from higher slope forest within a 95% CI. Similarly,
ATTc in lower slopes and open canopies do not differ within a 95% CI. However, open
canopies have higher CF to NCF odds ratio, narrower CI than lower slopes and lowest
SMD (average = 0.09, range = 0.02-0.24), indicating that the less sensitive ATTc is to
hidden bias, the more precise the ATTc estimate and the better match between CF and
NCF plots reflecting a more robust ATTc estimate.
3.5 Discussion
At the national level, my results clearly illustrate that the CFP has a positive effect on eH’
and a negative effect on AGTSC. However, the CFP has mixed and differential (positive,
negative and no) net effects on eH’ and AGTSC across altitudes, slopes, geographic
regions and canopy covers. For instance, the CFP has a significantly positive effect on
biodiversity conservation in overall forest and forests in higher and lower slopes, Terai
and open canopies while it has a significantly negative effect in higher altitudes and no
significant effects in lower altitudes, hills and closed canopies. In terms of carbon stocks,
the CFP has significantly positive effects in lower slopes and open canopies while it has
significantly negative effects in overall forest and forests in higher altitudes and higher
slopes and no significant effects in lower altitudes, Terai, hill and closed canopy. These
variations in ATTb and ATTc might reflect different forest management and silvicultural
practices of communities across the country. Different forest management practices are,
principally, encouraged by the CFP to suit local context. Under the broader management
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guidelines, local forestry technicians prepare and the district forest officers approve the
forest operational plan for each community forests separately.
My ATTb estimates reflect findings from earlier studies. While significant positive ATTb
reflects the contribution of CFP in revitalizing degraded forestlands (Gautam et al., 2002;
Luintel et al., 2009), significant negative ATTb indicates the reduction of biodiversity in
CF likely due to the communities’ preference for valuable species and selective
harvesting (Acharya, 2004) and higher pressure in the CFs. The biodiversity of CF
depends on context and communities’ efforts in conservation and their use of biomass
(Shrestha et al., 2010). Because communities manage forests for subsistence goods and
services of which choice of species constitutes a major part, the results reflect a wide
variety of locally targeted, specific forest management and conservation actions carried
out by individual communities. It also reflects that the policy and programmatic
frameworks for biodiversity conservation that were in place may have been too broad,
failing to provide locally suitable, practical guidelines to the communities and DFO staff.
For instance, Nepalese biodiversity strategy plans have provided space to local
governments and other line agencies (e.g., agriculture offices, national park and wildlife
reserve authorities, soil conservation offices, non-governmental organizations, etc.) for
decision-making. However, such line agencies might not have comprehensive knowledge
and/or appropriate human resources for decision making and planning for biodiversity
conservation.
My ATTc estimates reflect unexpected and complex results that confirm and also
contradict the earlier findings of Bluffstone et al. (2015), which concluded that the CFP
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effect on carbon is not significant. The result of ATTc may need to be viewed in the
context of basic objectives and management practices in CF, disturbance regime, base
carbon stock and spillover effect of CFP on NCF, all of which might not have been well
captured in the observed confounders. As degraded forests were handed over to the
communities, they primarily managed forest “passively” i.e., focusing on conservation
and conservative use of forest products (Yadav et al.; 2003), limiting the productivity and
carbon stock potential of forests. As extraction of timber and other woody forest products
from CFs is legal, the carbon stored in CFs reflects only that retained after harvesting.
Base-carbon affects biological and physical potential of forest to sequester carbon. For
instance, low carbon may constrain the biological potential of carbon sequestration but
provides physical space to store additional future carbon. Also, NCFs in the vicinity of
communities could have mimicked CFP with an aim to demonstrate their commitment to
forest management and persuade DFOs to designate those forests as CFs in the future.
Community and household surveys carried out as part of this research reflect that 80% of
communities have written rules and >60% of households engage in forest management in
NCFs.
The possibilities of positive, negative or no contributions of CFP to both ATTb and ATTc
demonstrate the need for a review of CFP particularly in view of the CBD and REDD+.
While the positive effects on ATTb and ATTc indicate the worthiness of continuation of
the program, the neutral and negative ATTc in some CFs signals the need for greater
policy, management, monitoring and motivational support to communities managing
forests under CFP.
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Differential ATTb and ATTc in different categories of CFs clearly indicate the
inadequacy of evaluating the effect of CFP at a national scale to identify local effects.
Different results across geographical regions suggest that rather than a “cookie-cutter
approach” or “one size fits all approach” to forest management, adaptive and areaspecific policies and programs are critical for promoting biodiversity conservation and
sequestering greater amounts of carbon. Such policies and programs need to provide
communities with practical guidance for adopting locally suitable management options.
This finding challenges the government’s current efforts toward CFP that promote
homogenous policy and program irrespective of geographic and topographic regions and
forest qualities. For instance, the same CFP is applicable for natural and plantation
forests, large and small-sized forests, forests in high-hill, mid-hill and Terai and opencanopy and closed canopy forests.
It is less clear whether estimated ATTb and ATTc in different categories of forests are
driven by different factors and/or differing degrees of bias. These results point to the need
for future research that helps explore why CFP is effective in some areas but ineffective
in others, how communities interpret and apply CFP, and what motivational and capacity
building supports to communities are needed. Such research would contribute to
amending current the CFP to make it more compatible with the CBD and REDD+. In the
context of inadequacy of systematic database systems instituted in Nepal (and perhaps in
many tropical countries), creating national and landscape level databases is critical to
advance future studies.
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My research adds to the slowly growing literature of impact evaluations of communitybased conservation policy (e.g., Bluffstone et al.; 2015; Pandey et al. 2014; Thapa-Magar
& Shrestha; 2015). First, my study employs a robust method to reduce bias in estimates
and strengthens the claim that I have measured the causal effects of Nepal’s CFP.
Second, this is one of the pioneer studies of its kind investigating the impact of CFP on
biodiversity and carbon. Finally, in contrast to the more common focus on aggregate
deforestation and poverty outcomes of conservation programs, I responded to recent calls
emerged due to introduction of REDD+ (UNFCCC, 2007b; UNFCCC, 2015) to better
tailor impact evaluations by examining outcomes on biodiversity conservation and carbon
storage.
The estimation of ATTb and ATTc is invariably difficult although matching based on a
large number of confounders helps overcome difficulties. Certain levels of imbalance in
the observed confounders still exists, although SMD is brought below an acceptable cutoff point, resulting in increased variations in ATTb and ATTc estimates. As there are
multiple, applicable matching algorithms with certain pros and cons, and tradeoffs need
to be made in choosing matching techniques, there is room for questions on the quality of
matching. The use of only SMD as a criterion to check the acceptability of the match
balance may also be considered a limitation of my analysis. Also, despite the execution of
sensitivity analysis, analytical and communicative complexities are prevalent in my
results as they are sensitive to the possibility of spurious variation driven by the effect of
unobservable confounders. Unobservable confounders may include the existence of
strong leaders and communities’ motivation affecting the probability of assignment to the
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CFP, carbon sequestration and/or biodiversity conservation. Also, the estimated results
do not reflect the bias induced by biological (e.g., life form, species, growth rate, wood
density and stage of life cycle), and ecological (e.g., successional stage, species
composition, disturbance regime) factors.
3.6 Conclusion
Using cross-sectional data and robust analytical methods for evaluating ATTb and ATTc
estimates, I demonstrate the existence of positive, neutral and negative effects of CFP
nationally, across geographic, topographic, and geo-political regions and in different
forest qualities. Specifically, the CFP in lower slopes and open canopies perform
positively and at higher altitudes performed negatively in both biodiversity conservation
and carbon storage. The CFP at lower altitudes, closed canopies and hills do not reflect a
unique path to contribute to biodiversity and carbon stock. My findings provide critical
methodological and substantive information in evaluating the communities’ contributions
to global environmental initiatives such as CBD and REDD+ by providing impacts on
biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration. In aggregate, evidence demonstrates
that the CFP has the potential to conserve biodiversity and sequester carbon in forests,
albeit differently across geography, topography and canopies. This indicates the
possibility of CFP to support global environmental initiatives such as CBD and REDD+.
However, dedicated, appropriate policies that motivate and capacitate communities to
implement active forest management and enhance performance of forests in conserving
more biodiversity and stocking more carbon is critical to realize this potential.
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As the CFP is a viable approach towards incentivizing communities that spur effects in
NCF as well, attempts to promote CFP are crucial for obtaining local communities’ real
and authentic contributions for promoting biodiversity conservation and carbon
sequestration. Equally important is to create awareness of global environmental issues
and build capacity to contribute to addressing those issues at the local level.
Given that average effects of CFP at the national level may be misleading, heterogeneous
effects of CFP across forest categories provide useful insights for regional or landscapelevel planning. Regional analyses provide critical insights about the factors responsible
for different levels of effectiveness of CFP. A locally specific cautious approach to
exploring key drivers of heterogeneity is crucial to help make policy and management
plans of biodiversity- and carbon- focused forestry effective. Landscape-level
assessments of CFP effectiveness may add value in informing locally suitable planning
and management of forest resources.
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Chapter 4: An Assessment of Causal Effects of the Nepalese Community Forestry
Program on Equity in Benefit Sharing
4.1 Introduction
Equity reflects justice in day-to-day interactions primarily in relation to the distribution of
social, political and economic goods and bads (Rawls, 1971). Equity implies “fair
treatment or due reward” (Schroeder & Pisupati, 2013:13) and involves getting a “fair
share” which is not biased by any personal stake and varies according to different
situations and cultures (Fisher, 1989). Equity ideally refers a fair opportunity i.e., free
from bias to everyone to participate in decision making processes and thus access
resources with their full potential as they need (Luintel, 2006). However, the concept of
equity is founded on the equality of liberty, opportunity, rights, welfare, utility and
income (Sen, 1992:ix).
In the context of environmental management, equity is related to resource access,
livelihood security and social dignity of resource-managing communities. Equity
motivates resource-managing communities and leads to economic and ecological gains
(McDermott, 2009). Equity is increasingly considered to be a legitimate basis for the
management of forest commons (e.g., Li, 1996); it affects credibility, acceptability and
social and environmental outcomes of any environmental management initiative, and
particularly those that emerge at the global level and trickle down to the local level. For
instance, one such contemporary environmental initiative is the United Nations Program
on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, conservation and
enhancement of forest carbon and sustainable management of forest in developing
countries (REDD+), in which equity is a paramount concern. REDD+ values “forest” as
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an economic commodity (Arsel & Buscher, 2012; Mcafee, 2012), which affects historical
and contemporary forms of resource distribution and appropriation (e.g. Fairhead et al.,
2012), leading to change in power and economic relations between different forestry
actors. Researchers, policy makers and practitioners have raised concerns that REDD+
may lead to social conflict and environmental degradation if equity at the grassroots level
is not addressed properly (e.g., Boyce et al., 2007; Patel et al., 2013; Paudel et al., 2015).
Focusing on equity rather than on participation would allow more effective
implementation of conservation initiatives (Smith & McDonough, 2001). However,
equity remains a largely unresolved issue in the REDD+ development process.
Many governments in tropical countries promote decentralized forestry to engage forestdependent communities and households in the conservation and management of local
forests. Decentralized forestry formally provides forest rights and incentives to forestmanaging communities (Charnley & Poe, 2007; Larson & Soto, 2008). However, studies
have shown both positive and negative results of decentralized forestry on equity and
thereby have invited debates. Advocates pitch decentralized forestry as an effective
approach to increasing access to forest benefits and improving rural wellbeing. For
instance, the Right and Resource Initiative (2014) indicates that decentralized forestry
may reduce rural poverty and halt environmental degradation; it provides vital resources
and safety nets to the rural poor for subsistence livelihoods, particularly when other
sources of production and income are not available (Beck & Nesmith, 2001).
Decentralized forestry devolves power to local communities fostering the evolution of
equitable, fair and inclusive processes and outcomes (e.g., Luintel, 2006) and reduces
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inequity by generating positive change at community and higher levels (e.g., McDermott
& Schreckenberg, 2009). Persha and Anderson (2014) and Luintel (2006) argue that
equity in decentralized forestry has improved primarily due to the support of forestry
projects and civil society organizations. The World Bank (2001) also noted that legally
recognized community forest user groups (CFUGs) receive required supports from a
range of state and non-state actors to improve institutional practices and forest
management.
Agrawal and Ostrom (2001) point out that the equity outcome of forest commons,
including decentralized forestry, may not necessarily meet this expectation. In line with
this view, Adhikari (2005), Agarwal (2001), Iversen et al. (2006) and Thoms (2008)
demonstrated that even much acclaimed decentralized forestry in South Asia is associated
with communities’ unequal forest access. Because of the inequitable distribution of forest
products, the gap between the rich and poor forest users is widening and the involvement
of poor and marginalized communities in forest management activities has been
decreasing in the hills of Nepal (Lamichhane & Parajuli, 2014). Mahanthy et al. (2009)
demonstrated that inequity in benefit sharing is common due to differential power, assets
and capacity among forest-managing community members. Inequities are reinforced by
local as well as wider societal processes (Hobley, 2007) including unequal economic and
cultural power relations (Bist, 1991), elite capture6 in decision-making and resources

6

Elite capture refers to the process by which local elites – individuals with superior political status due to

economic, educational, ethnic or other social characteristics – take advantage of their positions to amass a
disproportionately large share of resources or a flow of benefits, curtaining the benefits of the larger
population (Bardhan, 2002).
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(Persha & Anderson, 2014) and exclusion of the poor in economic growth and
commercialization processes (Beck & Nesmith, 2001).
Robust empirical evaluations of the effectiveness of decentralized forestry on equity are
lacking. This knowledge gap not only limits the credibility and legitimacy of the program
but also constrains the contributions of forestry actors in implementing innovative,
productive forest management systems in the context of newly emerging global
environmental concerns: biodiversity loss and carbon emissions. Therefore, empirical
research using robust analytical methods to conclusively evaluate the linkages between
decentralized forestry and equity is critical.
The Nepalese community forestry program (CFP), a form of decentralized forestry, is one
of the most popular and extensive forestry programs to revitalize degraded forests in
Nepal and fulfill the demand of subsistence forest products in rural areas. The CFP offers
a unique opportunity for research to examine causal effects of CFP on equity; it has ~40
years of history of managing ~1.8 million hectares of forest engaging ~ 42% of people
from a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds (Department of Forest [DoF], 2015).
The CFP legally recognized ~19,000 CFUGs, as autonomous public bodies having
perpetual succession that can acquire, possess, transfer or manage property (Ministry of
Law and Justice [MoLJ], 1993). The sizes and compositions of forests and CFUGs vary
across Nepal based on the distribution of forests and households. Diverse sizes and
compositions of forests and households create opportunities to understand, and pose
challenges to achieve, equity in forest-managing communities. In addition, many
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communities across the country are traditionally informally engaged in forest
management and bring a range of age-old benefit sharing practices.
In this research, I specifically examined whether and how much the Nepalese CFP
increases equity at the household level across the country, social groups (i.e., poor, dalit,
indigenous peoples and women-headed households) and geographic regions (i.e., hill and
Terai). I used cross-sectional data collected in 2013 from nationally representative
random samples of community forest (CF) and corresponding non-CF (NCF). I used both
survey data from 130 forests and perceptions of 1300 forest-managing households. I
followed a quasi-experimental, matching method - a method that mimics randomized
experiments - to analyze the data. The most prominent challenge in this research is to
deduce an appropriate counterfactual i.e., estimating equity in the absence of the program
(e.g., Hendrickson, 2008).
By using only matched samples, I estimated the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT) i.e., the average effect of CFP on equity (ATTe). As national-level estimates may
mask a great deal of variation in the effectiveness of CFP across social groups and
geographic regions, I estimated the ATTe across social groups and geographic regions. I
also estimated whether, where and to what extent my ATTe can be affected by hidden
bias caused by unobserved confounders by testing the sensitivity. My research broadens
and deepens the scientific understanding on the effects of CFP on equity. The CFP effect
on equity across social groups and geographic regions will provide crucial insights and
evidence to researchers, policy makers and managers to plan future courses of action
targeting different social groups and/or geographic regions. My results and methods are
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applicable beyond Nepal to include countries that are practicing decentralized forestry.
My results provide critical insight to assist REDD+ policy makers and planners in
making REDD+ and CFP more compatible.
4.2 Research methods: site, design and analytical model
The data presented are part of an on-going multi-disciplinary research project funded by
the World Bank and jointly implemented by Portland State University and ForestAction
Nepal (Bluffstone et al., 2015). The primary aim of the project was to assess the potential
synergies and/or tradeoffs between Nepalese forest commons and REDD+.
4.2.1 Sampling methods, sample sites and data collection
The researchers at ForestAction Nepal and I randomly selected 65 CFUGs from a pool of
137 national random samples of CF impact from a study conducted by the Nepalese
government during 2010-2012. We then randomly selected ten households from each
CFUG to survey. The field team selected 65 non-CFs in such a way that they were
analogous to CFs in a variety of characteristics. Such non-CFs were close, but not next to,
CFs to avoid being used simultaneously by the same people. The selected CFs and nonCFs were distributed in the tropical, sub-tropical and temperate climatic zones of 42 (out
of 75) districts across the country (Figure 4.1). A total of 1300 households (i.e., 10
households from each group) were surveyed.
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Figure 4.1 Distribution of sample plots
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By considering research objectives, a set of structured questions were developed for
household surveys. Questions were tested in two CFUGs for their appropriateness and
finalized before conducting the survey. Both quantitative (e.g., resource availability,
socio-economic profile) and qualitative (e.g., perspectives and experience) data were
collected from the survey. The data were collected from March to May 2013.
ForestAction recruited a team of 25 Nepalese field researchers with whom I closely
worked to collect the data. Each of the field researchers had undergraduate degrees in
forestry (12) and graduate degrees in social science (13), and ForestAction trained them
to conduct forest surveys, forest inventories and household surveys.
The training helped field researchers develop a common understanding of the research
and use the questionnaires effectively and efficiently during the survey. Field surveyors
were closely monitored and constantly supported by the ForestAction researchers to
ensure effectiveness of the survey and quality of the data.
4.2.2 Variable selection and measurement
4.2.2.1 Treatment and control variable
The treatment variable is the implementation of a formal CFP. Local communities and/or
the Nepalese government opt into CF status and therefore the data are observational and
non-random. On the other hand, the non-implementation of CFP, specifically the NCFs,
are the control variable. The resources of the NCFs are formally owned by, and
management responsibilities are vested on, the Nepalese government. However, they
remain open access (i.e., depletable, rivalrous and non-excludable resources), and local
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communities may protect and use the resources available in NCFs, particularly nontimber forest products, for fulfilling subsistence needs.
4.2.2.2 Outcome variable: the equity index
Equity constitutes contextual, procedural and distributional dimensions (McDermott et al.
2013). While contextual dimension refers to the overall capacity of different actors to
participate and capture benefits; procedural dimension focuses on the equity in decisionmaking processes; and the distributional dimension focuses on how costs, benefits and
risks are distributed among actors across time and space (McDermott et al. 2013). All
these dimensions are important to understand the dynamics of equity in forest commons.
Households may use different substantive, context-specific criteria and indicators to
view, and have different experience and perspectives on, these dimensions. Household
perceptions on these dimensions help create a complete picture of the equity.
Considering these dimensions, I constructed a composite measure of equity, equity index.
Equity index here means an accumulation of scores from a variety of individual items
that reflect above-mentioned three dimensions that together form households’ perceptions
of equity. Such an index is intended to capture most of the underlying ethics and
assumptions of ongoing processes of forest governance and management in relation to
benefit sharing. I used four different variables that reflect fairness at different stages of
benefit-sharing systems to construct equity index (Table 4.1). First, I used the fairness in
benefit sharing rules that exist in the community. Such rules are normally prepared
considering the socio-cultural and economic practices and resource condition of the
community, which primarily reflect the contextual dimension of equity. Second, I used
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the fairness in the processes of benefit sharing, which is generally guided by certain
governance principles. Such principles construct the foundation of procedural dimension
of equity that affect the level of acceptance of benefit sharing practice. Third, I used the
fairness of benefit sharing practice, which reflects the distributive aspect of equity in
benefit sharing. At last, I also used the existence of conflict related to benefit sharing. It is
important indicator that captures the satisfaction of forest users at the post benefit sharing
situation.
Table 4.1 The description of indicators used to create the equity index and their measurement units.
Variables
Definition of variables
Measurement unit
Fair rule

Existence of fair system of benefit sharing
(e.g., selecting forest beneficiaries).

1-5= Strongly disagree to
strongly agree

Fair process

Existence of fair and acceptable system of
accessing and distributing forest benefits.

1-5= Strongly disagree to
strongly agree

Fair practice

Existence of fair benefits distribution.

1-5= Strongly disagree to
strongly agree

Existence of
conflicts

Existence of conflicts and problems in
benefit distribution.

Yes= 1, Neutral= 3, No= 5

The four variables had different weights depending on the data structure. I identified the
weights of these variables considering variations explained by each variable through
employing a principal component analysis (PCA)7 as described in Organization for the

7

PCA is a simple and non-parametric method of extracting relevant information from confusing data sets

that helps extenuate the problem of multicollinearity and identifies the weights for each factor in
constructing an index. It reduces dimensionality of a data set by performing a covariance analysis between
factors and maximizes the correlation between the original variables and new uncorrelated factors that are
mutually orthogonal. Then the eigen technique, which transforms the original set of inter-correlated
variables into a new set with an equal number of independent uncorrelated factors, is used for factor
analysis. The principal factors are then classified in decreasing order according to the percentage of the
variance they account for so that most of the variation in the data can be described by the first few factors
that can be used to represent the original observations.
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Economic Cooperation and Development (2008). In order to prevent any single variable
having undue influence on the composite index, I standardized the variables by creating a
correlation matrix, so as to have zero means and unit variance at the start of the analysis.
Diagnostic checks of the data showed that the assumptions for PCA were met;
specifically, all the variables were correlated or internally consistent with the principal
components (Cronbach alpha = 0.71 (95% CI = 0.66-0.75)); sampling adequacy scored as
“middling” to “meritorious” (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure = 0.64 - 0.85); and the data
had different variance (Bartlett test of sphericity = 211.14, df = 3, p-value = < 0.000). As
my interest is to determine the weights for each variable to construct an equity index (as
opposed to minimizing the number of variables), I selected the principal components that
have at least one of the following attributes: (i) factors that have associated eigen values
larger than one commonly known as the Kaiser criteria (Lise, 2007; Manly, 2005), (ii)
factors that contribute cumulatively to the explanation of the overall variance by > 60%,
and (iii) factors that contribute at least 10% to the overall variance explanation. On these
bases, I selected all four principal components for further analysis, which explain 100%
of total variance (Table 4.2). Then I performed a varimax rotation of the original
variables associated with each of the selected principal components and ensured that each
variable is maximally correlated with one principal component (Jolliffe, 2002). The
rotation provided component loadings for each variable. Components that have a greater
than 0.5 loading were identified as important for further analysis.
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Table 4.2 Eigenvalues of the reduced correlation matrix, factor pattern and weight factor.
Principal
components

Eigen
values

Proportion
of variance

Cumulative proportion of variance

1

1.60

0.40

0.40

2

1.06

0.27

0.67

3

0.77

0.19

0.86

4

0.57

0.14

1

Variables/

Compo

Compo

Compo

Compo

components

nent 1

nent 2

nent 3

Fair rule

-0.47

0.43

Fair process

-0.50

Practice

Cronbach alpha = 0.71
nent 4

Component
scores*

Variable
weights*
*

-0.32

0.71

0.071

0.1080

0.44

-0.25

-0.71

0.100

0.1518

-0.33

0.23

0.92

0.05

0.161

0.2450

Existence of conflict

-0.66

-0.75

-0.04

0.01

0.327

0.4970

Explained variance

1.60

1.06

0.77

0.57

0.659

1

Proportion of
explained variance

0.40

0.27

0.19

0.14

Note: Numbers in bold face denote a dominating indicator (factor loading ≥ 0.5 or ≤ -0.5).
* Factor scores: square the significant loading factor (>0.5) and multiply by the proportion of explained
variance.
** Variable weights: Factor scores scaled to 1.

Component 1 accounted for 40% of the common variance and received moderately
negative loadings from process (-0.50) and conflict (-0.66). Component 2 explained 27%
of the common variance and received moderately negative loadings from conflict (-0.75).
Component 3 accounted for 19% of total variance and largely depended on the actual
practice of benefit distribution (0.92). Component 4 accounted for 14% of the common
variance and received positive leadings from rule (0.71) and negative leadings from
conflict (-0.71). By using the factor loadings and the proportion of variance explained by
principal factors, I calculated the weight for each indicator (Table 4.2). The weights for
rule, process, practice and conflict-related indicators of equity are 0.1080, 0.1518, 0.2450
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and 0.4970, respectively. I used these weights to construct the equity index for each
household. The equity index ranges from 0 – 1, where 0 means no equity at all and 1
means full equity. The descriptive statistics of equity index and the variables used are
given in the Table 4.3 below.
Table 4.3 The descriptive statistics of equity index and the variables used to construct index.
Variables

Mean

Standard deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Equity index

0.75

0.16

0.2

1

Fair rule

3.57

1.00

1

5

Fair process

3.49

1.03

1

5

Fair practice

3.62

0.91

1

5

Existence of conflicts

4.27

1.32

1

5

4.2.2.3 Confounding variables
As communities opted into CFP or were persuaded by the Nepalese government to join,
there were a number of confounders that affected treatment status and/or outcomes.
Confounders may inflate bias in ATTe estimates (Heinrich et al., 2010). I controlled the
confounding variables (“confounders”) through a matching process so as to minimize
error and identify the optimum matches between CF and NCF households. Matching
allowed me to develop a counterfactual control group from NCF households that
provided information about what would have happened in regards to equity in the
absence of CFP (Pattanayak, 2009).
On the basis of the literature and focus group discussions with 10 different forestmanaging communities and one consultation meeting with experts at Kathmandu in the
year 2012, I identified 14 observable confounders determined by forest/topographical
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characteristics and communities. I analyzed the relationships between confounders and
CFP assignment for social groups and geographic regions (Table 4.4). If treatments were
randomly assigned, the coefficients should be statistically insignificant.
Forest area: Forest area had a significant positive effect on the probability of a forest
being selected under CFP; each additional hectare of forest adds to the expected log odds
of selection by 0.0136, 0.0150 and 0.0260 in poor, indigenous people and women-headed
households, respectively. This is reasonable as the local communities prefer to obtain
larger-sized forests, which provide more resources. Also, the Nepalese government has a
policy of handing over forest according to the community’s willingness and capacity to
manage (MoLJ, 1995).
Forest topography: Forest slope had a significant positive effect on the probability of a
forest to be selected under CFP; each additional degree of slope adds to the expected log
odds of selection by 0.2889 in poor communities and 0.3871 in indigenous populations.

This is reasonable as the Nepalese government prioritized CFP in the hills.
According to my data, some of the confounders such as the number of forest user
households, travel time to the nearest road-head from the forest, altitude, moisture, soil
erosion, presence of Shorea robusta, years of communities conserving the forest,
broadleaf-conifer gradient, NDVI 1989, proportion of households living in the village for
at least 2 generations, proportion of ethnic population and proportion of poor are not
significantly related with the assignment into the CFP. However, these confounders are
important decision criteria during the initial years of CFP and therefore I kept them in the
analytical models (see Section 3.3.2.3).
115

Table 4.4 Observed confounders and their relationships with CFP assignment.
The model of relationship is generated using the probit model considering probability of forest selected
under CFP as the dependent variable and confounders as independent variables. The coefficients and the pvalues in parentheses are reported. A blank space indicates that the concerned confounder is not used in the
model to achieve matching in the particular forest category.
Confounders

Overall

Poor

Dalit

Indigen
ous
people

Womenheaded
household

Hill

Terai

Intercept

- 4.7807
(0.821)

- 6.3900
(0.5966)

- 5.3460
(0.563)

- 3.2570
(0.794)

- 4.6678
(0.641)

- 9.3334
(0.843)

- 8.6736
(0.782)

Forest area

0.0229
(0.201)

0.0136
(0.004)

0.0125
(0.177)

0.0150
(0.0427)

0.0260
(0.0454)

Number of forest
user households

- 0.0003
(0.921)

0.0005
(0.802)

- 0.0023
(0.687)

0.0003
(0.879)

0.0013
(0.626)

0.0874
(0.129)

- 0.0008
(0.799)

Travel time to
nearest road

- 0.1290
(0.965)

0.0036
(0.998)

- 0.9081
(0.529)

- 0.9320
(0.618)

- 0.1298
(0.915)

- 0.5000
(0.906)

1.4275
(0.761)

Altitude

0.0043
(0.552)

0.0019
(0.521)

0.0028
(0.435)

0.0010
(0.774)

0.0018
(0.520)

-0.0017
(0.889)

0.0024
(0.834)

Slope

0.4287
(0.191)

0.2889
(0.041)

0.2136
(0.175)

0.3871
(0.000)

0.1936
(0.173)

0.077
(0.902)

0.2785
(0.581)

Years of
communities
conserving forest

- 0.0185
(0.850)

0.0095
(0.875)

….

- 0.0076
(0.904)

0.0698
(0.533)

0.0411
(0.765)

- 0.0533
(0.693)

Moisture gradient

- 0.5303
(0.849)

- 0.1289
(0.930)

….

0.0171
(0.991)

- 0.0897
(0.939)

1.1895
(0.845)

- 0.2624
(0.946)

Broadleaf-conifer
gradient

- 0.0152
(0.997)

0.1528
(0.951)

1.2342
(0.638)

0.0857
(0.979)

- 0.5451
(0.799)

- 0.3970
(0.961)

-

Presence of Shorea
robusta

- 2.4642
(0.736)

- 2.1250
(0.537)

- 1.4444
(0.672)

- 2.4325
(0.570)

- 2.2193
(0.482)

0.0166
(0.999)

- 6.5473
(0.541)

Presence of soil
erosion

- 2.3708
(0.703)

- 1.6544
(0.6157)

- 1.1956
(0.714)

- 2.3963
(0.544)

- 1.0150
(0.703)

0.5564
(0.962)

- 0.3563
(0.969)

NDVI 1989

- 5.0557
(0.863)

- 3.2999
(0.817)

- 4.6764
(0.756)

- 3.7593
(0.833)

- 5.8121
(0.648)

- 0.8161
(0.989)

7.0555
(0.875)

Proportion of
ancestral household
(≥ 2 generations)

2.8127
(0.775)

3.8418
(0.464)

3.3199
(0.578)

2.1773
(0.738)

3.8504
(0.464)

3.8518
(0.894)

2.4360
(0.855)

Proportion of
ethnic population

0.6005
(0.937)

0.6275
(0.838)

0.0622
(0.988)

1.7862
(0.267)

- 0.2088
(0.941)

1.1531
(0.915)

2.5174
(0.817)

Proportion of poor
population

- 2.8359
(0.749)

….

- 2.6501
(0.603)

- 3.5630
(0.528)

- 1.9762
(0.627)

5.5278
(0.791)

- 8.1204
(0.509)

0.0185
(0.225)
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4.2.3 Specification of analytical models
4.2.3.1 Addressing confounding through matching
Because my study is observational, the principal problem in the estimation of ATTe is
identifying counterfactuals and dealing with confounders particularly due to selection
bias. Selection bias arises when the household of a CFP is not randomly selected, and CF
households differ from NCF households for reasons other than their status as CF or NCF
per se. Differences of CF and NCF confounders can effect equity in benefit sharing even
if the CFP had no effect. Therefore, confounders need to be controlled and
counterfactuals need to be identified so as to make matched households as good as
random or statistically equivalent. Matched CF and NCF households allow comparisons
to achieve unbiased measures of ATTe.
I used a two-step method -nonparametric matching and analysis- for identification of
counterfactuals and estimation of ATTe. Matching, an ex post identification technique,
reduces selection bias and generates a comparable set of NCF observations by controlling
observed confounders (Ho et al., 2007; Imben, 2004; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983;
Sekhon, 2011). Appropriate matching asymptotically balances observed confounders by
removing bias (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). However, there is no consensus on how
exactly matching ought to be done, how to measure the success of the matching
procedure, and whether matching estimators are sufficiently robust to misspecification
(Heckman et al., 1998).
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Matching reduces selection bias only if assumptions of ‘conditional independence or
unconfoundedness’ and ‘common support’ are met (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).
Conditional independence means that CFP status is independent of the confounders.
Matching techniques control selection bias fully if all confounders determining CFP
assignment are used, which is rare in practice as there could also be unobservable
confounders. This is a strong assumption as it makes CF and NCF households
comparable and must be justified by the data at hand. The “common support condition”
refers to two important conditions – positive probability (i.e., existence of the positive
probability of being both CF and NCF for values of each covariate) and overlap condition
(i.e., finding adequate comparable matches that help reduce model dependence).
I developed matching and propensity score models by including 10 to 14 observed
confounders that affect the assignment into CFP and equity in benefit sharing (Table 4.4).
As the confounders were measured at community and forest level, I applied a mixedeffects probit model to estimate propensity scores at household level and fed the scores
into the matching model. I found almost all variances (> 99%) of random effects were
attributed to the community or forest level effect and the fixed effects of confounders are
discussed in Section 3.3.2.3.
I used ≤ 0.25 standardized mean difference (SMD), a common numerical balance
diagnostic criterion to check whether matching is satisfactory and acceptable, as the cutoff point for matching adjustment (Rubin, 2001). The SMD expresses the “standardized
bias” and is similar to an effect size relative to the variability observed and estimated by
dividing ‘difference in mean outcomes between CF and NCF households’ by “standard
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deviation of outcome among CF households”. Reducing SMD minimizes the overt bias
due to measured covariates in the ATTe estimates (Imai et al., 2008; Rubin & Thomas,
1996).
I matched CF and NCF households based on observed confounders by using the MatchIt
package of R 3.2.2 (Ho et al., 2007). I used the matching with replacement approach,
allowing each selected NCF household to be matched to ≥1 CF households, as this option
provides the highest degree of balance and the lowest conditional bias (Abadie & Imbens,
2006; Dehejia & Wahba, 1999). I used genetic matching, a multivariate matching method
that optimizes the confounding balance between CF and NCF households by automating
the process of finding good matches using an evolutionary search algorithm (Diamond &
Sekhon, 2013). It is a generalization of propensity score and Mahalanobis distance
matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985), which minimizes balance measures by using pvalues. Mahalanobis metric is considered a useful tool to determine similarities between
CF and NCF households even when there are several correlated confounders
(Mahalanobis, 1936; Rubin, 1980).
In my dataset, I found that genetic matching was the best suited algorithm to balance the
maximum number of confounders bringing the SMD below the acceptable limit
(Appendix B). As the post-matching SMD for confounders is less than 0.25 standard
deviations and the average SMD across all covariates are 0.11, 0.16, 0.14, 0.14, 0.12,
0.09 and 0.15 for the overall CFUG and across poor, dalit, indigenous and womenheaded households, and households across hills and Terai respectively, I was able to find
a sufficient number of NCF households that are similar to CF households based on the
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covariates included in the matching process. It was not possible to bring SMD down to
≤0.25 for travel time to the nearest road-head in poor and women-headed households and
presence of Shorea robusta in the Terai while keeping as many covariates as possible in
the matching models. However, I included those confounders in the matching models, as
they contributed positively to achieving overall balance. A total of 20-63% NCF
households are matched with CF households in overall CFUGs and across different social
and geographic categories. The average ratios of matched NCF to CF households range
from 1:2.43 to 1:4.69 across social and geographic categories.
4.2.3.2 Comparing equity
The ATTe is estimated on the basis of average difference of equity in benefit sharing
between matched CF and NCF households. As the test of average difference relies on the
distributions of such differences, I checked whether the distributions are normal by using
graphical plots (e.g., histogram and qq-plot) and the Shapiro-Wilk test. I found that such
differences were not normally distributed and therefore using a t-test was not possible.
However, data were independently collected and randomized through the matching
process, so I used the pairwise Wilcoxon signed rank sum test to identify the [median]
ATTe by deducting NCF values from CF values. I compared equity at different levels and
categories such as for overall national level and across poor, dalit, ingigenous people and
women-headed households and households across hills and Terai regions. Such results
are crucial to identify the disaggregated local impact of CFP on the basis of recipients of
benefit sharing.
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4.2.3.3 Sensitivity analysis
Matching methods are not robust against “hidden bias” arising from the existence of
unobserved confounders that simultaneously affect assignment to CFP and outcomes.
The legitimacy of matching is based on the assumption that the assignment to CFP is
ignorable only when all the confounding covariates are employed in the analysis
(Thoemmes & Kim, 2011). Testing this assumption is empirically impossible as
measuring all confounders is practically not possible. Therefore, sensitivity analysis is
essential in helping us understand the robustness of research findings to potential hidden
bias.
Following the model of sensitivity analysis approach proposed by Rosenbaum (2002, ch.
4) and using the sensitivitymv package in R 1.3, I explored how sustainable my ATTe
estimates are in view of the potential effects of unobserved confounders. I quantified the
degree to which a key model assumption - CFP assignment is effectively random
conditional on the matches - must be violated in order for my results to be reversed. I
estimated how strong the effects of unobserved confounders on the CFP would have to be
to change the probability of assignment to CFP that significantly change my ATTe
estimates. I used a sensitivity parameter, gamma – Γ, that shows critical levels of hidden
bias as a quantity of difference in the odds of CFP assignment for two individuals with
the same observed confounders but who diverge on unobserved confounders. A higher Γ
implies that the estimated ATTe results are robust against a greater potential selection
bias, while a low Γ implies that even a mild selection bias could make the estimate
insignificant (where Γ = 1 indicates that no hidden bias exists). I determined the smallest
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value of Γ that will change the p-value of the “true” ATTe to a non-significant level
(>0.05). When the p-value exceeds 0.05, the Γ value indicates the CF to NCF odds ratio
at which ATTe estimates are sensitive to hidden bias. Since the sensitivity analysis for
insignificant ATTe is not meaningful, I computed the critical level of hidden bias only for
the significant CFP effects (Hujer et al., 2004).
4.3 Effect of the Community Forestry Program on equity in benefit sharing
Table 4.3 depicts that the absolute value of average equity at the household level is
consistently higher in CF than NCF in all social and geographic categories. In CF, the
highest average equity is in the hill households (0.6591) and the lowest is in the dalit
households (0.6044). In NCF, highest average equity is in the women-headed households
(0.6032) and the lowest is in the indigenous households (0.5228).
The ATTe depicted the varied estimates and levels of sensitivity of the effect of the CFP
on equity across social groups and geographic regions (Table 4.5). Equity in CF and NCF
households in the overall, hills, poor, dalit and indigenous households is significantly
non-identical (p < 0.05), indicating the significant positive effects of the CFP on equity.
The estimated ATTe in overall CFUGs, hills, poor, dalit, and indigenous households are
0.0937, 0.0921, 0.0505, 0.1391 and 0.0794, respectively. The sensitivity analysis showed
that these results can be nullified by the influence of unobserved confounders if the odds
ratio of CF to NCF is changed by 2.01, 1.74, 1.91, 1.14 and 2.61 in overall, hill, poor,
dalit, and indigenous households, respectively. In women-headed households (WHH) and
households in the Terai, the results showed that CF and NCF households are identical and
therefore the ATTe are insignificant (p > 0.05).
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My national level ATTe estimates may mask variations in the effectiveness of the CFP on
equity at household level across social categories and geographic locations. Therefore, I
estimated ATTe separately for each social category. I found that ATTe estimates are
overlapped within a 95% confidence interval in the overall, hill, poor, dalit and
indigenous households. The higher CF to NCF odds ratio, narrower confidence interval
and lowest SMD after matching indicate the less sensitive ATTe to unobserved
confounders, the more precise ATTe estimate and the better match between CF and NCF
households. These statistics reflect the more robust ATTe estimates.
Table 4.5 Average effect of the CFP on equity at household level and the results of sensitivity analysis by
social group and geographic region.
Column 1 is the social and geographic categories of households. Columns 2 and 3 contain the number of
CF/NCF plots and average SMD of confounders before and after matching across social and geographic
categories. Columns 4 and 5 present the mean equity of CF and NCF, respectively. Columns 6, 7-8 and 9
depict the ATTe, lower and upper confidence levels of ATT e and p-values, respectively. The last two
columns provide information about the sensitivities of estimated ATT e to the unobserved confounders. For
sensitivity estimation, trimming was carried out at 2.5 times the median of the absolute matched difference,
which is analogous to a trimmed mean that trims 5% outliers from each tails. I computed the critical level
of hidden bias only for the significant CFP effects at a 5% level of significance.
Social
category/geo
graphic
regions

No. of
CF/
NCF

Mean SMD
of observed
confounders
(before/ after
matching)

ATTe

Hidden bias

Point
estimate

Lower
confiden
ce limit95%

Upper
confiden
ce limit95%

pvalue

Critical
level of
bias (Γ)

P value

Overall

650/199

0.40/0.11

0.0937

0.0705

0.1103

0.000

2.01

0.055

Poor

253/73

0.41/0.16

0.0921

0.0577

0.1226

0.000

1.91

0.053

Dalit

94/33

0.70/0.14

0.0505

0.0108

0.0974

0.017

1.14

0.054

Indigenous
people

284/114

0.33/0.14

0.1391

0.1102

0.1699

0.000

2.61

0.051

WHH

122/26

0.47/0.12

0.0324

-0.0000

0.0705

0.062

-

-

Hill

410/101

0.20/0.09

0.0794

0.0505

0.1066

0.000

1.74

0.051

Terai

240/99

0.40/0.15

0.0215

-0.0108

0.0597

0.268

-

-
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4.4 Discussion
My analysis contributes to the recently emerging literature on the impact of formal
forestry decentralization on equity (e.g., Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Luintel, 2006; Naidu,
2009; Thoms, 2008). By using nationally representative samples from formal community
forest user groups and informal forest commons, and by utilizing robust analytical
methods that reduced bias, I demonstrated the effect of CFP on equity. At the national
level, different social groups such as poor, dalit, indigenous and women-headed
households, and households in the hills, my results clearly demonstrated that the CFP has
a positive effect on equity. However, the CFP has no statistically significant effects on
equity at the household level in Terai region. My results showed the variations in ATTe
across social and geographical groups of households. Such variations reflect the
implementation of locally-suitable, equitable benefit sharing mechanisms in community
forest user groups as provisioned by the Forest Act 1993, Forest Regulations 1995 and
Community Forestry Directives 2008.
My ATTe estimates reflect findings of earlier studies. My results are in line with a recent
study by Khanal Chhetri et al. (2016), who demonstrated, by taking Gini decomposition
approach in five community forest user groups, that the community forests have an
equalizing effect on household income distribution in the Nepalese hills. Significant
positive ATTe reflects the contribution of CFP in institutionalizing rules and practices of
benefit sharing in an equitable way as provisioned by the Community Forestry Directives
(Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation [MoFSC], 2008). The CFUGs receive support
from a range of state and non-state actors (World Bank, 2001) that help reduce elite
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capture of resources and promote more equitable benefit sharing (Luintel, 2006; Persha &
Anderson, 2014). Larson et al. (2010) argued that the forest management regime is an
important factor in determining the access and distribution of benefits from resources.
Formal forest decentralization, e.g., CFP, delegates certain levels of forest rights to the
CFUGs, resulting in increased opportunities to participate in forestry activities thereby
increasing their ownership in decision making and equitable access to forest resources
(Adhikari et al., 2014; Ribot & Peluso, 2003). The households participating in forestry
activities are more likely to benefit from the forest’s resources because of their better
access to information and ability to voice concerns (Agrawal & Gupta, 2005).
Community and household surveys carried out as part of this research reflect that 80% of
communities have written rules and >60% of households engage in forest management in
NCF. Utilizing both traditional and scientific knowledge on forest ecosystem and sociocultural practices, local communities might have made and implemented locally
appropriate forest management plans that increased forest productivity. Increased forest
productivity generally increases the ability of communities to access higher quantities of
products from the forest commons as indicated by Naidu (2011) in case of the Western
Himalayas. The formally registered CFUGs regulate the extraction and distribution of
forest products (Meynen & Dornboos, 2005), control the free-riding problem or control
unauthorized resource extraction and establish equitable benefit sharing systems.
The insignificant ATTe across Terai regions indicates a lack of dedicated institutional
rules and practices on the part of communities and supporting agencies including
government forest bureaucracy, civil society organizations, and donor funded projects.
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The Nepalese government had (and still has) low priority in promoting community
forestry in the Terai region (Bhattarai, 2006; MoFSC, 2000; World Bank, 2001). The
local communities also have a tendency to sell forest products to increase their CFUG
funds, which they generally spend in community development activities ignoring specific
needs of households (Lamichhane & Parajuli, 2014). Elites generally dominate the CFP’s
decision-making process in the Terai, which reinforces inequity in the communities.
These elites often develop clandestine relations with timber traders and corrupt forest
officials and misuse forest resources for their own benefits. They tend to homogenize the
community and ignore socio-economic and cultural diversity, while trying to develop
groupthink and reduce the freedom of members to make choices. At times, the elites and
decision-makers do not make the CFUG transactions transparent but rather make them
complex and ambiguous, so as to justify their exercise of discretionary power.
Differential ATTe across households in social and geographic categories clearly indicates
the inadequacy of evaluating the effect of CFP at the national scale to identify local
effects. Such ATTe further indicate the need of flexible and social group- and areaspecific policies for promoting equitable benefit sharing. While the positive ATTe
indicates the need to continue the existing CFP practices, the neutral ATTe signals the
need of greater, targeted support at policy, monitoring and motivational levels for the
forest-managing communities so as to ensure equitable benefit sharing. Neutral effects of
CFP in the Terai indicate a clear need to review the current community practices on
benefit sharing. As the population structure, socio-cultural diversities, and services and
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input provided by government and non-government institutions vary across geographic
area, reviewers need to carefully account such variables.
It is less clear whether my ATTe estimates are driven by different factors and/or differing
degrees of bias. These results point to the need for further research exploring why CFP is
effective in promoting equity in different social groups and hills, but not in the Terai,
how communities interpret and implement benefit-sharing provisions made in CFP, and
what motivational and capacity building supports to forest-managing communities could
be useful to ensure and strengthen equitable benefit sharing. Such research would
contribute to amending the current CFP to improve intended outcomes of CBD and
REDD+.
My research indicates that the Nepalese CFP may provide groundworks and lessons for
promoting equity in REDD+. However, a closer look at different factors affecting equity
at national to local levels is crucial. Scientists may be required to empirically answer the
questions regarding who should get REDD+ benefits, how, why, when and where.
Equally important is the examination of broader political and economic forces at
regional, national and international levels to understand the dynamics of equity at local
level. Such forces influence the shaping of household perceptions about equity in benefit
sharing and influence the quantity and flow of REDD+ benefits.
My research is the first of its kind to take the case of Nepalese community forestry and
bring insights into the less studied and complex issue of equity. The estimation of ATTe
is challenging, particularly using cross-sectional data. However, by matching based on a
large number of confounders I was able to overcome difficulties associated with non127

random sampling. However, a certain level of imbalance in the observed confounders still
exists, which might have added variation to my ATTe estimates. As there are competing
multiple, applicable matching methods available, each of which has certain advantages
and disadvantages, the methods I used may be debated. The use of SMD to check the
match balance may capture only certain dimensions of balance. Challenges may remain
in terms of understanding and communicating the results of the sensitivity analysis.
4.5 Conclusion
With the commencement of incentive-based forest management, including decentralized
forestry and REDD+, equity has been one of the critical outcomes of concern and is
therefore gaining momentum for examination and promotion. Equity has been crucial in
motivating forest-managing communities and in gaining their support for effective
management of forest commons. Using cross-sectional data and robust analytical
methods for evaluating ATTe estimates, I demonstrated the unique path and positive
causal effect of Nepalese CFP on household level equity except in the Terai. My results
indicated the need for review of benefit sharing practices in the Terai and continue (or
further improve or strengthen) such practices at the national level and across households
in the hills, and poor, dalit, indigenous and women-headed households.
My findings demonstrated the CFP’s potential to support CBD and REDD+ initiatives.
However, dedicated, appropriate policies promoting equity in the Terai are critical for
motivating communities in managing forests. A cautious approach in exploring key
drivers of heterogeneity in equity is important to helping policies and institutions
contribute to the objectives of CBD and REDD+. One policy initiative may be the
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promotion of CFP in non-CFP areas so as to promote equitable benefit sharing and
therefore incentivizing those communities. My research indicates that government in
tropical countries may need to devote more attention to decentralization policies to make
the CBD and REDD+ initiatives more equitable, legitimate, credible, acceptable and
effective in the long run. By addressing equity, CBD and REDD+ may be better
positioned to achieve their conservation, carbon sequestration and poverty reduction
goals.
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Chapter 5: An assessment of collective action drivers of carbon storage in Nepalese
forest commons
5.1 Introduction
The institutional practices governing conservation and management of forests in tropical
countries are defined by national and/or sub-national policies and regulations (Constance
et al., 2010). Over the last four decades, governments in many tropical countries have put
significant efforts into promoting “collective action”8 of local communities to stop
deforestation and manage forests sustainably by recognizing traditional forest
management practices and introducing formal decentralization reforms (Charnley & Poe,
2007; Larson & Soto, 2008). Approximately 15.5% of global forests (and 25% of
developing country forests) are under the control of communities (“forest commons”) and
the trend of community control through decentralization reforms is increasing (Rights
and Resources Initiatives [RRI], 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2008; World Bank, 2009). Local
communities’ primary objective in the management of forest commons is to access
essential subsistence forest products such as fuelwood, timber and grass (e.g., MoFSC,
1988).
Understanding the role of forest commons in mitigating climate change is important due
to their potential roles as both sinks and sources of carbon (Dixon et al., 1994) and
contributions to both rural livelihoods and biodiversity conservation. These roles are now
even more valued following the emergence of the Reducing Emissions from

8

Collective actions are activities carried out together or jointly by a specified community or a group of

people that share the same or similar objectives so that all individuals enhance their socio-economic,
cultural or political status as a group or community.
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Deforestation and Forest Degradation, Conservation and enhancement of forest carbon
and sustainable management of forest in developing countries (REDD+) program. Past
studies show potentially mixed results from communities’ conservation efforts in relation
to carbon storage and emissions. For instance, Nepalese forest commons have contributed
to reducing deforestation and forest degradation and restoring degraded forest ecological
systems (Chapagain & Banjade, 2009; Department of Forest Research and Survey
[DFRS], 2015; Gautam et al., 2002). On the other hand, local communities’ practices of
harvest and use of forest products (e.g., timber, fuelwood, and fodder), grazing and
burning can result in a significant loss of biomass carbon (Brown et al., 1991; Flint &
Richards, 1994; Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], 1993; Goldammer, 1990).
This paradox results from the diverse array of communities, and their actions governing
the management and use of local forests.
The REDD+ program should incentivize forest-dependent communities (Phelps et al.,
2010a) and follow common property design principles or collective action drivers
(Agrawal & Angelsen, 2009) to achieve its objectives, particularly in the forest
commons. Using a worldwide data set, Chhatre and Agrawal (2009) demonstrated the
possibility of both tradeoffs and/or synergies between climate and livelihood benefits of
forest commons. Other scholars have also indicated both the opportunities and challenges
of REDD+ to forest commons management. For instance, REDD+ brings unconventional
forestry investment to developing countries (Eliasch, 2008), which can improve forest
governance and bolster global conservation efforts (Wollenberg & Springate-Baginski,
2010), promote low carbon paths to development, generate livelihoods and reduce
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poverty. On the contrary, it may overlook livelihood related outcomes for local
communities (Campbell, 2009; Coomes et al., 2008; Putz & Redford, 2009;
Ratsimbazafy et al., 2011) and gradually alienate local people from accessing resource in
the future (Khatri, 2012; Phelps et al., 2010b). REDD+ will not necessarily serve to help
local community-managed forests (Ostrom, 2010). Dyer and Counsel (2010) warned that
the local people in developing countries may need to shoulder the cost of emissions
reduction instead of benefiting from REDD+.
Shyamsundar (2008) demonstrated that effective forest commons contribute to better
forest management particularly through promoting fairness in rules and sanctions and in
participation and monitoring (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2000, 2001). Beyene et al. (2013)
indicated that the collective action of forest-managing communities is one of the most
important determinants of carbon storage within forest commons. However, there is
limited empirical evidence that indicates whether better collective action practices lead
forests to sequester more carbon (Beyene et al., 2013; Chazdon, 2008; Jodha, 2008;
Ranganathan et al., 2008). Without empirical evidence of such relationships, it is difficult
to decide whether and how to implement REDD+ in forest commons effectively i.e., by
synergizing carbon and livelihood outcomes.
To understand the relationship between collective action drivers and carbon storage, I
conducted research on Nepalese forest commons. I took empirical data collected in the
year 2013 from a nationally representative random sample of 130 forest commons (both
forests and communities) and 1300 households. Nepal is one of the pioneer countries into
the practice of different legally supported models of forest commons over the last 40
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years. Approximately 42% of the population from a wide range of socio-economic
groups are formally organized in ~19,000 Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs),
which are engaged in managing ~1.8 million hectares of forests (Department of Forest,
2015). The high level of diversity of forests and communities in Nepal has posed
challenges, and created opportunities, to understanding the varied relationships between
collective action drivers and carbon storage.
Using a multivariate regression analysis, I analyzed the relationship between different
collective action drivers of Nepalese forest commons and forest carbon. Specifically, I
considered the communities’ (i) forest conservation history, (ii) engagement in forest
management, (iii) ability to modify rules, (iv) ability to enforce sanctions, (v) social
capital and (vi) transparency of forestry affairs as part of collective action drivers, as they
constitute critical elements of common property design principles (Agrawal & Chhatre,
2006; Agrawal, 2001, 2000; Anderson & Agrawal, 2011; Cox et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2009,
2000, 1990; Shyamsundar, 2008). Reflecting most findings of the collective action
literature, I hypothesize that these drivers are positively associated with more carbon
storage in forest commons. I discuss the research findings in view of literature and
emerging REDD+ program. Finally, I suggest analytical areas for consideration while
designing and implementing REDD+ at the local level so as to increase carbon storage in
forest commons.
5.2 Methods
The data presented are part of an on-going multi-disciplinary research project funded by
the World Bank and jointly implemented by Portland State University (PSU) and
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ForestAction Nepal (Bluffstone et al., 2015), a non-governmental, non-profit
organization that works on issues related to forestry, agriculture and climate change in
Nepal. The primary aim of the project was to assess the potential synergies and/or
tradeoffs between Nepalese forest commons and REDD+.
5.2.1 Samples and data collection
We (ForestAction researcher and I) selected a total of 130 forests and forest user groups
(FUGs), both CFUGs and non-CFUGs, for data collection (Figure 5.1). We randomly
selected 65 CFUGs from a pool of 137 national random samples from the CF impact
study conducted by the Nepalese government during 2010-2012. We randomly selected
ten households from each CFUG to be surveyed. The field team selected 65 non-CFUGs
in such a way that they shared a variety of characteristics with the CFUGs. Such nonCFUGs were close, but not next to CFUGs to avoid being used simultaneously by the
same people. The field researchers randomly selected 10 households in each non-CFUG
to be surveyed following same methods to those used in selecting CFUGs. Data were
collected by the field team from February to May 2013.
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Figure 5.1 Distribution of sample plots
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5.2.1.1 Forest data collection
We conducted a pilot survey in 2012 to estimate the required number of sample plots for
forest data collection. We selected 45 sample plots from nine community forests (CFs)
across physiographic regions to capture the greatest possible heterogeneity in plot basal
area, a proxy of forest biomass. We deployed a field team to measure the diameter at
breast height (DBH) of trees and saplings and estimated the basal area for each plot.
Considering variance of basal area, we calculated the number of required sample plots to
obtain results within 10% error and 95% confidence level using the standard formula (1)
(Saxena & Singh, 1987).
N = Cv2t2/E2…………………………….(1)
Where,
N = Required number of sample plots;
Cv = Coefficient of variation, s/µ (s = standard deviation and µ = sample mean);
E = Standard error, s/√n (n = sample number);
t = Value of student-t distribution for (n-1) degree of freedom and 95%
confidence level.
A total of 325 plots were estimated to be required for sampling in the CFs. Sample plots
were distributed among the 65 CFs, which were selected from the random samples
chosen for the national community forestry impact study conducted by the Nepalese
government during 2010-2012. ForestAction recruited a team of field researchers, with
whom I closely worked to collect the data. Each of the field researchers had
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undergraduate degrees in forestry, and ForestAction trained them to conduct forest
surveys and inventories.
As the size of CF varies, we allocated 3-7 sample plots in each forest based on the
quintile distribution of forest size. As the forest size in the hill and Terai markedly differ,
we considered different quintile ranges for hill and Terai (Table 5.1).
Table 5.1 Distribution of sample plots in community forests.
Quintile
distribution

Hill

Terai

Sample
plots/forest

<18

<113

3

13

39

2 quintile

18-64

113-154

4

13

52

3rd quintile

1st quintile
nd

Forest size (ha)

No. of
forest

No. of
plots

64-91

154-335

5

13

65

th

91-183

335-526

6

13

78

th

≥183

≥526

7

13

91

4 quintile
5 quintile

The field team carried out forest boundary surveys using a geographic positioning system
(GPS), prepared forest maps on graph paper and estimated forest areas. The maps of CFs
from the forest operational plans were copied onto the graph paper, so as to divide areas
into smaller grid cells. To identify the sample plots, the cells were selected randomly and
X and Y coordinates of the center of selected cells were identified. The coordinates were
then fed into the GPS unit to locate the plots in the forests. Due to differences in non-CF
size, it was possible to allocate 295 plots following forest size criteria and standards
given in Table 5.1. The distribution of sample plots is also given in Figure 5.1.
A circular plot with a radius of 8.92m was selected for collecting environmental data and
measuring trees (>5cm DBH), which is suitable for moderate to dense vegetation and has
been used widely (MacDicken, 1997). Using the same center, second and third plots with
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radii of 5.64m and 1m were established to measure saplings (1-5cm DBH) and count
seedlings, respectively (Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2 Size and shape of sample plot

The team measured height and circumference of each tree and sapling by using a
clinometer and linear tape, respectively. The team also recorded the vernacular name of
each species and collected data on canopy, slope, altitude, aspect, soil color, soil depth,
fire occurrence, forest encroachment, forest product collection, soil erosion and grazing
for each plot. Other data include forest area and management regime, number of
households using the forest and distances of forest from the nearest road and district
headquarters. Some data such as households in the CFUG were obtained from the CF
impact study conducted by the Nepalese government in 2010 (in which I trained field
enumerators and conducted preliminary data analysis).
5.2.1.2 Institutional data collection
The PSU and ForestAction researchers (including myself) developed a set of structured
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questions for community and household surveys by considering research objectives, and
input from focus group discussions with CFUG members, and consultations with national
level experts. We then tested the questionnaires in two CFUGs for their appropriateness
and finalized them before conducting the survey. We collected both quantitative (e.g.,
resource availability, socio-economic profile) and qualitative (e.g., perspectives and
experience) data from the survey.
I closely worked with the ForestAction-recruited team of field researchers to conduct the
household surveys. ForestAction recruited 12 field researchers having masters degrees in
social sciences and trained them to develop a common understanding of the research and
to use the questionnaires effectively and efficiently during the survey. We closely and
constantly monitored the field researchers and supported them to ensure effectiveness of
data collection and quality of data.
5.2.2 Analytical framework: variables, hypotheses and model specifications
I used a multivariate regression model to assess the relationships among collective action
drivers and carbon storage in Nepalese forest commons. I constructed a two-stage model.
First, I estimated the above ground tree and sapling carbon (AGTSC) for each forest.
Second, I constructed a regression model with carbon storage as the continuous
dependent variable and collective action drivers as the explanatory variables. I also
included some of the critical conditioning variables in the model.
5.2.2.1 Variable selection and hypotheses setting
I carefully selected dependent, explanatory and conditioning variables to accomplish my
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research. Table 5.2 presents these variables and how I operationalized them, and Table
5.3 shows the descriptive statistics of each variable. I collected forest data at tree and
plot levels, and social data at community and household levels as appropriate. I
transformed all tree and plot data to the forest level, and all household data to the
community level so as to match the data at common levels for further analysis. As the
forest commons are held in common and are primarily influenced by community-level
decisions, I focused my analysis at the forest common level.
Dependent variable: My dependent variable is carbon storage, which is measured in tons
per hectare. I used the equations (1) and (2) proposed by Chave et al. (2005) to estimate
Above Ground Biomass (AGB), which were prepared by using a large dataset of trees
across different climatic conditions of global sites. Equations (1) and (2) were used to
estimate AGB in dry (<1500mm average annual rainfall) and moist (1500-4000mm
average annual rainfall) forests respectively. These equations were used by several
researchers and recommended by the Nepalese government (Ministry of Forest and Soil
Conservation [MoFSC], 2010). Approximately 5% of sample plots in my study were in
dry forests.
AGB (kg) = 0.112*(

D2H)0.916 ………………….………. (1)

AGB (kg) = 0.0509*

D2H ………………………………..(2)

Where,

= Specific gravity of wood (g cm-3);
D = DBH;
H = Tree height
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Table 5.2 Descriptions of dependent, explanatory and conditioning variables and their measurement units.
All data collected at household level are aggregated at the community level and data collected at tree and/or
forest plot levels are aggregated at the forest level for analysis.
Notation

Variables

Measurement unit

A. Dependent variable
Carbon

Average estimated carbon per hectare of a forest

Metric ton per hectare

B. Explanatory variables
Conservation
duration

Number of years households in a community have
been engaged in the conservation of forest

Number of years

Participating
households

Proportion of households in a community that
participate in forest management activities

Proportion

Rules
modification

Community members can modify the rules of forest
management and benefit sharing as per their interest

Yes = 1, No = 0

Penalty
system

Forest-managing community has a system of
punishment for forest offenders

Yes = 1, No = 0

Public audit

Existence of public audit practice in the forestmanaging community

Yes = 1, No = 0

Mutual trust

Average level of mutual trust among forestmanaging community members

Yes = 2, Neutral = 1, No = 0

C. Conditioning variables
Terai

The forest is in the plainland (“Terai”) of the country

Yes = 1, No = 0

Forest area

The total area of a forest

Hectare

NDVI 1989

NDVI was calculated for the month of November
1989

Index

Indigenous
population

Proportion of indigenous peoples and ethnic groups
in a forest-managing community

Proportion

Group
household

The total number of households in a forest-managing
community

Number

Road distance

Time required for two-way travel to the nearest road

1= <2 hours, 2 = 2 hours - <
half-day, 3 = half-day, 4 = >
half-day

Altitude

The average altitude of a forest

Meter

Slope

The average slope of a forest

Degree
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I used species-based wood specific gravity recommended by Jackson (1994) to calculate
biomass. Where such information was not available, I used a general value derived from
average specific gravity of associated species (same genus and family) within a forest
type (Baker et al., 2004; Ngugi et al., 2011). I used Nepal-specific biomass equations
developed by Tamrakar (2000) to estimate the green biomass of individual saplings,
which was converted into dry biomass by multiplying with species-wise fractions or the
average of the associated species as identified in the literature. I used the fractions 0.627,
0.613, 0.58, 0.57, 0.545, 0.517, 0.5 and 0.45 for Quercus species, Lyonia ovalifolia,
Pinus roxburghii, Alnus nepalensis, Schima wallichii, Shorea robusta, Terminalia
tomentosa and Pinus wallichiana, respectively (Bhatt & Tomar, 2002; Jain & Singh,
1999; Kataki & Konwer, 2002; Shrestha et al., 2006; Wihersaari, 2005). For unidentified
species, or where wood density information was not available for the species, genus or
family, I used the overall mean wood density obtained from the database of species
compiled for this study (Baker et al., 2004). I converted AGB into carbon stock by
multiplying by 0.50 (IPCC, 2006), which I used as a proxy for carbon storage for further
analysis.
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Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of variables.
The total number of observations is 130.
Notation
Carbon
Conservation duration
Participating households
Rules modification
Penalty system
Public audit
Mutual trust
Terai
Forest area
NDVI 1989
Indigenous population
Group household
Road distance
Altitude
Slope

Mean
92.53
13.63
0.74
0.87
0.91
0.37
1.65
0.56
129.05
0.4253
0.40
295.82
1.42
774.14

Standard deviation
76.06
4.98
0.33
0.28
0.20
0.48
0.46
0.50
161.72
0.0887
0.30
588.09
0.80
633.38

Minimum
0.1685
1
0
0
0
0
0.1
0
1.1
0.1216
0
12
1
75

Maximum
362.09
23
1
1
1
1
2
1
1088
0.5775
1
6081
4
2410.6

15.79

12.63

0

46.25

Explanatory variables: I selected six critical collective action drivers that constitute
critical elements of common property design principles and used them to explain carbon
storage. These are the communities’ (i) forest conservation history, (ii) engagement in
forest management, (iii) ability to modify rules, (iv) ability to enforce sanctions, (v)
social capital and (vi) transparency of forestry affairs. I selected these variables on the
basis of the existing literature and theoretical expectations in explaining management
outcomes of forest commons (e.g., Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006; Agrawal, 2001, 2000;
Anderson & Agrawal, 2011; Cox et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2009, 2000, 1990; Shyamsundar,
2008). Specially, I considered design principles for better collective action as proposed
by Ostrom (1990), which includes (i) clear group boundaries, (ii) match rules governing
the forest commons to the local needs and conditions, (iii) ensure the ability of
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communities to modify rules, (iv) ensure monitoring and graduated sanctions, (v) resolve
disputes and (vi) strengthen bottom up planning and partnership. Examination of these
collective action drivers helps explain variation in forest management outcomes including
carbon storage (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Andersson & Gibson, 2007; Gibson et
al., 2005).
On the basis of the literature, I hypothesized that my explanatory variables are positively
associated with carbon storage. For instance, the history of communities’ conservation
efforts reflects the outcomes of forest commons such as biomass and/or carbon.
Generally, more years of conservation result in larger-sized trees and more carbon
storage (Luyssaert et al., 2008). For instance, forest carbon stocks in mid-hill Shorea
robusta forest proportionally increased with management duration at the rate of 2.6 Mg
ha-1yr-1 (Thapa-Magar & Shrestha, 2015). Researchers have reported that an increased
number of households participating in the management of forest resulted in better
management outcomes or forest quality. For instance, as the number of households
increased in the management of community forests in the hills of Nepal, the quality of
forest in terms of cover and area also increased over time (DFRS, 2015). Increases in the
proportion of participating households in a community may lead to consolidation of
efforts towards better management of forests. Participation of more people may increase
the acceptability of decisions at the community level, and also increase the number of
community members who embrace a wide variety of traditional knowledge that helps
enhance the productivity of forests (Posey, 2008 [1985]).
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The ability of forest-managing communities to modify forest management rules and
practices may have positive implications in forest quality. This is particularly true as local
communities can effectively use their locally-specific traditional knowledge about forest
resource management even during times of unanticipated change (Berkes & Folke, 1994;
Turner et al., 2003). The practice of enforcement of rules including penalties at the
community level is a necessary condition for the better management of forests (Gibson et
al., 2005). Enforcement increased the probability of regeneration and decreased the
chance of degradation of forests (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2008). Community forest
managers have identified transparency as a key element of forest governance that
positively contributes to better management of forests. Realizing this, the Nepalese
government has been promoting public audit practices at the community level to increase
transparency in decisions, activities and financial transactions of forest-managing
communities (MoFSC, 2008). It is intuitive that mutual trust among the members of
forest-managing communities reduces conflicts in managing forests and thereby may
likely improve forest management outcomes.
Conditioning variables: I selected eight conditioning variables that have frequently been
cited in the literature as influencing collective actions and forest conditions including
carbon (Andersen & Agrawal, 2011; Beyene et al., 2013; Chaiyo et al., 2011; Chhatre &
Agrawal, 2009). I controlled the effects of these variables so as to address the problem of
potential spurious effects on the association between collective action drivers and carbon
storage. These conditioning variables primarily characterize the ecological region (e.g.,
Terai), resource endowment (e.g., forest area, NDVI), community attribute (e.g., total
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number of households and proportion of indigenous population), geographic distance
(i.e., time taken to travel to and from the road, a proxy of market pressure), and
topographic features (e.g., altitude and slope) in which the forest-managing communities
operate.
Nepalese Terai forests are more diverse than those of the hills, and are dominated by one
of the most commercially valuable species – Shorea robusta. Due to their accessibility to
roads combined with a high demand for timber and a high rate of internal migration,
these forests are under high pressures from forest product extraction and land use change.
The area and quality of forest commons may have effect on the total as well as the
average (i.e., per hectare) carbon in the forest. When all else remain equal, larger and/or
better quality forests may have more carbon and fewer livelihood tradeoffs. Altitude and
slope also affect the productivity and carbon of the forest. The variations in altitude and
slope may affect the availability of temperature, rainfall and nutrients, resulting in varied
rate and quantity of increment in tree sizes, densities, cover and species composition
(e.g., Chapter 2). As Nepal is a mountainous country with a wide range of altitudes (i.e.,
70 - 8848 meters) and slopes (i.e., 0 - ~70 degree), Nepalese forest commons are highly
affected by such variations.
Time required for two-way travel from a community to the nearest road is a critical
measure of remoteness that affects a community’s transportation costs and market access.
Remoteness of forest may therefore be negatively associated with harvest level of forest
products particularly for commercial purposes, leading to greater carbon storage. Due to
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differences in geography and market access, collective actions in remote communities
may be different than in those closer to the roads or markets.
Larger numbers of households in a forest-managing community demand a greater
quantity of forest products and therefore exert higher pressures on forest resources. Also,
more competition for forest products due to high demand makes collective action more
challenging, particularly when the resources are limited. Such situations may result in
lower levels of carbon stocks in the forest commons. Different groups of indigenous
people may have different levels of forest product consumption due to their differential
forest-related socio-cultural practices and economic and livelihood strategies. It is evident
that certain indigenous groups such as Tamang, Rai and Magar consume more fuelwood
than the average community (e.g., Pokharel, 2003). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect
that the effect of indigenous populations on carbon storage may be negative.
5.2.2.2 Model specification
The literature considers better collective actions to be crucial for effective, productive
management of forest-commons resources such as carbon (e.g., Agrawal & Chhatre,
2006; Agrawal, 2001; Anderson & Agrawal, 2011; Ostrom, 1990). I drew my analytical
framework from this literature and hypothesized that better collective actions at the
community level lead to the development of appropriate, productive forest-management
plans, leading to higher levels of carbon storage. As several factors drive collective
actions, we can observe some of the critical ones and interpret their relationships to the
quality of forest with the support of empirical evidence and literature. Many of the
collective action drivers generally do not lend themselves to more robust causal,
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analytical methods such as matching. Therefore, I carried out multiple regression analysis
to understand the relationship between collective action drivers and carbon storage.
Collective actions are likely more complex than simply having a unidirectional influence
on forest quality measures such as carbon storage. Collective actions in forest commons
management constitute the main feature of common property rights, which emerge from
endogenous institutional processes (Heltberg, 2001). Such processes are defined,
developed and perpetuated by socio-cultural values and traditional practices of forest
managing communities through time. Ostrom (1990) highlighted that such processes
have been critical to long-term, stable and successful management of forest resources at
the local scale. Gautam (1991) also identified that local socio-cultural values and
traditional practices have been critical to the emergence and sustenance of Nepalese
forest commons including community forestry. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
a certain level of endogenous institutional process is inevitable in shaping relationships
between collective actions and forest resources in Nepal.
Endogenous institutional processes may introduce potential confounders causing
problems in the identification of the effects of collective action on carbon storage. Such
processes may affect the communities’ decisions to opt into forest commons (causing
selection bias) and to adopt collective actions considering the condition of forest
resources (causing reverse causality). In addition, omission of critical variables in the
model may also cause problems in identification. This problem exists particularly when
we use cross-sectional, observational data. However, based on the literature and data at
hand, my model is almost free from identification problems.
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Selection bias: Different researches such as Alcorn (1981), Barth (2008 [1956]), Posey
(2008 [1985]), and Rappaport (2008 [1967]) have shown that the forest management
behaviors of local communities are affected by multi-generational evolution of sociocultural, economic, environmental and livelihood values, knowledge and practices. The
practice of forest commons management in Nepal has a long history (Gautam, 1991) and
therefore is affected by different socio-cultural, economic and environmental values and
practices over time. Such values and perspectives are generally developed and refined by
the processes occurring at longer temporal and wider spatial scales. Therefore, the current
forest management behaviors of communities in Nepal are path dependent and not chosen
by the communities themselves. The distribution of forests and collective action features
across the communities can be considered as random, as this does not consider outcomes
of interest. Such a situation does not allow selection bias taking place in the collective
action behavior of local communities.
Omitted variables: My model does not suffer from omission of critical variables. As my
sample forest commons are located in human-dominated landscapes, population and
institution related variables are important to include in the model (Chhatre & Agrawal
2009). Therefore, as mentioned in the conditioning variable section (5.2.2.1) I included
critical population and institution related variables in my model (Table 5.2). However, I
did not include community monitoring, equity, clarity in rule, forest management plan
and conflict in my model as they were correlated with the variables included in the
model. For instance, communities’ ability to change rules is positively correlated with
community monitoring practices (ρ = 0.37, p = 0.000), equity in benefit sharing (ρ = 0.58,
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p = 0.000) and clarity in rules (ρ = 0.46, p = 0.000). Similarly, the proportion of
households engaged in forest management practices is associated with the existence of a
forest management plan (ρ = 0.28, p = 0.002); and mutual trust among households is
negatively correlated with conflict in the community (ρ = -0.29, p = 0.001).
Reverse causality: There is a possibility that forest managing communities adopt
collective actions through considering the condition of forest resources. Communities’
collective actions help them restrict access of outsiders to forest resources through their
management as shared private property (McKean & Ostrom, 1995). Therefore, there is
high likelihood that communities take more organized collective actions where higher
forest quantity and better forest quality exist where they perceive that benefits from
collective actions outweigh the costs of such efforts.
As such a situation has not been prevalent in Nepal, reverse causality is either absent or
negligible in my model. The Nepalese government prioritized community forestry, a
robust and formal version of forest commons (Table 5.4), in the hill region (Gilmour &
Fisher, 1991; World Bank, 2001). Most of the forests handed over to the communities as
community forests were degraded (Kanel & Shrestha, 2001). The government has
maintained its control and has been reluctant to hand over forests to communities in the
Terai due to the presence of good quality forests that have high commercial value and
revenue potential (Bhattarai, 2006; Gilmour & Fisher, 1991). Only small to medium sized
barren forests in the vicinity of settlements were handed over to communities in the
Terai.
My data also show that community forestry status has neither positive nor negative
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association with forest quality matrices such as forest area and NDVI 1989 (Table 5.4).
By comparing community and non-community forests, Bluffstone et al. (2015) showed
that community forests do not possess a unique path to store more carbon. Chapter 3 of
this dissertation provides evidence that community forests, in fact, have less carbon
storage than non-community forests. This evidence strongly suggests that better forest
quality did not drive more robust formal community forestry that depicts better collective
action in Nepal. I also checked the correlation between the independent variables and
residual error of my regression model and found that they were not associated (p = 1),
indicating that there is not endogeneity.
Table 5.4 Regression of community forestry status and collective action drivers and resource variables.
Data show that community forestry is statistically, positively associated with five (out of six) collective
action drivers under study reflecting the dominant forest commons literature.
Variables

Coefficient (p-value)

Conservation duration

0.03(0.001)

Participating HH

0.53 (0.000)

Rule change

0.83 (0.000)

Penalty system

0.43 (0.053)

Public audit

0.36 (0.000)

Mutual trust

0.06 (0.590)

Forest area

0.0004 (0.161)

NDVI1989

- 0.77 (0.121)

In recent years, the Nepalese government amended their earlier decision and began
handing over large sized, good quality natural forests to the communities throughout the
country including Terai. However, as Hyde et al. (1996) demonstrated, reverse causality
could be unlikely to be present as the forest-managing communities have no or little
incentive to invest in better collective action in case of abundant forest resources.
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Though I cannot exclude all possibilities of endogeneity, I view that the presence of
common exogenous factors that affect both collective action drivers and forest carbon
storage is unlikely in Nepalese forest commons. Such a logical view is not uncommon
and is shared by Beyene et al. (2013) who also used this assumption in an Ethiopian
forest commons study. Initiatives for effective collective action and forest commons
management are difficult to initiate from the outside but often emerge from complex
processes (Ostrom, 2009; Agrawal; 2007), indicating the possibility of no or very low
level of effect in both collective actions and forest resources. Agrawal and Yadama
(1997) also suggest that collective action mediates the implication of exogenous factors.
In fact, it is difficult to even think of a reasonably likely exogenous shock affecting both
forest commons and collective action drivers. This finding is applicable to Nepal as
Nepalese community forestry policy recognized the community forest user group as an
autonomous body for perpetual succession (MoLJ, 1995). Such a legal provision
strengthened the role of communities, and constrained the role of external factors, in
bringing changes in local level collective actions and forest management outcomes
simultaneously.
Model development and diagnostics: I checked Spearman correlations of carbon storage
with six explanatory variables to assess the strength of their relationships. I also checked
the relationships among the independent variables by using regression. I then built a
multiple regression model using equation (3) to assess the significance of explanatory
variables i.e., to estimate the unbiased coefficient.
Y = β0 + βi(Xi) + ε ............................................................(3)
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Where,
Y

Carbon stock in tons

β0

Value of the function when Xi = 0

Βi

Rate of change in carbon stock for unit change in respective explanatory variables

Xi Explanatory and conditioning variables used in the model
i

1, 2, ……, n

ε

Stochastic error not accounted for in the relationship between explanatory and
dependent variables assumed to follow a standard normal distribution across
observations, and the mean and variance are normalized to zero and one,
respectively.

I carried out the diagnostic check of my regression model by looking at both residual
plots and statistics. First, I graphically checked residual versus fitted values and carried
out the Ramsay Regression Specification Error test to examine for the possibility of nonlinearities of residuals. The p-value >0.05 in the Ramsey test indicates the linearity of
residuals. Second, I looked at the normal Q-Q plot for the possibility of a non-normal
distribution of residuals. Third, I graphically checked the standardized versus fitted
values of residuals and carried out the Breusch-Pagan (BP) test (p-value > 0.05) to
examine the heteroscedasticity, i.e., to test whether the variance of residuals change as
the function of observation. The p-value >0.05 in the Breusch-Pagan test indicates the
homoscedasticity of residuals. Using Cook’s Distance, I also examined whether
individual observations have a strong influence in the model. Observations having < 1
Cook’s Distance value are considered to not have a strong influence in the model.
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Finally, I calculated Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for each variable to check for
multicollinearity. When a value of VIF is >4 for a variable, it is considered as causing
multicollinearity.
5.3 Results and Discussion
Spearman correlations of explanatory and conditional variables with carbon storage are
shown in Table 5.5. The practice of public audit, Terai, forest area, NDVI 1989 and the
number of households in forest-managing communities were positively correlated with
carbon storage (ρ = 0.25 to 0.42), indicating moderately strong correlations between these
variables and carbon storage. On the contrary, the conservation duration, altitude and
slope of forest were negatively correlated with carbon storage. These negative
correlations ranged from -0.15 to -0.25, indicating weak associations between these
variables and carbon storage. Six other variables including proportion of household
engaged in forest management, communities’ ability to modify rules, communities’
practice of penalty system, existence of mutual trust among the forest-managing
households in a community, proportion of indigenous population in a community and
distance of forest from the district headquarters were insignificantly correlated to carbon
storage.
My main interest is in the collective action drivers as listed out as exogenous variables in
the Table 5.2. My exogenous variables in general are not significantly associated; though
there were certain level of association between some of them.
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I developed a multiple regression models to estimate the unbiased coefficients and
significance of collective action drivers to explain carbon storage (Table 5.6). Model 1
that uses only collective action drivers represents indicative results, as the effects could
be spurious. Therefore, I presented six additional regression models (e.g., Models 2, 3, 4,
5, 6 and 7), which contain all collective action drivers and different sets of conditional
variables that dampen spurious effects.
Table 5.5 Spearman correlations of explanatory variables with carbon stocks.
Variables
Conservation duration
Participating households

Correlation (p-values)
-0.15 (0.081)
0.14 (0.122)

Rules modification

-0.02 (0.842)

Penalty system

-0.08 (0.338)

Public audit

0.25 (0.004)

Mutual trust

0.06 (0.474)

Terai

0.27 (0.002)

Forest area

0.42 (0.000)

NDVI 1989

0.38 (0.000)

Indigenous population
Group household

-0.14 (0.103)
0.37 (0.000)

Headquarter distance

-0.09 (0.330)

Altitude

-0.22 (0.011)

Slope

-0.25 (0.004)

Model 2 adds Terai; Model 3 further adds forest area; Model 4 further adds NDVI 1989;
Model 5 further adds number of group households and proportion of indigenous people;
Model 6 further adds distance of forest from the district headquarters; and Model 7
finally adds altitude and slope. All models were highly statistically significant (p = 0.000)
and explain 12 – 35% of the variance of carbon storage. My models were well-specified
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as no violation of multiple regression assumptions were reported through residual
diagnostic tests. The Ramsay Regression Specification Error test showed that there was
no possibility of non-linearity of the residuals (p ≥ 0.540); the Breusch-Pagan test ruled
out the possibility of heteroscedasticity (p ≥ 0.309); Cook’s Distance indicated the lack of
strong influence of any observation (values range from 0.00 to 0.17); and the values of
VIF range from 1.06 – 2.53, which rejects the possibility of multicollinearity.
My models demonstrated mixed results in relation to my hypotheses. Results showed that
collective action drivers either positively or negatively explained or did not explain
carbon storage in Nepalese forest commons, indicating that better collective action does
not store additional carbon in the current setting. This result is in line with other study
results using the same data but different methods (e.g., Bluffstone et al. 2015; Chapter 3).
Models 1, 2 and 3 demonstrate that the public audit positively explains carbon storage;
change of community’s practice of public audit from “no” to “yes” increased carbon
storage by 41.54 tons per hectare. However, this result is true in the case of the absence
of conditional variables particularly NDVI 1989, which, when included in the model,
dampened the significant relationship of public audit and carbon storage.
As hypothesized, the proportion of households engaged in the management of forest
commons were consistently and positively correlated with carbon storage in four models
only when I included NDVI 1998 (i.e., Models 4, 5, 6 and 7). These models showed an
increase in each proportion of households participating in the management of forest
commons increased carbon storage by 37.18 – 41.14 tons per hectare.

156

Table 5.6 Multivariate regression explaining carbon stock.
Coefficients and standard errors are given in the parentheses. Significance codes are – “***” = 0.01; “**” = 0.05 and “*” = 0.1. I checked the regression
results replacing “distance to district headquarter” to “distance to roadhead”, but I found that the regression results are still insignificant.
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Conservation duration
-3.63 *** (1.30)
-3.17**(1.28) -2.97***(1.19) -2.22* (1.19)
-2.43**(1.17)
-2.48**(1.19)
-2.48* (1.27)
Participating households
41.26 (25.28)
37.79 (24.58)
37.63 (22.87) 37.18* (22.29)
41.14*(22.27)
40.89*(22.38)
40.43*(22.75)
Rules modification
-28.34 (25.50)
-19.03(24.98) -38.59 (23.65) -36.89 (23.06) -38.47*(22.59) -38.20*(22.71)
-37.98(22.89)
Penalty system
-54.20
-70.52**
-50.82
-71.43**
-74.18**
-74.61**
-74.30**
(33.37)
(32.90)
(30.62)
(30.79)
(30.21)
(30.38)
(30.63)
Public audit
41.54*** (13.83) 42.47***(13.43) 22.26*(13.29) 21.33 (12.96)
18.69 (13.11)
19.15 (13.31)
19.63 (13.46)
Mutual trust
4.59 (15.43)
6.29 (15.00)
6.63 (13.96)
5. 97 (13.60)
9.92 (13.41)
10.38 (13.60)
10.26 (13.72)
Terai
36.53***(12.65) 17.52 (12.52)
9.85 (12.52
10.41 (12.27)
11.21 (12.75)
4.86 (19.76)
Forest area
0.19***(0.04) 0.16***(0.04)
0.17***(0.04)
0. 17***(0.04)
0.17***(0.04)
NDVI1990
191.81***
161.68**
161.01**
160.94**
(70.50)
(70.03)
(70.37)
(70.94)
Indigenous population
-47.58**(18.34) -48. 16**(18.90) -48.42**(19.07)
Group household
0.01 (0.01)
0.01 (0.01)
0.00 (0.01)
Headquarter distance
1.26 (5.24)
1.81 (5.63)
Altitude
-0.002 (0.02)
Slope
-0.26 (0.77)
Constant
67.45 94.08* (48.08)
177.74 *** 127.25 (12.65)
133.13 ***
91.50* 99.48* (53.04)
(43.50)
(42.57)
(48.00)
(49.45)
Residual standard error
71.08
69.04
64.24
62.61
61.29
61.54
62.02
Adjusted R-squared
0.1268
0.1759
0.2866
0.3226
0.3506
0.3454
0.3352
F statistic
4.121
4.935
7.479
7.822
7.332
6.672
5.645
Degree of freedom
123
122
121
120
118
117
115
P-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Ramsey test (p-value)
0.34 (0.711)
0.62 (0.540)
0.22 (0.806)
0.42 (0.661)
0.27 (0.763)
0.25 (0.781)
0.17(0.843)
BP test (p-value)
4.71 (0.582)
6.90 (0.439)
9.07 (0.336) 10.06 (0.346)
12.29 (0.342)
13.21 (0.354)
16.07 (0.309)
Cook’s D
0.00-0.13
0.00-0.12
0.00-0.14
0.00-0.17
0.00-0.13
0.00-0.12
0.00-0.11
VIF
1.07-1.81
1.07-1.81
1.09-1.81
1.15-1.82
1.06-1.89
1.12-1.90
1.12-3.25
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Surprisingly, in opposition to my hypotheses, the number of years communities managed
the forest was negatively correlated with carbon storage both in the case of absence or
presence of conditioning variables. My estimates of 2.22 to 3.63 ton carbon per hectare
reduction with each year of increase in community engagement in forest conservation
was significant (p = < 0.1, <0.05). This result is in line with the finding of Anderson and
Agrawal (2011) who showed, by taking cross-country data, a negative association of
forest quality with the number of years communities engaged in forest conservation. This
result reflects the unique historical context of Nepalese community forestry program in
that degraded forests were formally handed over to local communities for management
(Kanel & Shrestha, 2001).
The communities’ ability to change the rules did not have significant effect on carbon
storage while controlling Terai and forest area. However, when I controlled the NDVI
1989, unexpectedly the effect became negative (i.e., reduction of 36.89 to 38.47 tons of
carbon per hectare for each point increase in NDVI 1989). This indicates the possibility
of spurious effects.
The existence of penalty systems in the community was consistently negatively
correlated with carbon storage (except Model 2); once a community adopted a penalty
system, the quantity of carbon was reduced from 50.82 to 74.18 tons per hectare. The
reduction was lower when controlling for the effects of Terai and forest area. The
reductions increase either without conditioning variables (i.e., Model 1) or with the
presence of more conditioning variables (i.e., Models 4, 5, 6 and 7). The negative
association of penalty systems with carbon storage contradicts the findings of Chhatre
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and Agrawal (2008), who demonstrated a positive association between local enforcement
and forest quality. This result also indicates the possibility of spurious effects.
Mutual trust among the households within a forest-managing community did not explain
the variation in carbon storage. This finding is consistent with and without conditioning
variables and probably contradicts the finding of Gibson et al. (1999) and Alcorn &
Toledo (1998) who argued that different measures of social capital explain the condition
and management success of local forests. I included mutual trust in the models because of
its theoretical significance for future analysis.
Seven out of eight conditioning variables (i.e., Terai, forest area, NDVI1989, proportion
of indigenous population, distance from district headquarters, altitude and slope) had the
expected sign, confirming the hypothesized direction of relationship between these
variables and carbon storage. However, their estimate of unbiased coefficients and level
of significance markedly vary. For instance, the estimated coefficients of forest area were
significant; it was evident that each additional hectare of forest area increased carbon
storage by 0.17 - 0.19 tons per hectare. Similarly, the estimated coefficients of NDVI
1989 were significant and evident that each additional number in index increased carbon
storage by 160.94 – 191.81 tons per hectare. These results of forest area and NDVI reflect
that carbon storage is increased as the quality of forest increased. Similar results were
reported by Beyene et al. (2013). My results showed that carbon storage was sensitive to
the presence of indigenous populations, with each additional proportion of indigenous
population decreasing carbon by 47.16 - 47.58 tons per hectare. The effects of two-way
travel time to district headquarters, altitude and slope were not significant in explaining
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the variation in carbon storage. The total number of households had an unexpected sign,
but this variable was also not significant in explaining carbon storage.
Per hectare carbon storage is primarily driven by baseline ecological conditions reflected
by forest area and NDVI. Ecological conditions influence the biological potential and
physical space for carbon storage. For instance, a higher carbon baseline enhances the
biological potential of carbon storage while providing smaller physical space for carbon
storage. The larger forest commons could have more undisturbed or less-disturbed forest
that potentially saved larger sized trees. Such larger trees are highly correlated with
carbon storage.
My models showed that conditioning variables such as Terai, forest area, NDVI and
proportion of indigenous population are significantly correlated with carbon (Table 5.5).
This indicates that these variables captured the unobserved effects of collective action
drivers that explain their relations with carbon storage. In addition, these variables also
explain other factors unrelated to collective action such as climate. As I am not interested
in analyzing these details, I do not view this issue as a problem. However, I cannot rule
out the possibility of empirical effects of the potential confounders that affect my
conditioning variables. As I mentioned earlier in the model specification section (5.2.2.2),
it is very difficult to envision exogenous factors that strongly affect both collective
actions and carbon storage.
While comparing different models, I found that conditioning variables have important
implications. It could be because they were associated with both carbon and collective
action (Appendix C). This indicates that there are some unobserved aspects of collective
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action captured by conditioning variables that explain these correlations. For instance, all
community forest user groups (CFUGs) need to carry out public audits (MoFSC, 2008);
the forestry officials closely monitor and ensure that the larger CFUGs comply with the
rule. This is also evident in my data that the public audit has positive, significant
associations with forest area (ρ = 0.27, p = 0.002) and number of households in the
community (ρ = 0.29, p = 0.001).
5.4 Conclusion
My study contributes to the recently emerging literature on understanding the relationship
between collective action drivers and carbon storage (e.g., Beyene et al., 2013; Chazdon
2008; Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009; Ranganathan et al., 2008) where several aspects are still
unknown. As collective action can be contextual and measured in different ways,
understanding its relationship with carbon storage may vary considerably. By using the
data from nationally representative samples of formal community forests, informal forest
commons and their corresponding forest user groups and households, I specifically
analyzed the relationships between key collective action drivers and carbon storage both
in the absence and presence of conditioning variables.
I found that different collective action drivers of Nepalese forest commons have both
favorable and constraining implications for carbon storage. For instance, proportion of
household participation in forest management activities and the existence of public audit
have positive, and the number of years communities conserved the forest, the ability of
communities to modify the rules and the existence of penalty systems have surprisingly
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negative, implications on carbon storage. I also found that the conditioning variables had
differential impacts on the coefficient and significance of collective action drivers. They
either enhanced or dampened or had a neutral effect on the coefficients and significance
of collective action drivers. In aggregate, collective action in Nepalese forest commons is
not going to explain or yield carbon. However, my results are indicative and they should
be considered preliminary because of potential endogeneity, which was not possible to
rule out completely.
My results also indicate the possibility of weak and ineffective implementation and
monitoring of collective actions in the management of forest carbon in the Nepalese
forest commons. Results also indicate that explicit policies and programs that seek to
enhance carbon by steering collective action in a direction that lead to carbon storage are
critical. In other words, the Nepalese government may need to pay more attention to
strengthen collective action towards enhancing carbon storage so as to make the REDD+
program a success.
My study does not identify specific causal mechanisms although the relationships
between collective action drivers and carbon storage were examined. Rather, it clearly
points out the urgency of attention for further in-depth research, incorporating other
collective action drivers and controlling possible bias due to endogeneity. It also suggests
the need to rethink and improve collective action practices in Nepalese forest commons
in order to contribute to the global environment through emission reduction and carbon
storage.
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Chapter 6: A synthesis of the research
6.1 Introduction
With an aim to inform emerging forest policies that contribute to mitigate climate change,
promote biodiversity conservation and support local scale ecosystem services, I draw
overall conclusions to my research in this chapter. I specifically highlight the ways that
forest commons could ecologically and socio-economically contribute to and/or constrain
the contemporary global environmental initiatives such as REDD+. I synthesize the main
arguments of my research, demonstrate their linkages with the REDD+ initiatives in
Nepal and forest commons literature, and indicate the areas for future inquiry.
Specifically, I examined Nepalese forest commons for their contributions to carbon
sequestration, biodiversity conservation, equity in benefit sharing, policy provisions and
institutional practices. I examined these aspects of forest commons taking an
interdisciplinary and multi-scale approach. My research offers important insights into
both ongoing policy processes regarding REDD+ in Nepal and the theory and action of
forest commons in general.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The next section outlines how the research
problem is contextualized within Nepal’s forest commons. Section three talks about
chapter-wise main findings of the research. Section four highlights the broader
relevance, theoretical and methodological contributions, and policy and management
implications of findings. Finally, section five signals the future direction of inquiry.
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6.2 Contextualizing the research
The global community has put in place agreements to address environmental challenges.
For instance, the global community designed and agreed on the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) to address climate change and biodiversity loss, respectively. These
initiatives clearly recognize the importance of tropical forests to sequester carbon and
conserve biodiversity (Clark et al., 2001; Mittermeier et al., 2004; Pan et al., 2011;
Parmentier et al., 2007; Philips et al., 1998). These agreements need to operate in a
context where over a billion local forest users control approximately 15.5% of global
forests for the supply of forest products and local ecosystem services, and the trend of
community control is increasing as a result of decentralization reforms, particularly in
tropical, developing countries (Charnley & Poe, 2007; Larson & Soto, 2008; RRI, 2014;
Sunderlin et al., 2008). Scholars have indicated that equity in benefit sharing, appropriate
policy provisions and acceptable institutional practices of forest management and carbon
sequestration are critical to ensure forest commons contribute to global environmental
initiatives.
There is an acute shortage of empirical, evidence-based knowledge that informs practical
policies, management plans and incentive mechanisms to support global environmental
initiatives at national and local scales. For instance, inadequate empirical knowledge of
the relationship between carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation in tropical
forests (Midgley et al., 2010; Szwagrzyk & Gazda, 2007; Talbot, 2010; Thompson et al.,
2011) raised questions about the potential contribution of biodiversity conservation (or
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CBD) to carbon sequestration (or REDD+) and vice versa (Miles & Dickson, 2010;
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2011). Similarly, potential
contributions of formal, more-organized forest commons (i.e., community forestry) to
REDD+ and CBD have been unknown due to a lack of robust knowledge on the
effectiveness of such forestry on carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation and
equitable benefit sharing. Past studies have identified inconclusive and conflicting results
in understanding the relationships between decentralization policies and institutions on
local socio-ecological systems, including collective actions and carbon sequestration.
I assessed the ecological, socio-economic and institutional dynamics of Nepalese forest
commons to inform contemporary Nepal’s international environmental initiatives,
particularly REDD+. The Nepalese government has decided to adopt the REDD+
program to contribute to climate change mitigation. It also expects to achieve co-benefits,
including biodiversity conservation and socio-economic benefits, from the REDD+
initiative. A range of international non-governmental organizations and donors have been
supporting the country’s preparations for REDD+ including formulating REDD+
strategy, developing institutional mechanisms, and building capacity of grassroots
stakeholders and forest-managing communities. Nepalese forest commons provided
excellent research sites and offered a unique learning ground to bring wide ranges of
ecological and socio-economic issues into the analysis, as Nepal hosts a wide range of
geographic locations, climatic patterns, forest types, socio-cultural practices, economic
status, and policy and institutional provisions. Also, Nepal provides a long history of
forest commons, both formal and informal, where nearly half of the country’s population
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is directly engaged in the management of forest commons. Nepalese forest commons are
critical components of subsistence livelihoods of local communities and local
environmental services. Despite high pressure for land use change and D&D, they have
potential to contribute to the global environmental initiatives in different ways such as
sequestering carbon, conserving biodiversity, and accumulating lessons that can be used
in similar contexts beyond the country.
6.3 Main findings
My research confirmed and expanded upon previous studies within the interdisciplinary
arena of human-environment interactions. My findings demonstrated the importance of
interdisciplinary (e.g., through an ecological, econometric, social and institutional) and
multi-scale (e.g., local, landscape and national) approaches of inquiry in examining and
explaining the ecological and socio-economic contributions of forest commons such as
carbon storage, biodiversity conservation, equity in benefit sharing and collective action
drivers. My findings expanded the current qualitatively-researched knowledge through
quantitative research on the (i) relationships of carbon and biodiversity, (ii) effects of
formal forestry decentralization on carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation and
benefit sharing, and (iii) relationships between carbon sequestration and drivers of
collective action including policy and institution.
My findings clearly indicated that the Nepalese forest commons have potential to
contribute to global environmental initiatives including REDD+ and CBD. However, the
level of contribution may be different based on the geographic and topographic contexts,
management regimes and forest qualities.
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6.3.1 Relationships between carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation
In chapter Two I assessed biodiversity, carbon and their relationships. My assessments
bring critical insights for researchers, policy makers and practitioners working at global,
national and local levels. My results demonstrated that Nepalese forests have potential to
increase carbon storage and biodiversity conservation. As carbon and biodiversity
fluctuate across altitude, slope and canopy cover, these are critical factors for planning
and implementing forestry projects including REDD+.
My results showed comparable carbon sequestration (98.34±4.19 Mg C ha-1) with other
field-based regional studies (e.g., Baral et al., 2009; Gurung et al., 2015; Pandey et al.,
2014;), which is higher than the IPCC default value (90 Mg ha-1). Variations in carbon
sequestration across geographic and topographic regions reflected differential site quality,
climatic factors, topographic conditions and past disturbances. Variations also indicated
the possibility of increased carbon sequestration with dedicated forest management
interventions in the future. I found that carbon sequestration decreased with increased
altitude and slopes. The opposite is true for canopy cover, which has a positive
relationship with carbon sequestration. My results showed that biodiversity increased
with canopy cover but there was no change across altitudes and slopes. Plot-level
biodiversity variations indicated the existence of a wide range of variables
simultaneously affecting the distribution of biodiversity.
I found complex and varied relationships of carbon with different indices of biodiversity
at the national level and across geographic and topographic regions and in forests with
different canopy covers. Such results primarily reflected the existence of a complex
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network of interactions between wide ranges of co-varying abiotic and biotic
environmental factors that affect different dimensions of both biodiversity and carbon.
However, my study indicated the possibility of synergies between carbon-forestry and
biodiversity conservation. It is evident from the fact that species richness and effective
number of species were weakly positively correlated with carbon sequestration. This
finding reflected earlier findings (e.g., Nadrowski et al., 2010; Potvin et al., 2011;
Thompson et al., 2009) and showed the relevance of interspecific complementarity
through niche differentiations or moisture conservation between species. However, I
found negative or no correlations of carbon with equitability index. I also found skewed
carbon sequestration on some species (i.e., 3% of species contain 84% of the carbon).
6.3.2 Effectiveness of formal forest decentralization on carbon sequestration and
biodiversity conservation
In chapter Three I examined the effectiveness of formal forest commons, the CFP, on
biodiversity conservation and carbon storage. My results indicated that the CFP has a
positive effect on biodiversity at the national level. However, I found mixed and
differential - positive, negative and no- effects of CFP on biodiversity conservation
across geographic and topographic regions and in forests with different canopy covers.
The CF in lower and higher slopes, in Terai districts, and in open canopies had positive
effects on biodiversity conservation. However, the CF had a negative effect on the higher
altitudes and an insignificant effect in the hills, lower altitudes and closed canopies. My
positive biodiversity estimates reflect the contribution of CFP in revitalizing degraded
forestlands (Gautam et al., 2002; Luintel et al., 2009), while negative biodiversity
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indicates the communities’ preference for valuable species and selective harvesting
(Acharya, 2004) and higher pressure in the CFs.
In terms of carbon sequestration, my results indicated that the CFP has a negative effect
on carbon at the national level. However, I found mixed and differential - positive,
negative and no- effects of CFP on carbon storage across geographic and topographic
regions and in forests with different canopy covers. There were significant positive
effects of CFP in the open canopies and the lower slopes. On the contrary, there were
negative effects of CFP in the higher slopes and the higher altitudes. My carbon estimates
were unexpected and complex, both reflecting and contradicting the earlier findings of
Bluffstone et al. (2015), which concluded that the CFP effect was not significant. All the
results for both biodiversity and carbon were sensitive to the unobserved confounders.
However, the level of sensitivity was higher for the negative results.
My results should be viewed in the context of the objectives and management practices in
CF, the disturbance regime, the base carbon stock in CF and NCF, and spillover effect of
CFP on NCF, all of which might not have been well captured in the observed
confounders. My results demonstrated that the CFP can be an effective forest
management strategy to contribute to global ecosystem services including biodiversity
conservation and carbon sequestration. They also pointed out the inadequacy of
evaluating the effect of CFP at the national scale to identify local effects.
6.3.3 Effectiveness of formal forest decentralization on equity in benefit sharing
In chapter Four I examined the effectiveness of formal forest commons, the CFP, on
equity in benefit sharing at the household level. My results indicated that the CFP has a
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positive effect on equity at the national level, across social groups (i.e., poor, dalit,
women-headed households, indigenous peoples) and hills. However, I found no effect of
CFP on equity in Terai. My positive equity estimates reflect the contribution of CFP to
better governance and equitable benefits (Luintel et al., 2009, Luintel 2006; McDermott
& Schreckenberg, 2009; Persha & Anderson, 2014; Pokharel & Nurse 2004; Pokharel et
al., 2007;) and the implementation of community forestry guidelines (Ministry of Forest
and Soil Conservation, 2008), while no effect on equity in Terai indicates the lack of
effort on the part of communities managing community forests and support agencies in
the region in adequately addressing benefit-sharing issues (Bhattarai, 2006; Birendra et
al., 2014). All results were moderately to highly sensitive to unobserved confounders.
The level of sensitivity to unobserved variables was higher for dalits and lower for
indigenous peoples.
My results should be viewed in the context of the socio-cultural practice of resource
sharing in Nepalese society and the spillover effect of CFP on NCF. My results strongly
demonstrate that the CFP can be an effective forest management strategy to contribute to
making REDD+ benefit sharing equitable across the country and social groups such as
poor, dalit, indigenous and women-headed households and households in the hills. They
also point to the relevance of evaluating the effect of CFP at the national scale as well as
across geographic regions and social groups to identify local effects.
6.3.4 Examination of policy and institutional drivers of carbon sequestration
In chapter Five I assessed the relationships between collective action drivers and carbon
sequestration. My assessments bring critical insight for researchers, policy makers and
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practitioners, and particularly to those who are working at national and local levels. My
results demonstrate that collective action drivers may have positive, neutral or negative
relationships with carbon sequestration. The conditioning variables may have
considerable (either statistically significant or insignificant) effects in shaping those
relationships. They either enhance or dampen the relationships between collective action
drivers and carbon sequestration to a certain degree.
My results suggest that theoretical expectations and earlier findings of forest commons
governance research may not always be true in all cases. My findings also indicate the
possibility of weak and ineffective implementation and monitoring of collective action in
the management of forest carbon in Nepalese forest commons. My study suggests the
need for context-specific in-depth research that considers additional dimensions of
collective action to aid in the practical relevance of my research. It also suggests the need
for rethinking and improving collective action practices in Nepalese forest commons to
contribute to the global environment through emissions reduction and carbon
sequestration.
6.4 Relevance, contributions and implications of findings
6.4.1 Broader relevance
My research findings have broader relevance from both spatial and temporal
perspectives. Although my research was based on Nepalese forest commons, results from
this work are applicable to other regions, particularly in the tropical, developing countries
where formal and/or informal forest commons are in practice. In such countries, the
governments are also adopting formal decentralization of forest, and therefore, better
171

understanding of the relationships among the driving processes becomes crucial. I
suggest careful adaptation of my findings by extracting the idea to suit particular
ecological and socio-economic contexts. My aggregated national results and
disaggregated results from across the geographic and topographic regions and forests of
different canopy covers provide a broad range of lessons for adaptation in different
spatial contexts. By providing detailed descriptions of the study regions, future
comparisons of my results can also be made. My results will be valuable to others
evaluating forest management alternatives in the face of climate change currently and/or
in the future.
My research findings suggest the possibility of synergy between two global
environmental initiatives, CBD and REDD+. However, care should be taken at the
national and local levels while formulating policies, preparing management plans and
implementing the plans. Dedicated policy provisions, management plans and actions are
critical to achieve synergistic effects of these two global initiatives.
6.4.2 Theoretical and methodological contributions
My research is intended to add to the slowly growing interdisciplinary and multi-scale
research approaches to socio-ecological systems building on multiple disciplines and
scales to examine larger human-environment relationships (e.g., Berkes & Folke, 1998,
1994). Principally, it adds to the emerging literature and theoretical propositions
regarding forest commons management in the context of climate change (Beyene et al.,
2013; Chazdon 2008; Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009; Ranganathan et al., 2008). It specifically
demonstrates the use of biophysical, socio-economic, policy and institutional information
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to broaden understanding of human actions on forest resources. My research integrates
the biophysical information from the tree, plot, forest and larger spatial scales and socioeconomic and institutional information from the household and community levels. It
empirically demonstrates that decentralized forestry and/or communities’ engagement in
the management of forest could have positive impacts on global environmental outcomes
such as biodiversity and carbon sequestration, while fulfilling local forest product needs.
It also strengthens the possibility of differential environmental outcomes across space,
management regimes and forest qualities, and therefore supports the arguments made for
sub-national policies and landscape-level management of forests. In the context of the
slowly growing literature on the impact of forestry decentralization, my research brings
robust findings and therefore provides strong evidence for policy effectiveness.
My research provides novel methods for evaluating the communities’ contributions to
global environmental initiatives. I employed robust methods to reduce the bias in
estimates and strengthened the claim that I have measured the causal effects of formal
decentralization of Nepalese forests. My research is one of the pioneer studies in
examining the impact of formal forest decentralization. In particular, the evaluation of
global environmental outcomes such as biodiversity conservation and carbon storage,
instead of socio-economic benefits at the local level, is a novel idea that I brought into the
analysis. A mix of data across scales (e.g., tree to landscape level and household to
national level) and disciplines (e.g., ecology, socio-economic and policy) brought
methodological insights to using multi-scale and interdisciplinary data in examining
complex relationships of humans and nature. I demonstrated the complementarities and
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synergy of interdisciplinary, multi-scale and multi-source data of quantitative and
qualitative natures. The disaggregated analysis across geographic and topographic
regions, management regimes and forest qualities demonstrated the relevance of policy
and management of forest commons across spatial scales. It also showed how nationallevel aggregated results can mislead regional or sub-national findings. My research is one
of the first studies to examine the impact of formal decentralization of Nepalese forestry
by using nationally representative data and robust analytical analysis. Therefore, it
contributes by setting the stage for further studies on natural resource policy evaluation in
Nepal and beyond.
6.4.3 Policy and management implications
My estimates of carbon are conservative (i.e., they include only above ground live tree
and sapling) and therefore may be used to guide future research. These estimates may
need to be revised for the purpose of incentivizing forest-managing communities under
REDD+. The existing biodiversity and possible increase of carbon in the Nepalese forest
commons clearly indicates the ability of forest-managing communities to contribute
positively to the CBD and REDD+ initiatives. The higher estimates of carbon while using
field-based methods than that of the IPCC’s biome average indicated the possibilities of
more financial incentives for forest-managing communities through REDD+ program if
they use field-based methods. Nepalese forest-managing communities could gain more
benefits, including local employment opportunities by mobilizing their field-level
resource persons to monitor carbon sequestration at the forest level.
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The weak, positive correlations between biodiversity and carbon show the possibility of
increasing the number and abundance of species by carbon-forestry, indicating the
possibility of synergy between CBD and REDD+. However, my finding of skewed
biodiversity in some species and negative associations of carbon with species evenness
warns of the possibility of constraining biodiversity conservation and promotion.
Therefore, dedicated and appropriate policy provisions and institutional mechanisms and
management interventions will be critical to safeguard biodiversity conservation in
carbon-forestry. Forest-managing communities may need to adapt their forest
management decisions and interventions to make both REDD+ and CBD effective in
achieving their goals. Careful and site-specific planning, proper implementation and
periodic monitoring of silvicultural activities are critical to ensure synergy between
carbon and biodiversity outcomes and thereby promote climate mitigation, biodiversity
conservation and other ecosystem services in the long-run. The differential relations of
carbon with biodiversity indices indicate that the policy makers and forest-managing
communities need to clarify which components of biodiversity (e.g., richness, abundance
or evenness) they are prioritizing.
As the formal forest commons is a viable approach towards incentivizing communities
(Agrawal, 2007; Agrawal & Gupta, 2005; Agrawal & Ostrom, 2008, 2001), policy
makers and planners can promote formal decentralization in order to solicit local
communities’ contributions for promoting biodiversity conservation and carbon
sequestration. Disaggregated data would provide useful insights for regional or landscape
level planning for community forest management. The forest-managing communities
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may strengthen and/or revise the already tested landscape approach to forest management
to promote carbon sequestration without compromising biodiversity conservation
potentials.
6.5 Future areas of inquiry
There are several unresolved research questions that would increase the scientific
understanding of environmental outcomes of forest commons in tropical, developing
countries. I suggest some of the critical research areas that stemmed from, but remained
outside the scope of, my research. The high variabilities of biodiversity, carbon and their
relationships warrant further in-depth research to understand their dynamics (e.g., Day et
al., 2013; Thompson et al., 2012). Such research at different spatial and temporal scales
would enhance our scientific understanding to a great extent. Use of information about
functional and evolutionary diversities, adaptive capacity of forests, impact of forest
management modalities and all pools of carbon may help refine understanding of
relationships between biodiversity and carbon.
A locally specific approach to explore key drivers of heterogeneity in ecological
outcomes of forest commons is crucial to help make policy and management plans of
biodiversity- and carbon-focused forestry effective. Landscape level assessments of CFP
effectiveness may add value in informing locally suitable planning and management. The
examination of the effects of different management interventions and/or silvicultural
practices is another prime area for future research. Equally important is to explore the
connection of forest resources with livelihood adaptation. Locally specific forest-based
adaptation could be helpful to promote resource conservation and livelihoods for which
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study about cross-cultural comparison and traditional ecological knowledge becomes
crucial (Spoon, 2013, 2014).
Long-term, ongoing data collection and research may need to be institutionalized to
resolve the issues of perplexing changes in biodiversity and carbon. Researchers can
continue to test, validate and review the findings of my research over time and with
increasing amounts of data. A good mix of biophysical and social surveys, in-depth
qualitative interviews, and robust statistical analyses may help elucidate critical
relationships between local forest management practices and global environmental
initiatives.
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Appendix A. Covariate wise before and after matching standardized difference of mean
Covariates
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Covariates
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Note: overall= overall forest of the country, lower altitude = <1000m, higher altitude = ≥1000m, lower slope = <15 degree, higher slope = ≥15 degree, open
canopy=<50%, closed canopy= ≥50%, Terai= political districts of southern plain land, hill= political districts except southern plain land.
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Appendix B. Covariate wise before and after matching standardized difference of mean
Covariates
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Appendix C. Exploratory regression of independent variables.
Variables in the top row were considered as dependent (Y) and in the first column as independent (X). Coefficient (p- values) are reported.
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--

Slope

0.17
(0.435)
0.92
(0.784)
4.51
(0.254)
8.56
(0.124)
0.95
(0.679)
-0.14
(0.955)
-19.10
(0.000)
-0.02
(0.013)
-29.17
(0.019)
1.69
(0.646)
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(0.000)
0.01
(0.000)

208

